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“Uncertainty cannot be dismissed so easily in the analysis of optimizing investor behavior. An 
investor who knew future returns with certainty would invest in only one security, namely the 
one with the highest future return. If several securities had the same, highest, future return 
then the investor would be indifferent between any of these, or any combination of these. In 
no case would the investor actually prefer a diversified portfolio.” (Markowitz, 1991) 
The question of whether the future value of capital market instruments can be forecasted – 
in order to be able to solely invest in securities with the best possible performance – has 
been the subject of a controversial debate for decades (Lakonishok, 1980; Dimson and 
Marsh, 1984; Fraser and MacDonald, 1993; Krag, 1995; Henze, 2004; Spiwoks, 2004; Benke, 
2006; Spiwoks, 2009; Söderlind, 2010). Many of the investigations on forecasting compe-
tence carried out until now have led to sobering results.  
Markowitz’ portfolio theory (1952) is therefore still considered to be definitive for invest-
ment decisions. In his groundbreaking work Portfolio Selection, Markowitz showed that for 
risk-averse investors it is usually meaningful to divide their assets up across a range of secu-
rities. Nevertheless, in practice investors frequently hold highly under-diversified portfolios 
(see, for example, Anderson 2013; Hibbert, Lawrence and Prakash 2012; Goetzmann and 
Kumar, 2008; Meulbroek, 2005; Polkovnichenko, 2005; Huberman and Sengmueller, 2004; 
Agnew, Balduzzi and Sundén, 2003; Guiso, Haliassos and Japelli, 2002; Benartzi, 2001; 
Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Barber and Odean, 2000; Bode, van Echelpoel and Sievi, 1994; 
Blume and Friend, 1975; Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum, 1974). 
There are many possible reasons for securities portfolios not being optimally diversified. 
Experimental economic research in particular has shown that heuristics and cognitive distor-
tions can influence the behavior of investors significantly. This can also make meaningful 
portfolio diversification significantly more difficult: The correlations between investment 
alternatives are frequently neglected by investors. Considerable empirical evidence already 
exists for this phenomenon of correlation neglect (see, for example, Gubaydullina and 
Spiwoks, 2015; Eyster and Weizsäcker, 2010; Hedesstrom et al., 2006; Benartzi and Thaler, 
2001). Many investors distribute their assets evenly across all of the investment alternatives 
available. This phenomenon, which is known as the 1/N heuristic, is a special form of correla-
tion neglect. In the meantime, there are also significant empirical findings on this issue (see, 
for example, Fernandes 2013; Morrin et al., 2012; Baltussen and Post, 2011; Hedesstrom et 
al., 2006, and Benartzi and Thaler, 2001). Many investors allow themselves to be misled by 
irrelevant information, or attach too much importance to certain items of information (cf. 
Gubaydullina and Spiwoks, 2015; Kallir and Sonsino, 2009; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008). 
Investment decisions are also frequently skewed by an inappropriately strong focus on do-
mestic financial instruments. This phenomenon is known as home bias, and has been proven 
empirically (cf. Weber et al., 2005; Poterba, 2003; Mitchell and Utkus, 2002). Many investors 
also tend to see patterns, where in reality there are none. This often leads to random pro-
cesses being dealt with inappropriately. In this way, the so-called gambler’s fallacy can im-
pede optimal decisions on diversification (see, for example, Stöckl et al., 2015; Huber et al., 
2010). Emotions can also exert an enormous influence on investment decisions. Grable and 
Roszkowski (2008), for example, showed in an experimental study that subjects who pos-
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sessed predominately positive emotions were willing to take greater financial risks. Kuhnen 
and Knutson (2011) carried out experiments to establish how different moods affected in-
vestment decisions. This revealed that subjects with predominantly negative emotions tend 
to choose low-risk investments, while subjects with predominantly positive emotions tended 
to favour riskier investments. Subjects whose emotions are positive are more optimistic in 
relation to their investment decisions. Kaplanski et al. (2015) showed that the mood of in-
vestors had an influence on their expectations in terms of returns, and on their perception of 
risk. The happier the subjects were, the greater were their expectations of their returns, and 
the lower the presumed risk. Experiments carried out by Lee and Andrade (2014) showed 
that negative affects promote risk aversion in investment decisions. 
Additional research efforts in this field can be found in this dissertation. In particular, the 
influence of heuristics and cognitive distortions such as the status-quo bias, herd behavior, 
gambler's fallacy, overconfidence bias, and last but not least the influence of emotions on 
diversification behavior, are examined here. In addition, a new procedure for determining 
risk preference is presented, and finally the forecasting skills of analysts in the Asia-Pacific 
region are studied. 
First contribution – Portfolio Diversification: The Influence of Herding, Status-Quo Bias and 
Gambler's Fallacy 
In the last two decades, experimental economic research has identified some heuristics and 
cognitive distortions (such as the 1/N heuristic, home bias, mental accounting or the illusion 
of control) which can contribute towards sub-optimal portfolio diversification.1 However, 
there is still an enormous need for research.  
In the meantime there is a great deal of empirical evidence which shows that the phenome-
na of herd behavior, status-quo bias and gambler's fallacy can have a significant effect in 
many financial decision-making situations. In the case of herding behavior, subjects orien-
tate their actions towards those of others, and in this way a herd is formed. In the case of 
status-quo bias, subjects find it difficult to actively make decisions. Instead, they prefer to 
leave things as they are. In the case of gambler's fallacy, subjects try to use a sequence of 
random events to make deductions about future random events, although this is in fact im-
possible in the case of independent random events.  
However, these phenomena have not yet been investigated in connection with diversifica-
tion decisions. The second chapter (Portfolio Diversification: The Influence of Herding, Sta-
tus-Quo Bias and Gambler's Fallacy) therefore considers whether herd behavior (orientation 
towards the majority of one’s fellow players or towards the most successful player (guru)), 
status-quo bias or gambler’s fallacy provide suitable approaches for explaining why many 
subjects have sub-optimally diversified portfolios. 
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive overview see pages 2-3. 
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The experiment is loosely based on the approach used by Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015). 
The subjects have a choice between two entirely uncorrelated investment alternatives which 
are identical with regard to their expected returns and the risk involved. The two investment 
alternatives can both only lead to two events, which each have a probability of occurrence of 
50% and are based on a random process. In this situation, the efficient frontier is reduced to 
a single point (half each of the two investment alternatives), so that the exact extent of the 
risk aversion of the subjects has no influence on the optimal portfolio decision. A rational 
and risk-averse subject would therefore always have to choose a combination of half each of 
the two investment alternatives. 
In order to be able to examine possible herd behavior among the subjects, in Treatment 1 
the portfolios of all of the players and their investment performance so far are disclosed af-
ter each round and presented in a list. In this way, before the subjects might possibly re-
structure their portfolio, they obtain an overview of the composition of the portfolios of the 
majority of the subjects in the previous round, and can see the portfolio content selected by 
the most successful player up to now in the last round. In this way the subjects can align 
themselves with the opinion of the majority or that of the most successful player up to that 
point. In Treatment 2 the subjects receive no information about the behavior or the invest-
ment performance of the other participants. They are only informed about their own per-
formance, so there is no opportunity for them to align themselves with the majority opinion 
or with a guru. In order to shed more light on the aspect of status-quo bias, in Treatment 1 
the subjects received various portfolio compositions as a starter. In Treatment 3, on the oth-
er hand, all of the subjects received the optimal portfolio compositions as a starter. Even 
before the first round of the game, the subjects can recompose their portfolios free of 
charge. In order to detect a possible tendency towards gambler’s fallacy, the subjects were 
asked in all three treatments to explain the basis of their portfolio decisions.  
The strategy of always choosing half each of the two investment alternatives only represents 
the rational strategy in the case of risk-averse investors. Possible divergences from the ra-
tional strategy can therefore only be identified if the participants in the experiment are all 
risk-averse. This is why the Holt and Laury (2002) test was carried out with every single sub-
ject, and risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects were thus filtered out of the field of partici-
pants.  
It could be seen that the majority of portfolio decisions are not based on rational considera-
tions. In addition, we established that herd behavior does not make a significant contribu-
tion towards sub-optimal portfolio decisions. The subjects did not follow either the majority 
or the most successful investor (guru). The behavior of the subjects remained fragmented 
even in the final round. With regard to status-quo bias, the subjects did not retain their ini-
tial portfolios, and they very quickly disposed of their starter packages. Overall, in Treatment 
1 the optimal portfolio was not retained any longer than in Treatment 3. The strong diver-
gences from a rational strategy cannot therefore be explained by status-quo bias either.  
Ultimately it became clear that gambler's fallacy played an essential role in the explanation 
of the irrational behavior of the subjects. This phenomenon can be seen clearly if one ana-
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lyzes the portfolio decisions of the subjects and their justifications. Many subjects seemed to 
find patterns in a history of random events. However, gambler’s fallacy is indisputably also 
jointly responsible for many sub-optimal portfolio decisions. 
Second contribution – Emotions and Exposure to Risk: The Influence of Positive and Nega-
tive Emotions on Portfolio Decisions  
For a while now it has been clear that emotions also have an effect on decision-making in 
economic contexts. In recent years, the influence of the weather on market returns at stock 
exchanges throughout the world has also been thoroughly investigated. While doing so, at-
tempts were also made to create a connection between the weather on the one hand and 
the mood of capital market protagonists on the other. In some empirical studies, genuine 
correlations were established. Experimental economic research is therefore increasingly in-
terested in the question of which influence positive and negative emotions have on invest-
ment decisions. In the meantime there are a range of findings showing that the mood of 
investors can influence their investment decisions. However, as yet there have been no stud-
ies on whether the mood of investors also has an effect on their diversification behavior and 
thus on the exposure to risk in their portfolios. This research question is dealt with in the 
third chapter – Emotions and Exposure to Risk: The Influence of Positive and Negative Emo-
tions on Portfolio Decisions. 
The design of the experiment is loosely based on the work of Gubaydullina and Spiwoks 
(2015). Each subject has to make four investment decisions. In each task the subjects can 
choose between two different investment alternatives. The subjects have to compile a port-
folio which contains four shares. They profit from the dividend payments, which are based 
on a random process. In each task, four different portfolio compositions are possible which 
are identical with regard to the expected returns, but whose variance differs. The price 
movements of the two investment alternatives are ignored in order to create a decision-
making situation which is as clear as possible. Mood is influenced by positive film excerpts 
(in the positive treatment), negative ones (in the negative treatment) and neutral film ex-
cerpts (in the neutral treatment). After each film excerpt a manipulation check takes place in 
order to test whether the intended mood has actually been created among the subjects. In 
all three treatments it is only the film excerpts which differ. The rest of the experiment is the 
same in all three treatments. The Holt and Laury (2002) test was used to filter risk-neutral 
and risk-loving subjects out of the field of participants, because minimum variance portfolios 
represent the rational strategy only in the case of risk-averse subjects. 
It was shown that the deployment of the film excerpts led to the desired results. In each of 
the three treatments, the desired mood was predominant. To this extent, the approach was 
very well suited to answering the questions posed in an appropriate way. Overall, the results 
of the experiment reveal that only a small part of subjects take rational decisions – in other 
words they always choose the optimal portfolio. This is also reflected by an unnecessarily 
high-risk exposure. The subjects frequently fail to choose the minimum variance portfolio, 
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although all five portfolio alternatives always exhibit the same expectation value for the 
payment. A closer look at the results of the experiment shows that the mood of the subjects 
has an influence on their diversification behavior. This becomes clear when their risk expo-
sure is considered. The average risk exposure in the neutral treatment is significantly lower 
than in the positive treatment and the negative treatment. In addition, a neutral mood leads 
to the subjects obtaining higher risk-adjusted payoffs. The average risk-adjusted payment 
was significantly higher in the neutral treatment than in the positive and the negative treat-
ments. 
Third contribution – Measurement of Risk Preference 
In chapters two and three, new behavioral anomalies were identified which can be viewed 
as a reason for sub-optimal portfolio diversification. According to Markowitz’s (1952) portfo-
lio theory, a diversified portfolio is only meaningful for risk-averse subjects. In chapters two 
and three it was therefore necessary to precisely define the risk preferences of the subjects 
in order to filter risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects out of the field of participants, because 
decisions which can be absolutely meaningful for a risk-averse subject are frequently com-
pletely inconceivable for a risk-loving subject and vice-versa. The well-established Holt and 
Laury (2002) test was used to determine the risk preferences of the subjects. It can be seen, 
however, that Holt and Laury’s (2002) procedure to determine risk preference clearly also 
has its weaknesses. The decision-making situation is relatively complex, so that some sub-
jects do not decide according to their actual preference, and make rather spontaneous and 
ill-considered decisions (for similar observations see Jacobson and Petrie 2009, and Charmes 
and Viceisza 2011). In addition, clear results are not obtained in every case.2 The fourth 
chapter, Measurement of Risk Preference, deals precisely with this issue, and a new proce-
dure for the determination of risk preference is proposed. 
In order to exactly define the risk preference of the subjects, the following three features are 
taken into account in the new procedure. First of all, the new approach is simple and clear. 
The subjects know precisely which consequences their decisions will have. They have no rea-
son to make spontaneous and ill-considered decisions. Instead they can make conscious de-
cisions which correctly reflect their preferences. Secondly, it makes a clear differentiation 
between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects possible, which is by no means the 
case with the conventional procedures, and thirdly, it takes the influence of loss aversion on 
risk preference into account.  
The new procedure to determine risk preference is a decision between two lotteries. The 
subjects can choose between taking a card from pile A or one from pile B. Both piles consist 
of four playing cards each. The subjects are informed that the profit expectation in both piles 
is identical. In addition, the subjects are made aware of the fact that pile A leads to results 
which fluctuate slightly around the expected value (low-risk), while pile B leads to results 
                                                          
2 There are various procedures to determine risk preference which all exhibit certain weaknesses. For an over-
view see pages 100-107. 
- 7 - 
which fluctuate considerably around the expected value (high-risk). The subjects have three 
alternatives (pile A, pile B, or indifference as to whether the card is from A or B). This permits 
unambiguous conclusions about the three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-
neutral and risk-loving). In order to take the third property into account and to investigate 
the influence of loss aversion on risk preference in more detail, the new approach to estab-
lish risk preference is carried out in three variations. In Treatment 1 there is no possibility of 
loss, in Treatment 2 a small loss is possible, and in Treatment 3 there is the possibility of a 
large loss. 
The results were clear and are largely in line with our expectations. In Treatment 1 (no pos-
sibility of loss), less than half of the subjects chose the low-risk variation, and more than half 
of the subjects chose the high-risk variation. Only very few subjects were indifferent as to 
whether they chose pile A or pile B. In Treatment 2 (low possibility of loss), just under half of 
the subjects chose the low-risk variation, and less than half of the subjects chose the high-
risk variation. Here again, only a few subjects were indifferent to whether they chose pile A 
or pile B. In Treatment 3 (significant possibility of loss), however, loss aversion had a marked 
influence on risk preferences. Here, more than two-thirds of the subjects chose the low-risk 
variation, and much less than a third of the subjects chose the high-risk variation. Here 
again, only a few subjects were indifferent to whether they chose pile A or pile B.  
The results show in particular how important it is to provide an appropriate possibility of loss 
when determining risk preference. Only in this way can the risk preferences of the subjects 
be realistically determined and a clear differentiation made between risk-averse, risk-neutral 
and risk-loving subjects. 
Fourth contribution – The Accuracy of Interest Rate Forecasts in the Asia-Pacific Region: 
Opportunities for Portfolio Management 
Future interest rate trends are of key significance in portfolio management, because bond 
and share prices are significantly influenced by interest rates. If the general level of interest 
rates in an economy rises, the prices of most bonds will fall and vice-versa. If one wishes to 
take a critical look at the current market price of a share, one should establish its future fair 
value. And in order to establish the future fair value of a share, one has to forecast the pre-
dominant future interest rate level, because this simultaneously represents the future dis-
count rate in the determination of the fair value. It is therefore not surprising that the relia-
bility of interest rate forecasts is of great interest to academia and the world of business.  
In the last four decades, the quality of interest rate forecasts in the G7 states has already 
been abundantly researched. However, the results of these studies have largely been very 
sobering. Only very few studies considered the interest rate forecasts they analyzed to be 
largely reliable. There have only been a few studies which have dealt with interest rate fore-
casts for the Asia-Pacific region, and they do not provide a comprehensive impression of the 
reliability of the forecasts, because either the assessment criteria were insufficient or the 
period of investigation was too short. In the fifth chapter, The Accuracy of Interest Rate 
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Forecasts in the Asia-Pacific Region: Opportunities for Portfolio Management, we therefore 
take an in-depth look at the forecasting competence of analysts in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The study analyzes interest rate forecasts from eleven countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The forecast data used comes from the journal Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts, which is 
published on a monthly basis. We not only analyzed the consensus forecasts, but also the 
individual forecasts of the respective institutions. Overall a total of 85,264 forecasts were 
examined which were published in the period from 1990-2016. The large number of bench-
marks deployed in this empirical analysis enables a comprehensive assessment of the quality 
of the forecasts: (1) Comparison to a naïve forecast with the aid of the Diebold-Mariano test, 
(2) examination of the forecast direction with the help of the sign accuracy test, (3) examina-
tion for systematic forecast errors with the aid of the unbiasedness test, and (4) test for the 
presence of possible topically-oriented trend adjustments with aid of the TOTA coefficient. 
The results are very sobering in part. With a few exceptions, all of the forecast time series 
are characterized by the phenomenon of topically-oriented trend adjustment. This means 
that the overwhelming majority of all forecast time series reflect the present rather than the 
future. This is in line with previous studies (see, for example, Spiwoks et al., 2015; Spiwoks et 
al., 2010; Spiwoks et al., 2008). These results for topically-oriented trend adjustment are also 
reflected in the unbiasedness test. Almost all of the forecast time series proved to be biased. 
A comparison with the naïve forecast shows that only a small part of the forecast time series 
predicts the future interest rate trend in a significantly more precise way.  
However, some of the results of the study are also surprisingly positive. The sign accuracy 
test reveals that almost half of the forecast time series foresee the future trend (rising or 
falling interest rates) significantly better than a random walk forecast. This is a notable suc-
cess which is entirely in contrast to the forecast time series made in other parts of the world 
(see, for example, Spiwoks et al., 2008). Overall it can be stated that – at least in some of the 
countries – forecasts of future interest rate trends in the Asia-Pacific region are significantly 
more successful than those made in other parts of the world. This has consequences for 
portfolio management: It is conceivable that active portfolio management strategies based 
on these interest rate forecasts can lead to systematic excess returns in bond investments. 
Fifth contribution – Overconfidence: The Influence of Positive and Negative Affect 
In economics, overconfidence bias is viewed as one of the reasons for inefficient capital 
markets. Evidence for this phenomenon has already been found among various groups of 
individuals such as investors, managers, bankers and other important economic players (see, 
for example, Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2014; Menkhoff et al., 2013; Barber and Odean, 2001). 
And the influence of this behavioral anomaly on their portfolio decisions can be tremendous 
(cf. Deaves et al., 2009; Barber and Odean, 2001; Odean, 1999). However, until now only a 
few factors are known which might determine the extent of overconfidence. In addition, 
there are hardly any studies on whether positive or negative emotions have an influence on 
self-confidence. Whether emotions can impair possible learning effects in relation to self-
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assessment has not been investigated at all up to now, but the sixth chapter, Overconfi-
dence: The Influence of Positive and Negative Affect, deals with this issue. 
The design of the experiment is loosely based on the work of Ifcher and Zarghamee (2014). 
In a real effort task experiment, the subjects are given tasks to do in five rounds of a game. 
After every round the subjects assess their own performance. Absolute overconfidence is 
recorded, and relative overconfidence is also assessed. Subsequently the subjects receive 
feedback on their actual performance. Every subject finds out how many tasks he or she has 
solved correctly (absolute overconfidence) and how they have fared in relation to the other 
subjects (relative overconfidence). Over the course of the five rounds, the subjects thus have 
the opportunity to learn from their experiences in the preceding rounds and to gradually 
assess themselves more and more realistically. In other words, learning effects are possible. 
Mood is influenced by positive film excerpts (in the positive treatment), negative ones (in 
the negative treatment) and neutral film excerpts (in the neutral treatment). After each film 
excerpt a manipulation check takes place in order to test whether the intended mood has 
actually been created among the subjects. In all three treatments it is only the film excerpts 
which differ. The rest of the experiment is exactly the same in all three treatments. 
It can be clearly stated that the deployment of the film excerpts led to the desired results. To 
this extent, the approach was very well suited to answering the questions posed in an ap-
propriate way. Overall, the results of the study also show that there are no significant differ-
ences between the treatments with regard to either absolute overconfidence or relative 
overconfidence.  
In respect of the occurrence of learning effects, however, there is a difference between the 
moods. When considering absolute overconfidence, learning effects appear in the neutral 
mood. The participants assess their performance significantly more precisely in the last two 
rounds of the game than in the first three rounds of the game. By contrast, these significant 
learning effects do not arise in either a positive or a negative mood. When relative overcon-
fidence is considered, there are no learning effects. The subjects cannot gauge their relative 




- 10 - 
References 
Agnew, J. / Balduzzi, P. / Sundén, A. (2003): Portfolio Choice and Trading in a Large 401(k) 
Plan, American Economic Review, 93(1), 193-215. 
Anderson, A. (2013): Trading and Under-Diversification, Review of Finance, 17(5), 1-43. 
Andres, P. / Spiwoks, M. (1999): Forecast Quality Matrix: A Methodological Survey of Judg-
ing Forecast Quality of Capital Market Forecasts, Journal of Economics and Statistics, 219, 
513-542. 
Baltussen, G. / Post, G. T. (2011): Irrational Diversification: An Examination of Individual 
Portfolio Choice, Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis, 46(5), 1463-1491. 
Barber, B. / Odean, T. (2001): Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and common 
Stock Investments, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 261-292. 
Benartzi, S. (2001): Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) Accounts to Compa-
ny Stock, Journal of Finance, 56(5), 1747-1764. 
Benartzi, S. / Thaler, R. H. (2001): Naïve Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution 
Saving Plans, American Economic Review, 91(1), 79-98. 
Benke, H. (2006): Was leisten Kapitalmarktprognosen? Die Sicht eines Stiftungsmanagers, 
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Kreditwesen, 17, 40-49. 
Blume, M. E. / Friend, I. (1975): The Asset Structure of Individual Portfolios and Some Impli-
cations for Utility Functions, Journal of Finance, 30(2), 585-603. 
Bode, M. / van Echelpoel, A. / Sievi, C. R. (1994): Multinationale Diversifikation: Viel zitiert, 
kaum befolgt, Die Bank, 94(4), 202-206. 
Charness, G. / Viceisza, A. (2011): Comprehension and Risk Elicitation in the field: Evidence 
From Rural Senegal, IFPRI Discussion Papers, 1135. 
Deaves, R. / Lüders, E. / Luo, G. Y. (2009): An Experimental Test of the Impact of Overconfi-
dence and Gender on Trading Activity, Review of Finance, 13, 555-575. 
Dimson, E. / Marsh, P. (1984): An Analysis of Brokers’ and Analysts’ Unpublished Forecasts 
of UK Stock Returns, Journal of Finance, 39, 1257-1292. 
Eyster, E. / Weizsäcker, G. (2011): Correlation Neglect in Financial Decision Making, DIW 
Discussion Paper, 1104. 
Fernandes, D. (2013): The 1/N Rule Revisited: Heterogeneity in the Naïve Diversification Bi-
as, International Journal of Marketing Research, 30(3), 310-313. 
Fraser, P. / MacDonald, R. (1993): The Efficiency of CAC Stock Price Forecasts: a Survey 
Based Perspective, Revue Économique, 44(5), 991-1000. 
Goetzmann, W. N. / Kumar, A. (2008): Equity Portfolio Diversification, Review of Finance, 
12(3), 433-463. 
Grablea, J. E. / Roszkowski, M. J. (2008): The Influence of Mood on the Willingness to Take 
Financial Risks, Journal of Risk Research, 11(7), 905-923. 
- 11 - 
Gubaydullina, Z. / Spiwoks, M. (2015): Correlation Neglect, Naïve Diversification, and Irrele-
vant Information as Stumbling Blocks for Optimal Diversification, Journal of Finance and In-
vestment Analysis, 4(2), 1-19. 
Guiso, L. / Haliassos, M. / Japelli, T. (2002): Household Portfolios, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Hedesstrom, T. M. / Svedsater, H. / Garling, T. (2006): Covariation Neglect among Novice 
Investors, Journal of Experimental Psychology-App., 12(3), 155-165. 
Henze, J. (2004): Was leisten Finanzanalysten? Eine empirische Analyse des deutschen Akti-
enmarktes, Reihe Finanzierung, Kapitalmarkt und Banken, 38, Lohmar. 
Hibbert, A. M. / Lawrence, E. R. / Prakash, A. J. (2012): Can Diversification be Learned?, 
Journal of Behavioral Finance, 13(1), 38-50. 
Holt, C. A. / Laury, S. K. (2002): Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, American Economic Re-
view, 92(5), 1644-1655. 
Huber, J. / Kirchler, M. / Stöckl, T. (2010): The Hot Hand Belief and the Gambler’s Fallacy in 
Investment Decisions under Risk, Theory and Decision, 68(4), 445-462. 
Huberman, G. / Sengmueller, P. (2004): Performance and Employer Stock in 401(k) Plans, 
Review of Finance, 8(3), 403-443. 
Ifcher, J. / Zarghamee, H. (2014): Affect and Overconfidence: A Laboratory Investigation, 
Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 7(3), 125-150. 
Jacobsen, S. / Petrie, R. (2009): Learning from Mistakes: What Do Inconsistent Choices over 
Risk Tell Us?, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 38(2), 143-158. 
Kallir, I. / Sonsino, D. (2009): The Neglect of Correlation in Allocation Decisions, Southern 
Economic Journal, 75(4), 1045-1066. 
Kaplanski, G. / Levy, H. / Veld, C. / Veld-Merkoulova, Y. (2015): Do Happy People Make Op-
timistic Investors?, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 50(1-2), 145-168. 
Krag, J. (1995): Sind Aktienkurse prognostizierbar?, Jenaer Vorträge, 8, Baden-Baden. 
Kuhnen, C. M. / Knutson, B. (2011): The Influence of Affect on Beliefs, Preferences, and Fi-
nancial Decisions, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(3), 605-626. 
Lakonishok, J. (1980): Stock Market Return Expectations: Some General Properties, Journal 
of Finance, 35, 921-931. 
Lease, R. C. / Lewellen, W. G. / Schlarbaum, G. G. (1974): The Individual Investor: Attributes 
and Attitudes, Journal of Finance, 29(2), 413-433. 
Lee, C. J. / Andrade, E. B. (2014): Fear, Excitement, and Financial Risk-Taking, Cognition and 
Emotion, 29(1), 178-187. 
Markowitz, H. M. (1952): Portfolio Selection, Journal of Finance, 7(1), 77-91. 
Markowitz, H. M. (1991): Foundations of Portfolio Theory, Journal of Finance, 46(2), 469-
477. 
Menkhoff, L. / Schmeling, M. / Schmidt, U. (2013): Overconfidence, Experience, and Profes-
sionalism: An Experimental Study, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 86, 92-
101.  
- 12 - 
Meulbroek, L. (2005): Company Stock in Pension Plans: How Costly Is It? Journal of Law and 
Economics, 48(2), 443-474. 
Mitchell, O. S. / Utkus, S. P. (2002): The Role of Company Share in Defined Contribution 
Plans, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper, 9250. 
Morrin, M. / Inman, J. J. / Broniarczyk, S. M. / Nenkov, G. Y. / Reuter, J. (2012): Investing 
for Retirement: The Moderating Effect of Fund Assortment Size on the 1/N Heuristic, Journal 
of Marketing Research, 49(4), 537-550. 
Odean, T. (1999): Do Investors Trade Too Much?, American Economic Review, 89(5), 1279-
1298. 
Polkovnichenko, V. (2005): Household Portfolio Diversification: A Case for Rank-Dependent 
Preferences, Review of Financial Studies, 18(4), 1467-1502. 
Poterba, J. M. (2003): Employer Share and 401(k) Plans, American Economic Review, 93(2), 
398-404. 
Söderlind, P. (2010): Predicting Stock Price Movements: Regressions versus Economists, Ap-
plied Economics Letters, 17(9), 869-874. 
Spiwoks, M. (2004): Die Verwendbarkeit der ZEW-Aktienindex-Prognosen für aktive Portfo-
liomanagement-Strategien, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 224, 557-578. 
Spiwoks, M. (2009): Deceptive Unity: Surprising Characteristics of Pre-Tax Corporate Profit 
Forecasts, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 26, 170-177. 
Spiwoks, M. / Bedke, N. / Hein, O. (2008): Forecasting the Past: The Case of US Interest 
Rate, Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, 22(4), 357-379. 
Spiwoks, M. / Bedke, N. / Hein, O. (2010): Topically Orientated Trend Adjustment and Auto-
correlation of the Residuals – An Empirical Investigation of the Forecasting Behavior of Bond 
Market Analysts in Germany, Journal of Money, Investment and Banking, 14, 16-35. 
Spiwoks, M. / Gubaydullina, Z. / Hein, O. (2015): Trapped in the Here and Now – New In-
sights into Financial Market Analyst Behavior, Journal of Applied Finance and Banking, 5(1), 
35-56. 
Stöckl, T. / Huber, J. / Kirchler, M. / Lindner, F. (2015): Hot Hand and Gambler’s Fallacy in 
Teams: Evidence from Investment Experiments, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiza-
tion, 117, 327-339. 
Weber, E. U. / Siebenmorgen, N. / Weber, M. (2005): Communication Asset Risk: How 
Name Recognition and the Format of Historic Volatility Information Affect Risk Perception 









PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION:  
THE INFLUENCE OF HERDING, STATUS-QUO BIAS, 
AND THE GAMBLER’S FALLACY 
 
 
with Thomas Nahmer, Markus Spiwoks and Kilian Bizer 





















Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, 32(2), 167-205. 
Wolfsburg Working Papers, 17-01, February 2017. 
Diskussionsbeiträge der Sonderforschungsgruppe Institutionenanalyse, 17-2, March 2017. 
 
  
- 14 - 
Abstract 
This experimental study examines the influence of herding (following the majority of fellow 
gamblers or the most successful gambler (guru)), status-quo bias, and the gambler’s fallacy 
on diversification behavior. We find that neither herding nor status-quo bias contributes 
significantly to non-optimal portfolio choices. The gambler’s fallacy, however, plays an im-
portant role in these decisions. Many subjects appear to find patterns in a history of random 
events and then use these “patterns” to infer the sequence of future events. The gambler’s 
fallacy is significantly responsible for the fact that the optimal structure of a portfolio is con-
sidered in only 37.7% of all choices made by an investor. 
Keywords 
Behavioral finance, experiments, portfolio choice, non-optimal diversification, herding, guru, 
status-quo bias, gambler’s fallacy 
JEL Classification 















- 15 - 
1 Introduction 
Markowitz (1952) shows that it is useful for risk-averse investors to split capital among dif-
ferent investment instruments. Practice shows, however, that investors often have strongly 
underdiversified portfolios.1 
Experimental economic research increasingly addresses the question of why investors seem 
to find it so difficult to make useful portfolio diversifications. Gubaydullina and Spiwoks 
(2015) show that many investors have difficulty dealing with the correlations of income re-
turn developments.2 The meaning of the correlations is systematically misjudged. Take the 
example of 1/n heuristics, where investors distribute their capital equally among all invest-
ment alternatives seemingly without noticing or caring how strongly the income returns of 
these instruments are correlated. Morrin et al. (2012) provide evidence that many subjects 
tend toward 1/n heuristics (for similar findings, see Fernandes, 2013; Baltussen and Post, 
2011). Rieger (2012) reveals that investors systematically miscalculate the probabilities of 
occurrence. Fellner, Güth, and Maciejovsky (2004) conclude that investors often suffer from 
an illusion of expertise, and hence overestimate the advantageousness of their own choice 
of investment. Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009) note that diversification decisions are dis-
torted by the phenomenon of mental accounting. Weber, Siebenmorgen, and Weber (2005) 
detect that investors are subject to a home bias when choosing investment instruments for a 
portfolio. 
We conducted expert discussions with high-ranking bank managers,3 which revealed other 
possible reasons for suboptimal diversification decisions. It seems possible that many sub-
jects are distracted from optimal diversification by observing the investment choices of oth-
er investors (herding). Being influenced by the successful investment decisions of prominent 
investors can play a significant role in this process (guru effect). Furthermore, optimal diver-
sification can be hindered by subjects holding on to existing portfolios (status-quo bias). Sub-
jects can also be distracted from meaningful portfolio choices by exclusively following puta-
tive patterns of random events (the gambler’s fallacy). 
The present study therefore addresses the question of whether or not (1) herding, (2) status-
quo bias, and (3) the gambler’s fallacy do, indeed, sidetrack subjects from making optimum 
diversification decisions. The literature provides multiple indications of the significant influ-
ence that these phenomena can exert on economic decisions. 
Looking at the herding literature first, the observation that subjects take their bearings from 
one another and thereby act as a herd traces as far back as Mackay (1841). Keynes (1936) 
points out the herding behavior of financial market actors and presents two possible expla-
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Dimmock et al. (2016), Anderson (2013), Hibbert, Lawrence, and Prakash (2012), Goetzmann and 
Kumar (2008), Meulbroek (2005), Polkovnichenko (2005), Huberman and Sengmueller (2004), Agnew, Balduzzi, 
and Sundén (2003), Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002), Benartzi (2001), Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Barber and 
Odean (2000), Bode, van Echelpoel, and Sievi (1994), Blume and Friend (1975), and Lease, Lewellen, and 
Schlarbaum (1974). 
2 For similar results, see also Eyster and Weizsäcker (2011), Kallir and Sonsino (2009), and Hedesstrom, Sved-
sater, and Garling (2006). 
3 We thank Mr. Lothar Henning, Bethmann Bank Frankfurt, and Mr. Frank Weber, Sparkasse Lippstadt, for ex-
tensive talks concerning investment behavior of bank customers. 
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nations for it (reputational herding and investigative herding). Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
continue along these lines, adding fuel to a fierce debate that has been raging for the past 25 
years. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) show that herding 
can even occur when subjects behave rationally and make reasonable decisions (informa-
tional cascades). Devenow and Welch (1996) were the first to clearly differentiate between 
rational herding (reputational herding, investigative herding, and informational cascades) 
and irrational herding. There are numerous empirical findings that confirm herding behavior 
among actors on the financial market.4 Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider herding 
as a possible origin of non-optimal portfolio diversification. To date, there have not been any 
experimental studies examining the potential influence of herding on diversification deci-
sions. 
A special case of herding is the guru effect. Gurus are highly ranked religious authorities in 
Hinduism and Buddhism. In Western cultures, the term “guru” also refers to leaders whose 
followers trust them blindly and uncritically, and the term “guru effect” has been used to 
describe the situation where private investors rigorously copy the decisions of prominent 
and very successful investors. The gurus’ behavior is closely observed by many actors on the 
capital market, which is why it can lead to herding. In the research on this phenomenon, 
capital market simulation with interacting artificial agents (agent-based computational eco-
nomics) has established itself as a reliable research method. The method has revealed that 
the network structure of communication among the agents significantly influences events on 
the capital market. Gurus are so-called super nodes that have numerous direct communica-
tion links with other capital market actors and, for this reason, can trigger herding.5 Fur-
thermore, the guru effect may contribute to distracting investors from optimal diversifica-
tion decisions. There is as yet no research on how the influence of an investment guru im-
pacts investor’s portfolio decisions. 
Many people find it difficult to make decisions and thus tend to avoid them, simply leaving 
things as they are, which is known as the status-quo bias (cf. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988). The psychological processes of this behavior are explained in detail by Anderson 
(2003). Especially in situations when investors accede to an existing security portfolio (e.g., 
by inheritance), they often tend to postpone or even completely fail to adjust the portfolio 
structure. Even if different performances of the stocks in the portfolio lead to an unintended 
imbalance, many investors, out of dread of adjusting the portfolio, fail to take appropriate 
action. Aside from dread, this lack of action is often grounded in reluctance to take responsi-
bility for the portfolio’s future profit, or lack thereof. Many investors are afraid of regretting 
                                                          
4 Huang, Wu, and Lin (2016), Choi (2016), Galariotis, Rong, and Spyrou (2015), Chang (2013), Kremer and Nautz 
(2013), Lin, Tsai, and Lung (2013), Belhoula and Naoui (2011), Boyson (2010), Kim and Jegadeesh (2010), Chiang 
and Zheng (2010), Spiwoks, Bizer, and Hein (2008), Chen, Wang, and Lin (2008), Walter and Weber (2006), 
Voronkova and Bohl (2005), Spiwoks (2004), Sias (2004), Ennis and Sebastian (2003), Chang, Cheng, and Khora-
na (2000), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999), Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999), Christie and Huang (1995), 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Klemkovsky (1977), Kraus and Stoll (1972). 
5 See, e.g., Panchenko, Gerasymchuk, and Pavlov (2013), Hein, Schwind, and Spiwoks (2008, 2012), Tedeschi, 
Iori, and Gallegati (2009, 2012), and Markose, Alentorn, and Krause (2004). Sumpter, Zabzina, and Nicolis 
(2012) show that a small number of leaders can heavily influence decisions. 
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their own actions (cf. Inman and Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg et al., 2002; Kahnemann and 
Tversky, 1982). There are now some empirical findings on the status-quo bias as it applies to 
financial market actors.6 Numerous experimental studies also provide evidence of the sta-
tus-quo bias (see, e.g., Geng, 2016; Yen and Chuang, 2008). Hence, it seems reasonable to 
consider the status-quo bias as a possible reason for non-optimal diversification. There is as 
yet only one experimental study that directly addresses this topic: Brown and Kagel (2009) 
yield information on the influence of the status-quo bias on non-optimal portfolio choices. 
Looking now at the literature on the gambler’s fallacy, we start with the experimental study 
by Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015) that found that irrelevant information can distract sub-
jects from optimal diversification decisions. Considering the history of random events in 
evaluating random processes seems particularly tempting to many subjects, a phenomenon 
known as the gambler’s fallacy. For example, if a coin toss shows “heads” three times in a 
row, many people assume that “tails” will show next. The history of unconnected random 
events, however, does not reveal anything about the future. The possibility for “heads” in 
the fourth toss is also exactly 50%. The gambler’s fallacy has long been a subject of interest,7 
but no work has been done in the context of portfolio diversification. 
We conduct an experiment to discover the reasons for insufficient portfolio diversification. 
In 15 periods, the subjects must make individual decisions about the structure of a portfolio 
of stocks. By taking a between-subjects approach, we examine the possible influence of 
herding, the status-quo bias, and the gambler’s fallacy. We find that neither herding nor sta-
tus-quo bias contribute significantly to non-optimal portfolio choices. The gambler’s fallacy, 
however, plays an important role in these decisions. 
2 Hypotheses and Experimental Design 
2.1. Identification of Optimal Portfolios 
Identifying optimal diversification decisions is difficult even in the easiest of cases, when 
there are only two stocks (A and B) involved that are independent in their income return 
development. Not only must the efficient frontier of all possible stock combinations be de-
termined, but the investor’s indifference curve must be considered (see Figure 1). 
A strongly risk-averse investor (Subject 1) finds his ideal combination of stocks in the lower 
margin of the efficient frontier. A less risk-averse investor (Subject 2), however, finds his ide-
al combination of stocks in the upper margin of the efficient frontier. Although there are 
reliable empirical methods to differentiate between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., Freiburg and Grichnik (2013), Bryant, Evans, and Bishara (2012), Gubaydullina, Hein, and Spiwoks 
(2011), Kempf and Ruenzi (2006), Choi et al. (2004), Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003), and Patel, Zeck-
hauser, and Hendricks (1991). 
7 See e.g. Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016), Suetens, Galbo-Joergensen, and Tyran (2016), Stöckl et al. (2015), 
Powdthavee and Riyanto (2012), Barron and Leider (2010), Ayton and Fischer (2004), Clotfelter and Cook 
(1991), Tversky and Kahneman (1971, 1974). 
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subjects,8 capturing the exact layout of the indifference curves for a specific subject remains 
impossible. Some studies try to solve this problem by considering all stock combinations on 
the efficient frontier as an ideal choice. However, this approach does not consider that only 
one exact point of the efficient frontier can be deemed the optimal combination of stocks 
for an individual investor. 
Figure 1: Identification of Optimal Stock Combinations in Consideration of the Efficient Fron-


















To avoid results so vague that interpretation of them is an exercise in futility, we employ the 
method of Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015): The subjects are offered two entirely uncorre-
lated alternatives for investment (A and B), which are identical regarding the expected in-
come return and risk. By doing so, the efficient frontier is reduced to a single point (point Z 
in Figure 2). In this environment, it is of no importance whether a strongly or a less risk-
averse subject makes the decision. In both cases, only the exactly equal mix of both invest-
                                                          
8 See, e.g., Lönnqvist et al. (2015), Charness, Gneezy, and Imas (2013), Crosetto and Filippin (2013), Dohmen et 
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ment alternatives (A and B) can be interpreted as the ideal combination of stocks. Only with 
this methodology can precise results in an experiment on diversification be obtained. 
Figure 2: Precise Identification of an Ideal Combination of Stocks with a Punctiform Efficient 
















Ours is an individual decision experiment that follows the approach of Gubaydullina and 
Spiwoks (2015). The subjects can choose between two different risky securities, A and B. In 
each period, they assemble a four-stock portfolio. The possible portfolios are AAAA, AAAB, 
AABB, ABBB, and BBBB. Stock A and stock B both generate an income return of ±0 experi-
mental currency units (ECU) or +7 ECU in each period. Both possible returns occur with a 
probability of 50% and follow a random process. Stock A’s performance is independent of 
Stock B’s performance. Both stocks thus have an expected value of 3.5 ECU. A portfolio con-
sisting of four stocks is expected to generate a return of 14 ECU per period (see Table 1). The 
ECUs are converted into Euros in the ratio of 10:1, resulting in an expected value of €1.40 
per period. Hence, the subjects can profit from their investment behavior if it is successful. 
The five possible portfolios may have the same expected income return of 14 ECU per period 
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each portfolio.9 The standard deviation of the combination AAAA is 14.0, whereas the stand-
ard deviation of the combination AABB is only 9.9 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Expected Values and Standard Deviations of the Income Return for the Five Portfo-
lios Considering the Possible Random Events for Stocks A and B in ECU 
Random Events A: +7; B: +7 A: +7; B: ±0 A: ±0; B: +7 A: ±0; B: ±0   
SD  (p1 = 0.25) (p2 = 0.25) (p3 = 0.25) (p4 = 0.25) E(r) 
AAAA +28 +28 ±0 ±0 14 14.0 
AAAB +28 +21 +7 ±0 14 11.1 
AABB +28 +14 +14 ±0 14 9.9 
ABBB +28 +7 +21 ±0 14 11.1 
BBBB +28 ±0 +28 ±0 14 14.0 
p = probability of occurrence; E(r) = expected value of income return; SD = standard deviation. 
2.2 Rational Strategy 
A rational, risk-averse subject should always choose the combination AABB. Since the ex-
pected income returns of the five possible portfolios are identical, it is rational for each risk-
averse subject to choose the portfolio with the minimum variance – independent of the de-
gree of the subject’s risk aversion. 
This choice is intuitive. Regarding the structured components of the given stocks, the sub-
jects can recognize the portfolio with the minimum variance without having to make any 
mathematical calculations. Using simple plausibility, it can be established that the income 
return level is most when both stocks A and B are equally represented in the portfolio (see 
Table 1). 
However, considering the numerous empirical findings on the incapability or reluctance of 
subjects to make reasonable diversification decisions, we expect clear deviations from the 
rational strategy (always portfolio AABB) to occur in this experiment. 
We thus arrive at our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The subjects are going to behave rationally, which means that they are going 
to exclusively choose the portfolio with the minimum variance (AABB). 
The experiment consists of three treatments. The rational investment strategy (always 
AABB) is easily realizable in all three treatments. Therefore, the subjects’ tendency toward 
rational diversification decisions is analyzed in all three treatments (see Table 2). 
                                                          
9 Whether or not the subjects exhibit herding behavior, whether or not they are subject to the status-quo bias, 
and regardless of whether or not they fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy does not influence their payout. If herd-
ing, status-quo bias, or the gambler’s fallacy lead to frequent deviation from the optimal strategy (always port-
folio AABB), only the exposure to risk increases. The expected payout, however, remains unaffected. In fact, 
the experiment only shows random differences concerning the payouts. Neither consequent herding nor a 
permanent status-quo bias or a perpetual gambler’s fallacy lead to systematically higher payouts than the op-
timal strategy. 
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Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 
Status-Quo Bias 
Hypotheses 5, 6 
Gambler’s Fallacy 
Hypotheses 7, 8 
Treatment 1 
VIEW+0%OPT X X X X 
Treatment 2 
NOVIEW+0%OPT X X  X 
Treatment 3 
VIEW+100%OPT X  X X 
2.3 Herding 
As are investigating herding, or the influence of the guru effect, the subjects must be given 
the opportunity to copy the portfolio decisions of the majority or those of the most success-
ful fellow investor in each period. This results in an experiment that is structured in multiple 
periods. The portfolios can be rearranged at no cost before the start of each period. 
In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), the portfolios of each subject as well as their investment 
success are published in a ranking. Thus, before they decide whether or not to restructure 
their own portfolio, the subjects are given insight into their fellow investors’ portfolio choic-
es in the past period and into the portfolio of the most successful subject. This allows the 
subjects to follow the majority or the most successful investor (guru). In Treatment 2 
(NOVIEW+0%OPT), the subjects do not receive any information about the other subjects’ 
behavior or their investment success. They are informed solely of their own success and 
therefore do not have the option of following a guru or the majority because neither are 
detectable (see Figure 3 and Table 2). 
Given the numerous empirical findings on the occurrence of herding in the financial market, 
we expect the portfolios to assimilate during Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT). Thus our second 
hypothesis reads as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: The subjects are not going to converge in the 15 periods of Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT) and will not form a herd. 
Since the investment behavior and success of the other subjects cannot be observed in 
Treatment 2, we expect the subjects to be less distracted from the rational strategy (always 
portfolio AABB). Thus our third hypothesis reads as follows. 
Hypothesis 3: The average deviation from the rational strategy (always portfolio AABB) is not 
going to be stronger in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). 
If deviations from the rational strategy occur more often and are stronger in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT), this should show in the average exposure to risk. 
Hypothesis 4: The average exposure to risk is not significantly higher in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). 
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2.4 Status-Quo Bias 
To reveal, or not, the presence of status-quo bias, we equip the subjects with different 
stocks in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT): 25% of the subjects each start with portfolio AAAA, 
portfolio AAAB, portfolio ABBB, and portfolio BBBB; 0% of the subjects start with the optimal 
portfolio (AABB). The subjects were allowed to reassemble their portfolios before the first 
period. In Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), 100% of the subjects receive the optimal portfolio 
(AABB) at the beginning of the experiment, which they can again reassemble before it starts 
(see Figure 3 and Table 2). As the status-quo bias has often been empirically established, we 
assume that the optimal portfolio (AABB) is more frequently selected during the 15 periods 
of Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT) than during Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT). 
Hypothesis 5: The average deviation from the rational strategy (always portfolio AABB) will 
not be stronger in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT). 
If the deviations from the rational strategy are stronger and occur more often in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT), this should show in the average exposure to risk. 
Hypothesis 6: The average exposure to risk will not be higher in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) 
than in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT). 
2.5 The Gambler’s Fallacy 
To detect whether the subjects have fallen prey to the gambler’s fallacy, we ask them in all 
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sons for their portfolio choices (in Period 5 and Period 11). The tendency toward the gam-
bler’s fallacy can take effect in all three treatments and is therefore investigated in all three 
(see Table 2). 
As the gambler’s fallacy is an often observed phenomenon, we expect the subjects to try to 
detect patterns in the history of random events, which do not exist. For example: “After 
Stock A has generated a high income return, I will put my faith in Stock B” or “After Stock B 
has lastly returned no income, I will choose Stock B.” Responses like this are evidence of the 
gambler’s fallacy. We expect this type of answer to be given often. 
Hypothesis 7: The gambler’s fallacy is not going to be one of the main reasons for certain 
portfolio choices. 
Evidence of the gambler’s fallacy can also be discovered by looking at the history of the 
game. If a positive (negative) event for Stock A (Stock B) frequently leads to a reduced (in-
creased) interest in Stock A (Stock B) in the following period, the influence of gambler’s falla-
cy can be inferred. 
Hypothesis 8: A positive (negative) income return in the current period does not reduce (in-
creases) the popularity of this stock in the next period. 
2.6 Capture of Risk Attitude and Conduction of the Experiment 
The exclusive rational strategy for risk-averse investors is to always choose portfolio AABB. 
Therefore, deviations from the rational strategy will be identified only if risk-averse subjects 
are admitted to the experiment. To this end, we tested each subject according to Holt and 
Laury (2002) and cleared the starting field of risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects. To ensure 
that the task was fully understood by all subjects, we asked them control questions. Only 
those who answered all control questions correctly were admitted to the experiment. The 
complete instructions and control questions can be found in Appendix 1. 
The experiment was conducted from 19 May 2016 to 27 May 2016 at the Ostfalia Laboratory 
for Experimental Economic Research (Ostfalia Labor für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung 
OLEW) of the Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences in Wolfsburg. One-hundred-eighty-eight 
subjects took part in the experiment, 38 of whom showed to be risk-neutral or risk-loving. 
One-hundred-fifty subjects showed risk-averse behavior and thus were admitted to the ac-
tual experiment. Fifty-three subjects were exposed to Treatment 1, 46 subjects to Treatment 
2, and 51 took part in Treatment 3. The subjects are students of the Ostfalia University of 
Applied Sciences in Wolfsburg, 84 of whom study at the Faculty of Business (44.7%), 28 at 
the Faculty for Health Services (14.9%), and 76 at the Faculty of Automotive Engineering 
(40.4%). Sixteen sessions were conducted in total. Ten to twelve subjects took part in each 
session. 
The experiment was implemented in z-Tree (see Fischbacher, 2007). At the Ostfalia Lab, we 
used 12 workspaces, each equipped with a monitor, with a wall separating the subjects. The 
experiments were consistently overseen by a game master to prevent the subjects from 
communicating with each other or using unauthorized devices (like smartphones). The sub-
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jects did not receive a general show-up fee. When assessing their willingness to take risks, an 
average of €2.18 was paid out to each subject. The actual experiment resulted in a payout of 
€21.89 on average. In total, the subjects received an average payout of €24.07. The highest 
payout was €31.85, the lowest was €17.40. The experiment lasted 45 minutes on average. 
The payout can therefore be deemed highly attractive. All subjects appeared to concentrate 
and seemed motivated. 
3 Results 
3.1 Rational Strategy 
The results of the experiments partly meet the expectations but also reveal some surprising 
facts. Hypothesis 1 states that the subjects are going to behave rationally, which means that 
they are going to exclusively choose the portfolio with the minimum variance (AABB). Tables 
3 and 4 clearly show that Hypothesis 1 must be rejected. The optimal portfolio (AABB) is the 
most frequently chosen alternative in all three treatments, but more than 60% of all portfo-
lio choices can be viewed as less than completely optimal (Table 3). This is also evident when 
analyzing the exposure to risk (average standard deviation of the portfolios). The t-test (one-
sample mean-comparison) shows that, in all three treatments, portfolios with standard devi-
ations significantly higher than the standard deviation of the optimal portfolio are chosen 
(Table 4). Many subjects thus exhibit non-rational investment behavior. On the other hand, 
however, extreme portfolios (AAAA or BBBB) were chosen in only 21.4% of all portfolio deci-
sions. 








































































Rational Strategy for all Three 
Treatments 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) 11.68% 18.73% 39.75% 19.36% 10.44% 
Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT) 8.68% 22.45% 31.89% 22.46% 14.49% 
Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT) 8.36% 21.69% 40.93% 18.29% 10.71% 
Total 9.63% 20.88% 37.74% 19.95% 11.77% 
- 25 - 





Average SD P-Value 
Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) 9.9 11.37 0.0000*** 
Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT) 9.9 11.49 0.0000*** 
Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT) 9.9 11.29 0.0000*** 
Total 9.9 11.40 0.0000*** 
*** = significant with an error rate of 1%; ** = significant with an error rate of 5%; * = significant with an error rate of 10%; 
SD = standard deviation. 
3.2 Herding 
Herding should be reflected in either a quick or gradual assimilation of the subjects’ deci-
sions. We therefore examine whether the decisions made by the subjects converge. Table 5 
shows that the subjects’ behavior continues to be fragmented until the last period, that is, 
no herding occurs.10 







































































































Session 1 30.0% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Session 2 33.3% 33.3% 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% 
Session 3 11.1% 33.3% 44.4% 0.0% 11.1% 
Session 4 30.0% 20.0% 40.0% 0.0% 10.0% 
Session 5 0.0% 42.9% 28.6% 14.3% 14.3% 
Session 6 37.5% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 25.0% 
In the next step, we compare decisions for the portfolio that was preferred by most subjects 
to the portfolio that was chosen against the majority opinion. We conclude that the subjects 
chose the portfolio based on majority opinion in the previous period for a total of 320 times. 
The portfolio that the majority did not prefer in the previous period was chosen 422 times. 
Since herding can also be a temporary phenomenon, it makes sense to show the frequencies 
separately according to periods and to check the significance of the frequencies using a Chi-
square goodness-of-fit test (Table 6). In Period 2 we can see, for instance, that 30 subjects 
follow the majority opinion of the previous period in choosing their portfolio, while only 23 
subjects do not do so. However, this difference is insignificant. In those periods with signifi-
                                                          
10 The course of the six sessions of Treatment 1 are set out in Tables A-1 to A-6 in Appendix 2. 
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cant deviations (Periods 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13), those decisions not following the majority 
opinion always outbalance those that do. Hence, we cannot establish significant herding, 
evidenced by following the majority opinion, at any point during the experiment. 
Table 6: Portfolio Decisions According to and Opposing the Majority Opinion in Treatment 1 
Period Number of Portfolios 
According to the Ma-
jority Opinion in Pre-
vious Period 
Number of Portfolios 
Opposing the Majority 
Opinion in Previous 
Period 
P-Value 
2   30   23 0.336 
3   25   28 0.680 
4   31   22 0.216 
5   24   29 0.492 
6   24   29 0.492 
7   27   26 0.891 
8   20   33 0.074* 
9   18   35 0.020** 
10   18   35 0.020** 
11   19   34 0.039** 
12   22   31 0.216 
13   15   38 0.002*** 
14   22   31 0.216 
15   25   28 0.680 
total 320 422  
*** = significant with an error rate of 1%; ** = significant with an error rate of 5%; * = significant with an error 
rate of 10%. 
Neither is there much evidence of a “guru effect” (see Table 7). The guru obviously only im-
presses the subjects slightly. In 212 cases, their decision follows the previous leader’s portfo-
lio; they do not do so in 530 cases. Only in Period 7 are there more subjects following the 
guru’s opinion than those not doing so. The Chi-square goodness-of-fit test shows, however, 
that the difference is insignificant. In all periods – except for Periods 3 and 7 – the decisions 
not to choose the portfolio of the most successful subject is observed significantly more of-
ten. 
Overall, we conclude that there is no herding in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT). Neither the 
majority opinion nor the opinion of the leading subject (guru) has much impression on the 
subjects. Hypothesis 2 states that the subjects are not going to converge in the 15 periods of 
Treatment 1 and will not form a herd. Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. 
Contrary to our expectations, the portfolio with the minimum variance is chosen significantly 
more often in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). We as-
sumed that, by observing and following their fellow subjects’ behavior, the subjects would 
frequently deviate from choosing the optimal stock combination AABB. In Treatment 2, 
where the other subjects’ behavior cannot be observed, herding is generally impossible. As a 
matter of fact, the contrary turns out to be the case. While the portfolio with minimum vari-
ance (AABB) was chosen in 39.8% of all cases in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), it was selected 
- 27 - 
in only 31.9% of all cases in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test shows that this unexpected difference is even statistically significant. The p-value is 
0.021. Hypothesis 3 states that the average deviation from the rational strategy (always 
portfolio AABB) is not going to be stronger in Treatment 1 than in Treatment 2. Hypothesis 3 
cannot be rejected. 
Table 7: Portfolio Decisions Following and Not Following the Guru in Treatment 1 
Period Number of Portfolios 
Corresponding to the 
Leading Subject of the 
Previous Period 
Number of Portfolios 
Opposing the Leading 
Subject of the Previ-
ous Period 
P-Value 
2     6   47 0.000*** 
3   22   31 0.216 
4   12   41 0.000*** 
5   14   39 0.001*** 
6   19   34 0.039** 
7   28   25 0.680 
8   17   36 0.009*** 
9     7   46 0.000*** 
10   19   34 0.039** 
11   12   41 0.000*** 
12     9   44 0.000*** 
13   11   42 0.000*** 
14   16   37 0.004*** 
15   20   33 0.074* 
total 212 530  
*** = significant with an error rate of 1%; ** = significant with an error rate of 5%; * = significant with an error rate of 10%. 
We had expected that the possibility of following other subjects would lead to a significantly 
higher exposure to risk (average standard deviation of the portfolios) in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT). Since herding did not develop, risk 
exposure did not increase. The average standard deviation of the portfolios in Treatment 1 
(VIEW+0%OPT) was 11.37. The average standard deviation of the portfolios in Treatment 2 
(NOVIEW+0%OPT) was 11.49. According to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, this difference 
is not relevant. The p-value is 0.5485. Hypothesis 4 states that the average exposure to risk is 
not significantly higher in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 2 
(NOVIEW+0%OPT). Hence, Hypothesis 4 cannot be discarded. 
As an interim result, we conclude that the subjects do not behave rationally in making most 
of their portfolio choices. The optimal portfolio (AABB) is chosen in only 30 - 40% of all cases 
(39.8% in Treatment 1, 31.9% in Treatment 2). Herding is clearly not responsible for this. 
There is neither a lasting orientation toward the portfolio structure chosen by a majority of 
subjects nor a lasting orientation toward the portfolio structure of the most successful sub-
ject. 
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3.3 Status-Quo Bias 
To discover, or not, the presence of any status-quo bias, we now compare Treatment 1 with 
Treatment 3. In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), 25% of the subjects are given portfolio AAAA, 
25% portfolio AAAB, 25% portfolio ABBB, and 25% portfolio BBBB before the start of the 
experiment. No subject receives the optimal portfolio AABB (see Table A-7 in Appendix 3). In 
Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), every subject received the portfolio with the minimum vari-
ance (AABB) (see Table A-9 in Appendix 3). The subjects are permitted to reassemble their 
portfolios before the beginning of the first period. 
We expected a tendency to follow the status-quo, as has often been found in the literature. 
That is, in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), where all subjects start with the optimal portfolio 
(AABB), the optimal portfolio structure should have been selected more often than in 
Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), in which no subject was provided with an ideally structured 
portfolio. As a matter of fact, the subjects did not retain their initial portfolios. In Treatment 
3 (VIEW+100%OPT), 39.2% of the subjects reassembled their portfolio before the start of the 
first period, resulting in only 60.8% of the portfolios having the ideal structure (AABB) before 
the start of the first period (see Figure 5 and Table A-9 in Appendix 3). Over the course of the 
game, this percentage drops even further.  
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Figure 5: Percental Distribution of the Portfolios in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT) 
 
In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), the share of the optimal portfolio (AABB) increases to 45.3% 
even before the first period and ranges between 45% and 30% from Period 3 to Period 15 
(see Figure 4 and Table A-7 in Appendix 3). 
In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), 39.8% of all portfolios have the optimal structure. In Treat-
ment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), only 40.9% of portfolios with this structure remain. This difference 
is small and non-relevant according to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The p-value is 
0.6626. Hypothesis 5 states that the average deviation from the rational strategy (always 
portfolio AABB) will not be stronger in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 3 
(VIEW+100%OPT). Hypothesis 5 cannot be discarded. 
We assumed that, given the status-quo bias in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), the optimal 
portfolio (AABB) would be chosen more often than in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), which 
could have resulted in a significantly lower exposure to risk. As a matter of fact, the average 
exposures to risk (standard deviation) are 11.37 in Treatment 1 and 11.29 in Treatment 3. 
According to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, this difference is not relevant. The p-value is 
0.9741. Hypothesis 6 states that the average exposure to risk will not be higher in Treatment 
1 (VIEW+0%OPT) than in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT). Hypothesis 6 cannot be rejected. 
As an intermediate result, we conclude that most subjects do not behave rationally when 
compiling their portfolios; however, this deviation from the rational strategy is not explained 



























AAAA AAAB AABB ABBB BBBB
- 30 - 
3.4 The Gambler’s Fallacy 
It is plausible to believe that subjects inferred from past random events that a certain se-
quence of future events would occur, even though this is a nonsensical interpretation of in-
dependent random events. To see if this was indeed the case, we assess the reasons the 
subjects gave for their portfolio choices at the beginning of Period 5 and at the beginning of 
Period 11. In the experiment, the subjects were asked to provide the following information: 
“Please give a short explanation for your decision in Period 5 (Period 11)! This explanation 
does not affect your result! You can openly state your considerations.” We expected to re-
ceive answers demonstrating that the subjects had indeed fallen prey to the gambler’s falla-
cy.11 
We differentiate between the following clusters of reasons: (1) Rational consideration (suit-
able orientation toward the expected value of the income return and the risk); (2) herding 
(following the majority of investors); (3) herding (following the most successful investor, the 
guru); (4) status-quo bias (following the present portfolio); (5) the gambler’s fallacy (follow-
ing the history of random events); (6) incomprehensible explanations;12 and (7) other rea-
sons.13 
Figure 6: Percentage of the Named Reasons for the Portfolio Choices 
 
                                                          
11 Examples of answers demonstrating the gambler’s fallacy: “One of the stocks did not show a positive value 
development which is why I assume that this stock develops positively in the next period.” “The value of Stock 
A has developed more positively than Stock B which is why I hope that Stock B now develops positively.” “The 
performance of Stock B in period 10 was 0 and Stock A showed an added value of 7, which is why I assume that 
Stock B could gain in the next period.” “With Stock A having developed positively, I now invest in Stock B.” 
12 Incomprehensible explanations are, for instance, filling the answer box with random letters or only numbers. 
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It can be concluded that subjects often tried to forecast future random events from past 
random events. This consideration was detected in 40.67% of the answers (see Figure 6). 
The frequency of this reasoning significantly exceeds a barely accidental distribution of an-
swers. The Chi-square goodness-of-fit test shows a p-value of 0.000. Hypothesis 7 states that 
the gambler’s fallacy is not going to be one of the main reasons for certain portfolio choices. 
Hypothesis 7 is rejected. It appears that the gambler’s fallacy contributes significantly to irra-
tional portfolio choices. 
The question remains whether a behavioral pattern explaining the gambler’s fallacy can be 
directly explained by analyzing the portfolio choices. The sequence of random events (in-
come return of Stock A and Stock B) was structured by coin toss in advance and then taken 
as a basis in all treatments (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Sequence of Random Events and Resulting Gambler’s Fallacy 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Random Event 
of Stock A 
±0 +7 ±0 +7 +7 ±0 ±0 +7 ±0 ±0 +7 +7 ±0 ±0 +7 
Random Event 
of Stock B 
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The first row of Table 8 lists the periods of the experiment. The second and the third rows 
list the sequences of random events of Stock A and Stock B (income return of ±0 or +7). The 
fourth line shows which stock is preferred by the subjects who fall prey to the gambler’s fal-
lacy. In Period 1, for instance, Stock A has an income return of ±0 ECU and Stock B has an 
income return of +7 ECU. This is the development that the subjects can see before Period 2. 
This results in a preference for Stock A. Before the start of Period 3, the “errant gambler” 
again prefers Stock A. This is because, in the previous period, both stocks had a positive in-
come return (+7 ECU) but for Stock A, it is the first in succession, while it is the second in 
succession for Stock B. Before Period 4, the events of Period 2 are repeated and result in yet 
another preference for Stock A. Period by period, considerations such as these lead to pref-
erences that are listed in the fourth line of the table. 
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If all portfolios of all subjects contain more Stocks A than Stocks B, we call this an overweight 
of Stock A. If all portfolios of all subjects contain more Stocks B than Stocks A, we call this an 
overweight of Stock B. We can establish that Stock A (Stock B) is being overly weighted if the 
gambler’s fallacy leads to a preference for Stock A (Stock B). And this is exactly what occurs 
in the fifth row of Table 8 (for more specific detail, see Table A-10 in Appendix 4). In seven 
periods (Periods 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 14, and 15), we would expect Stock A to be overly weighted 
according to the gambler’s fallacy, which is indeed the case (see sixth row in Table 8). In sev-
en periods (Periods 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 13), we would expect Stock B to be overly weighted 
according to gambler’s fallacy, which is also the case (see seventh row in Table 8). In a 2 x 2 
matrix on the predictive accuracy of the gambler’s fallacy regarding the overweight of stocks 
A and B in Periods 2–15, the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test shows that a predictive accuracy 
of 14:0, which is highly significant (p-value = 0.000). 
Hypothesis 8 states that a positive (negative) income return in the current period does not 
reduce (increases) the popularity of this stock in the next period. Hypothesis 8, therefore, 
must be rejected. It is obvious that the gambler’s fallacy affects the subjects’ portfolio choic-
es and thereby contributes to the fact that the rational choice (to always chose the portfolio 
with the minimum variance) is observed in only 37.7% of all decisions made by the subjects. 
This result specifically confirms the study by Stöckl et al. (2015) that also demonstrates that 
investment decisions can be influenced by the gambler’s fallacy. We can also conclude that 
the gambler’s fallacy is rather unaffected by general conditions. It occurs regardless of 
whether information is or is not provided about the other subjects’ behavior, and also mani-
fests regardless of whether or not subjects start with an optimal portfolio. Stöckl et al. 
(2015), too, affirm the stability of the gambler’s fallacy under various modes of communica-
tion or in the event of group decisions. 
Barron and Leider (2010) also find indications of the gambler’s fallacy. However, in their 
study, the gambler’s fallacy does not prove stable if long historic time series of random 
events are shown to the subjects. Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016) also find indications of 
gambler’s fallacy, which in their study is stronger in inexperienced subjects than in experi-
enced subjects. Furthermore, Suetens, Galbo-Joergensen, and Tyran (2016) show that the 
gambler’s fallacy can change into a hot-hand fallacy if a certain event reoccurs in unusually 
long streaks. Our results are in accordance with the studies by Huber, Kirchler, and Stöckl 
(2010) and Ayton and Fischer (2004). These studies show that the gambler’s fallacy mani-
fests in the prognosis of random events. But these studies also show that, when estimating 
people’s success, the hot-hand fallacy is predominant. 
4 Conclusion 
The present experimental study examines subjects’ diversification behavior. It focuses on the 
research question of whether herding (being guided by most fellow investors or by the most 
successful investor (guru)), status-quo bias, and / or the gambler’s fallacy can explain why 
many subjects maintain clearly underdiversified portfolios. Although much empirical evi-
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dence has been found to explain the influence of these phenomena (herding, status-quo 
bias, and the gambler’s fallacy) on many economic decisions, they have not been experimen-
tally examined in the context of diversification decisions. 
This experiment follows the approach by Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015): There are only 
two alternatives for investment (Stock A and Stock B), which can produce only two results. 
Either they bring an income return of ±0 ECU or a return of +7 ECU per period. Both results 
occur with a probability of 50%. Stock A’s return and Stock B’s return are independent 
events. In this environment, the efficient frontier is reduced to one point (equal mixture of 
Stock A and Stock B), so that the subjects’ degree of risk aversion does not influence optimal 
portfolio choice. 
In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), the subjects receive information on their fellow investors in 
each period. They learn who chose which portfolio and how successful everyone was with 
their decisions. In Treatment 2 (NOVIEW+0%OPT) this information is not provided. A com-
parison of Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 is intended to indicate the extent to which subjects 
are distracted from making optimal portfolio choices due to herding behavior (being guided 
by most fellow investors or by the most successful investor (guru)). Herding was not ob-
served: The subjects neither followed most of their fellow investors nor did they emulate the 
most successful investor (guru). We draw the conclusion that herding does not play a signifi-
cant role in explaining non-optimal portfolio choices. 
In Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT), the subjects start with different portfolios. Each of the port-
folios AAAA, AAAB, ABBB, and BBBB is given to 25% of the subjects at the start of the exper-
iment. In Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT), 100% of the subjects receive the optimal portfolio 
(AABB). If status-quo bias is playing a role in diversification decisions, the optimal portfolio 
should be chosen more often in Treatment 3 (VIEW+100%OPT) and the average exposure to 
risk should be less than in Treatment 1 (VIEW+0%OPT). However, the experiment did not 
reveal a significant difference between Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 regarding the choice of 
optimal portfolios or the average exposure to risk. Hence, status-quo bias does not explain 
non-optimal portfolio choices. In this respect, our results clearly contradict the study by 
Brown and Kagel (2009). 
Over the course of the experiment, the subjects were asked twice about their reasons for 
making a certain decision. We conclude from their answers that many subjects are inclined 
to infer future developments from past random events. If a positive event (+7 ECU) has oc-
curred for Stock A (Stock B), the subjects tend to assume that Stock B (Stock A) will be the 
optimal choice in the next period. Conversely, if a negative event (±0 ECU) has occurred for 
Stock A (Stock B), the subjects tend to assume that Stock A (Stock B) will be the optimal 
choice in the next period. This phenomenon, known as the gambler’s fallacy, is clearly visible 
when analyzing the subjects’ portfolio choices. This result particularly confirms the study by 
Stöckl et al. (2015) that shows that investment decisions can be influenced by the gambler’s 
fallacy and that the latter is stable under different general conditions. 
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Most portfolio choices (62.3%) in this experiment were non-optimal. However, neither herd-
ing nor status-quo bias contributed to this irrational behavior. The gambler’s fallacy, howev-
er, had a substantial influence on the subjects’ portfolio choices. 
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Appendix 1: Instructions, Control Questions, Screenshot, Assessment of Risk 
Attitude 
Instructions (Treatment 1 and Treatment 3) 
 
The Game 
By investing in stocks, you can benefit from the income return. There are two securities 
(Stock A and Stock B) to choose from. In each period of the game, the value of Stock A is 
changed by +0 experimental currency units (ECU) or +7 experimental currency units (ECU); 
both events occur with a probability of 50%. The same is true for Stock B. Both securities 
have an expected value of +3.50 ECU per period. The performances of both stocks are inde-
pendent random events. 15 periods will be played in total and in each period, you have 4 
units at your disposal that must be invested. The 4 units can be invested in the following 
portfolio combinations: 
 
Portfolio 1: AAAA 
Portfolio 2: AAAB 
Portfolio 3: AABB 
Portfolio 4: ABBB 
Portfolio 5: BBBB 
 
The game starts at period 0. At period 0, you have the possibility to restructure the portfolio 
that was randomly assigned to you. The performance of the stocks for the single periods 
were previously determined by 15 x two coin tosses (one toss for Stock A and one toss for 
Stock B). “Heads” signifies a good period (+7 ECU) and “tails” signifies a weak period (+0 
ECU). You can earn up to 420 ECU in the 15 periods. 
For maximum transparency, you will be shown your results and all subjects will be ranked 
after each period. The ranking is established according to the total earnings. You will there-
fore be able to compare the performance of your portfolio to the performance of the other 
subjects’ portfolios. You can also earn up to €3.85 in a lottery, detailed information on which 
you will receive in due course. 
 
The Payout 
In the 15 periods, you can earn up to 420 ECU with the securities. 1 ECU equals €0.10. The 
maximum payout is €42.00 (420 x 0.10). Up to €3.85 from the lottery are added to this sum. 
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Please note: 
• Please keep quiet during the experiment! 
• Please do not look at your seatmate’s monitor! 
• Auxiliary devices (calculators, smartphones etc.) are not allowed. All electronic devices 
must be switched off! 
Instructions (Treatment 2) 
 
The Game 
By investing in stocks, you can benefit from the income return. There are two securities 
(Stock A and Stock B) to choose from. In each period of the game, the value of Stock A is 
changed by +0 experimental currency units (ECU) or +7 experimental currency units (ECU); 
both events occur with a probability of 50%. The same is true for Stock B. Both securities 
have an expected value of +3.50 ECU per period. The performances of both stocks are inde-
pendent random events. 15 periods will be played in total and in each period, you have 4 
units at your disposal that must be invested. The 4 units can be invested in the following 
portfolio combinations: 
 
Portfolio 1: AAAA 
Portfolio 2: AAAB 
Portfolio 3: AABB 
Portfolio 4: ABBB 
Portfolio 5: BBBB 
 
The game starts at period 0. At period 0, you have the possibility to restructure the portfolio 
that was randomly assigned to you. The performance of the stocks for the single periods 
were previously determined by 15 x two coin tosses (one toss for Stock A and one toss for 
Stock B). “Heads” signifies a good period (+7 ECU) and “tails” signifies a weak period (+0 
ECU). You can earn up to 420 ECU in the 15 periods. For maximum transparency, you will be 
shown your results after each period. You can also earn up to €3.85 in a lottery, detailed 
information on which you will receive in due course. 
 
The Payout 
In the 15 periods, you can earn up to 420 ECU with the securities. 1 ECU equals €0.10. The 
maximum payout is €42.00 (420 x 0.10). Up to €3.85 from the lottery are added to this sum. 
In total, you can earn up to €45.85. You will receive your money at the end of the experi-
ment. 
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Please Note: 
• Please keep quiet during the experiment! 
• Please do not look at your seatmate’s monitor! 
• Auxiliary devices (calculators, smartphones etc.) are not allowed. All electronic devices 
must be switched off! 
Control Questions 
Control questions (tick the box): 
 
1. What is your task in this game? 
ʘ Solving mathematical problems. 
ʘ Investing in stocks and taking part in a lottery. (correct) 
ʘ Giving economic forecasts. 
 
2. How many different securities are there to choose from and how many free stocks do 
you receive? 
ʘ There are 4 different securities to choose from and I receive 2 free stocks. 
ʘ There are 2 different securities to choose from and I receive 2 free stocks. 
ʘ There are 2 different securities to choose from and I receive 4 free stocks. (correct) 
 
3. On what does the payout depend in the 15 periods? 
ʘ On the dividend payouts. 
ʘ On the performance of the stocks. (correct) 
ʘ On the DAX market trend. 
 
4. How many different combinations of the portfolio are possible? 
ʘ 2 
ʘ 4 
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Screenshot Treatment 1 (recreated to increase readability) 
 
You are subject 10. Your result in period 1: 
The performance of 
Stock A in Period 1 is  
The performance of 
Stock B in Period 1 is 
Your payout for Period 
1 is 
Your total payout so 
far amounts to 
±0 ECU +7 ECU 14 ECU 14 ECU 
Previous results of all subjects: 
Ranking according to 
Previous Success 
Subjects Pay-out so far Last Portfolio Compo-
sition 
1 3 28 ECU BBBB 
1 5 28 ECU BBBB 
3 4 21 ECU ABBB 
4 7 14 ECU AABB 
4 9 14 ECU AABB 
4 10 14 ECU AABB 
7 1 7 ECU AAAB 
7 6 7 ECU AAAB 
9 2 0 ECU AAAA 
9 8 0 ECU AAAA 
There are still two stocks to choose between (Stock A and Stock B). The value developments 
for both stocks are independent random processes with the possible results +7 ECU (good 
period development) and ±0 ECU (unprofitable period development). 
You receive 4 stocks. You can choose whether to receive 4 Stocks A, 3 Stocks A and one 
Stock B, 2 Stocks A and 2 Stocks B, one Stock A and three Stocks B or 4 Stocks B. The value 
developments of the stocks in period 2 were previously determined by two coin tosses (one 
toss for Stock A and one toss for Stock B). “Heads” means a good development in the period 
whereas tails stands for a negative period development (±0 ECU). 
Do you want to reallocate your portfolio? If not, please click on “O.K.”! If so, please choose 
your preferred portfolio and then click on “O.K.”! 
I choose: ʘ 4 Stocks A 
ʘ 3 Stocks A + 1 Stock B 
ʘ 2 Stocks A + 2 Stocks B 
ʘ 1 Stock A + 3 Stocks B 
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Instructions to Determine the Risk Preference 
Each decision is a choice between “version A” and “version B”. Each version is comparable to 
a lottery with different payouts and different probabilities of occurrence. 
You have 10 decisions to make and enter. One of these decisions will be considered to de-
termine your payout from the lottery as follows: After you entered all your decisions, a ten-
sided dice is thrown to select one of the 10 decisions. Each of the decisions therefore has a 
10% probability of being chosen. The selected lottery (A or B) is then played. The probability 
of occurrence is simulated by an urn containing table tennis balls: In an urn with 10 table 
tennis balls the number of orange balls determines the probability of the higher payout. 
Example for decision no. 8: In an urn with 10 table tennis balls are 8 orange-colored and 2 
white balls. The probability that a randomly picked ball is orange is therefore 80%. If the 
picked ball is orange, you will receive €2.00 in version A and €3.85 in version B. If the picked 
ball is white, you will receive €1.60 in version A and €0.10 in version B. So: You make 10 de-
cisions (either A or B), one of them is randomly selected (with a dice) and played (with an 
urn and 10 table tennis balls) – the result will determine your payout from the lottery. Please 
answer the following control questions about the lottery before making any decisions. 
Risk 
level 



























1 10% €2.00 90% €1.60 10% €3.85 90% €0.10  
2 20% €2.00 80% €1.60 20% €3.85 80% €0.10  
3 30% €2.00 70% €1.60 30% €3.85 70% €0.10  
4 40% €2.00 60% €1.60 40% €3.85 60% €0.10  
5 50% €2.00 50% €1.60 50% €3.85 50% €0.10  
6 60% €2.00 40% €1.60 60% €3.85 40% €0.10  
7 70% €2.00 30% €1.60 70% €3.85 30% €0.10  
8 80% €2.00 20% €1.60 80% €3.85 20% €0.10  
9 90% €2.00 10% €1.60 90% €3.85 10% €0.10  
10 100% €2.00 0% €1.60 100% €3.85 0% €0.10  
 
 
Control Questions to Determine the Risk Preference 
Control questions (tick the box): 
 
1. What is the minimum and the maximum payout in the lottery? 
ʘ The minimum payout is €0.00 and the maximum payout is €1.60. 
ʘ The minimum payout is €0.10 and the maximum payout is €3.85. (correct) 
ʘ The minimum payout is €0.10 and the maximum payout is €1.60. 
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2. If the dice selects the 7th decision and you choose version A and have drawn a white 
table tennis ball from the urn, what is your payout? 
ʘ €0.00 
ʘ €2.00 
ʘ €1.60 (correct) 
 
3. How many white table tennis balls are in the urn if the dice chooses the tenth deci-
sion? 
ʘ 10 
ʘ 0 (correct) 
ʘ 5 
 




ʘ 4 (correct) 
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Appendix 2: Results of Treatment 1 per Session 




































































































































Distrib. 25% 25% 0% 25% 25% 
- - 
Period 1 20.0% 0.0% 60.0% 20.0% 0.0% - - 
Period 2 10.0% 20.0% 70.0% 0.0% 0.0% AABB BBBA 
Period 3 20.0% 10.0% 30.0% 10.0% 30.0% AABB AABB 
Period 4 20.0% 10.0% 40.0% 20.0% 10.0% AABB, BBBB BBBB 
Period 5 0.0% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 30.0% AABB AAAA  
Period 6 0.0% 10.0% 60.0% 20.0% 10.0% AABB AAAB 
Period 7 0.0% 10.0% 80.0% 0.0% 10.0% AABB AABB 
Period 8 10.0% 20.0% 40.0% 10.0% 20.0% AABB AABB 
Period 9 10.0% 0.0% 40.0% 10.0% 40.0% AABB BBBA 
Period 10 10.0% 10.0% 30.0% 20.0% 30.0% AABB, BBBB BBBB, AABB 
Period 11 20.0% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 10.0% AABB, BBBB BBBB 
Period 12 20.0% 0.0% 50.0% 20.0% 10.0% AABB AAAA 
Period 13  20.0% 10.0% 40.0% 20.0% 10.0% AABB BBBB 
Period 14 30.0% 0.0% 40.0% 30.0% 0.0% AABB AAAA 
Period 15 30.0% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 0.0% AABB AAAA 
In Session 1 of Treatment 1, 60% of the subjects have already settled on portfolio AABB. This 
number increases to 70% in Period 2. Subject to some variations, it increases to 80% in Peri-
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tion 25% 25% 0% 25% 25% 
- - 
Period 1 0.0% 22.2% 44.4% 33.3% 0.0% - - 
Period 2 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 3 0.0% 11.1% 55.6% 33.3% 0.0% AABB AABB, ABBB 
Period 4 11.1% 11.1% 55.6% 22.2% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 5 0.0% 11.1% 55.6% 22.2% 11.1% AABB ABBB 
Period 6 11.1% 0.0% 44.4% 44.4% 0.0% AABB AABB, ABBB 
Period 7 11.1% 0.0% 55.6% 33.3% 0.0% AABB, ABBB AABB, ABBB 
Period 8 11.1% 22.2% 44.4% 11.1% 11.1% AABB ABBB 
Period 9 11.1% 22.2% 33.3% 22.2% 11.1% AABB AAAB 
Period 10 11.1% 11.1% 44.4% 22.2% 11.1% AABB AABB 
Period 11 22.2% 22.2% 44.4% 11.1% 0.0% AABB BBBB, ABBB 
Period 12 0.0% 11.1% 44.4% 33.3% 11.1% AABB AAAA 
Period 13  11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 55.6% 11.1% AABB BBBB 
Period 14 22.2% 44.4% 22.2% 0.0% 11.1% ABBB BBBB, ABBB 
Period 15 33.3% 33.3% 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% AAAB BBBB, AAAB 
In Session 2 of Treatment 1 we again observe a trend toward the stock combination AABB. In 
the first period, 44% of the subjects chose this portfolio structure, and 67% do so in the sec-
ond period. Subsequently, however, these decisions recede to 11% in Period 13, only to end 
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25% 25% 0% 25% 25% - - 
Period 1 11.1% 33.3% 33.3% 11.1% 11.1% - - 
Period 2 11.1% 0.0% 77.8% 11.1% 0.0% AAAB, AABB BBBB 
Period 3 11.1% 44.4% 44.4% 0.0% 0.0% AABB AAAA 
Period 4 0.0% 22.2% 66.7% 0.0% 11.1% AAAB, AABB AAAA, AAAB, AABB 
Period 5 0.0% 11.1% 44.4% 22.2% 22.2% AABB AAAB 
Period 6 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 22.2% 44.4% AABB BBBB 
Period 7 0.0% 22.2% 55.6% 0.0% 22.2% BBBB BBBB 
Period 8 11.1% 0.0% 55.6% 11.1% 22.2% AABB AAAB, AABB, BBBB 
Period 9 11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 44.4% 11.1% AABB AAAA 
Period 10 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 44.4% 22.2% ABBB BBBB 
Period 11 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 22.2% 11.1% ABBB BBBB 
Period 12 11.1% 11.1% 66.7% 0.0% 11.1% AABB AAAA, BBBB 
Period 13  0.0% 0.0% 55.6% 22.2% 22.2% AABB AAAA, BBBB 
Period 14 11.1% 22.2% 55.6% 0.0% 11.1% ABBB BBBB 
Period 15 11.1% 33.3% 44.4% 0.0% 11.1% AAAB AAAA, AAAB 
In Session 3 of Treatment 1, an increasing number of subjects choose portfolio BBBB. None 
of the subjects in Period 3 decides for this combination. In Period 4, 11% make this decision, 
and as much as 22% do so in Period 5, and even 44% in Period 6. This development, howev-
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25% 25% 0% 25% 25% - - 
Period 1 0.0% 30.0% 40.0% 30.0% 0.0% - - 
Period 2 10.0% 30.0% 50.0% 10.0% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 3 0.0% 20.0% 50.0% 30.0% 0.0% AABB AAAA, AABB, ABBB 
Period 4 10.0% 40.0% 40.0% 10.0% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 5 0.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% AAAB, AABB AAAB 
Period 6 0.0% 30.0% 40.0% 20.0% 10.0% AAAB AAAB 
Period 7 10.0% 50.0% 20.0% 10.0% 10.0% AABB AAAB 
Period 8 10.0% 20.0% 55.0% 20.0% 0.0% AAAB BBBB 
Period 9 0.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 10.0% AABB AAAA 
Period 10 0.0% 10.0% 40.0% 40.0% 10.0% AAAB, AABB, ABBB AABB 
Period 11 10.0% 40.0% 40.0% 10.0% 0.0% AABB, ABBB AABB 
Period 12 10.0% 10.0% 20.0% 40.0% 20.0% AAAB, AABB AAAA 
Period 13  0.0% 50.0% 40.0% 0.0% 10.0% ABBB BBBB 
Period 14 30.0% 20.0% 40.0% 0.0% 10.0% AAAB AABB 
Period 15 30.0% 20.0% 40.0% 0.0% 10.0% AABB AAAA 
In Session 4 of Treatment 1, similar results are achieved. The portfolio structure ABBB is in-
creasingly considered by the subjects. In Period 7, this portfolio is selected by 10% of the 
subjects, and by 20%, 30%, and 40% percent in the subsequent periods. This development 
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25% 25% 0% 25% 25% - - 
Period 1 0.0% 14.3% 71.4% 14.3% 0.0% - - 
Period 2 0.0% 28.6% 57.1% 14.3% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 3 0.0% 28.6% 42.9% 28.6% 0.0% AABB AAAB 
Period 4 0.0% 28.6% 42.9% 14.3% 14.3% AABB ABBB 
Period 5 0.0% 71.4% 14.3% 14.3% 0.0% AABB AAAB 
Period 6 0.0% 14.3% 57.1% 28.6% 0.0% AAAB AAAB 
Period 7 0.0% 0.0% 57.1% 28.6% 14.3% AABB ABBB 
Period 8 0.0% 14.3% 28.6% 57.1% 0.0% AABB ABBB 
Period 9 0.0% 14.3% 42.9% 42.9% 0.0% ABBB AAAB 
Period 10 0.0% 14.3% 28.6% 57.1% 0.0% AABB, ABBB AABB 
Period 11 14.3% 42.9% 28.6% 0.0% 14.3% ABBB AAAB, ABBB 
Period 12 14.3% 28.6% 0.0% 57.1% 0.0% AAAB AAAB 
Period 13  0.0% 14.3% 42.9% 42.9% 0.0% ABBB AAAB, ABBB 
Period 14 0.0% 14.3% 28.6% 28.6% 28.6% AABB, ABBB ABBB 
Period 15 0.0% 42.9% 28.6% 14.3% 14.3% AABB, ABBB, BBBB AAAB, ABBB 
In Session 5 of Treatment 1, the combination ABBB is again popular for some time. The 
number of subjects deciding for this portfolio increases from Period 5 (14%), over Periods 6 
and 7 (29%) to Period 8 with 57%. Subject to some variations, this choice recedes to 14% in 
Period 15.   
- 53 - 





































































































































25% 25% 0% 25% 25% - - 
Period 1 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 37.5% 12.5% - - 
Period 2 25.0% 25.0% 12.5% 25.0% 12.5% AABB BBBB 
Period 3 25.0% 37.5% 37.5% 0.0% 0.0% AAAA, AAAB, ABBB ABBB 
Period 4 25.0% 62.5% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% AAAB, AABB AABB 
Period 5 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 0.0% AAAB AAAB 
Period 6 25.0% 12.5% 12.5% 37.5% 12.5% AAAA, AAAB, AABB, ABBB AAAA 
Period 7 12.5% 0.0% 12.5% 37.5% 37.5% ABBB ABBB 
Period 8 37.5% 0.0% 25.0% 37.5% 0.0% ABBB, BBBB BBBB 
Period 9 12.5% 25.0% 25.0% 12.5% 25.0% AAAA, ABBB AABB 
Period 10 25.0% 12.5% 50.0% 0.0% 12.5% AAAB, AABB, BBBB BBBB 
Period 11 37.5% 25.0% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% AABB BBBB 
Period 12 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 25.0% 37.5% AAAA AAAA 
Period 13  37.5% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 25.0% BBBB BBBB 
Period 14 37.5% 37.5% 12.5% 0.0% 12.5% AAAA BBBB 
Period 15 37.5% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 25.0% AAAA, AAAB AAAA 
In Session 6 of Treatment 1, no herding can be established for portfolio AAAB. In Period 1, 
this combination is chosen by 13% of the subjects, by 25% in Period 2, by 38% in Period 3, 
and by as much as 63% in Period 4. In the following period, this development suddenly 
stops. As early as Period 7, this portfolio is no longer chosen by any of the subjects. 
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Appendix 3: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Game 












































































25% 25% 0% 25% 25% 
Period 1 7.5% 18.9% 45.3% 24.5% 3.8% 
Period 2 9.4% 17.0% 56.6% 15.1% 1.9% 
Period 3 9.4% 24.5% 43.4% 17.0% 5.7% 
Period 4 11.3% 28.3% 43.4% 11.3% 5.7% 
Period 5 3.8% 26.4% 37.7% 18.9% 13.2% 
Period 6 5.7% 11.3% 41.5% 28.3% 13.2% 
Period 7 5.7% 15.1% 47.2% 17.0% 15.1% 
Period 8 13.2% 13.2% 41.5% 22.6% 9.4% 
Period 9 7.5% 17.0% 32.1% 26.4% 17.0% 
Period 10 7.5% 9.4% 37.7% 30.2% 15.1% 
Period 11 22.6% 22.6% 37.7% 9.4% 7.5% 
Period 12 13.2% 9.4% 34.0% 28.3% 15.1% 
Period 13  11.3% 18.9% 32.1% 24.5% 13.2% 
Period 14 22.6% 22.6% 34.0% 9.4% 11.3% 
Period 15 24.5% 26.4% 32.1% 7.5% 9.4% 
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25% 25% 0% 25% 25% 
Period 1 2.2% 15.2% 52.2% 21.7% 8.7% 
Period 2 8.7% 30.4% 17.4% 34.8% 8.7% 
Period 3 4.3% 28.3% 32.6% 21.7% 13.0% 
Period 4 10.9% 34.8% 15.2% 19.6% 19.6% 
Period 5 8.7% 13.0% 50.0% 13.0% 15.2% 
Period 6 15.2% 13.0% 39.1% 17.4% 15.2% 
Period 7 13.0% 19.6% 30.4% 28.3% 8.7% 
Period 8 4.3% 39.1% 28.3% 10.9% 17.4% 
Period 9 8.7% 21.7% 21.7% 21.7% 26.1% 
Period 10 4.3% 13.0% 37.0% 26.1% 19.6% 
Period 11 15.2% 26.1% 26.1% 17.4% 15.2% 
Period 12 0.0% 10.9% 39.1% 32.6% 17.4% 
Period 13  4.3% 19.6% 28.3% 32.6% 15.2% 
Period 14 15.2% 30.4% 26.1% 21.7% 6.5% 
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0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
Period 1 5.9% 19.6% 60.8% 7.8% 5.9% 
Period 2 5.9% 29.4% 43.1% 11.8% 9.8% 
Period 3 9.8% 17.6% 43.1% 21.6% 7.8% 
Period 4 11.8% 25.5% 21.6% 23.5% 17.6% 
Period 5 5.9% 13.7% 51.0% 15.7% 13.7% 
Period 6 9.8% 25.5% 37.3% 17.6% 9.8% 
Period 7 5.9% 25.5% 41.2% 19.6% 7.8% 
Period 8 7.8% 35.3% 33.3% 17.6% 5.9% 
Period 9 0.0% 13.7% 47.1% 33.3% 5.9% 
Period 10 3.9% 9.8% 47.1% 27.5% 11.8% 
Period 11 17.6% 15.7% 41.2% 17.6% 7.8% 
Period 12 3.9% 21.6% 39.2% 21.6% 13.7% 
Period 13  5.9% 23.5% 27.5% 23.5% 19.6% 
Period 14 13.7% 25.5% 39.2% 13.7% 7.8% 
Period 15 17.6% 23.5% 41.2% 2.0% 15.7% 
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Appendix 4: Further Results 
Table A-10: Manifestation of the Gambler’s Fallacy in the Portfolio Choices of All Treatments 


















































































































































































2 ±0 +7 A 8.00% 25.33% 40.00% 20.00% 6.67% 6.67% Yes 
3 +7 +7 A 8.00% 23.33% 40.00% 20.00% 8.67% 2.67% Yes 
4 ±0 +7 A 11.33% 29.33% 27.33% 18.00% 14.00% 8.67% Yes 
5 +7 ±0 B 6.00% 18.00% 46.00% 16.00% 14.00% -6.00% Yes 
6 +7 +7 B 10.00% 16.67% 39.33% 21.33% 12.67% -7.33% Yes 
7 ±0 ±0 B 8.00% 20.00% 40.00% 21.33% 10.67% -4.00% Yes 
8 ±0 +7 A 8.67% 28.67% 34.67% 17.33% 10.67% 9.33% Yes 
9 +7 ±0 B 5.33% 17.33% 34.00% 27.33% 16.00% -20.67% Yes 
10 ±0 ±0 B 5.33% 10.67% 40.67% 28.00% 15.33% -27.33% Yes 
11 ±0 +7 A 18.67% 21.33% 35.33% 14.67% 10.00% 15.33% Yes 
12 +7 ±0 B 6.00% 14.00% 37.33% 27.33% 15.33% -22.67% Yes 
13 +7 +7 B 7.33% 20.67% 29.33% 26.67% 16.00% -14.67% Yes 
14 ±0 +7 A 17.33% 26.00% 33.33% 14.67% 8.67% 20.00% Yes 
15 ±0 ±0 A 19.33% 24.00% 36.00% 8.67% 12.00% 22.67% Yes 
Table A-10 shows that the gambler’s fallacy did indeed consistently influence the subjects’ 
portfolio choices. The first column lists those periods of the game in which the gambler’s 
fallacy could take effect. No random events existed before Period 1, which is why the gam-
bler’s fallacy could not take effect before the portfolio choice in Period 2. The second and 
third columns of Table A-10 list the random events of the previous periods. The fourth col-
umn shows which stock is preferred by the subjects who fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy. In 
Period 1, for instance, Stock A has an income return of ±0 ECU and Stock B has an income 
return of +7 ECU. This is the development that the subjects can see before Period 2. This 
results in a preference for Stock A. Before the start of Period 3, the “errant gambler” again 
prefers Stock A because, in the previous period, both stocks had a positive income return (+7 
ECU) but for Stock A, it is the first in succession, while it is the second in succession for Stock 
B. Before Period 4, the events of Period 2 are repeated and result in yet another preference 
for Stock A. Period by period, considerations such as these lead to preferences that are listed 
in the fourth column of Table A-10. 
Columns 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Table A-10 show the percentages of the five possible portfolio 
compilations (AAAA, AAAB, AABB, ABBB and BBBB) for all three treatments (Treatment 1, 
Treatment 2, and Treatment 3; for detailed results, see Tables A-7, A-8, and A-9 in Appendix 
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3). Column 10 of Table A-10 displays an unweighted spread, calculated by subtracting the 
portfolio decisions that chose Stock B (Columns 8 (Y) and 9 (Z)) from those that prefer Stock 
A (Columns 5 (W) and 6 (X)). We calculate: (W + X) – (Y + Z). In Period 2 this means: (8.00 + 
25.33) – (20.00 + 6.67) = 6.67. 
If the subtraction results in a positive value, it can be concluded that the subjects preferred 
Stock A to Stock B when compiling their portfolios. If the subtraction results in a negative 
value, it can be concluded that the subjects preferred Stock B to Stock A when assembling 
their portfolios. Consequently, we can expect that a preference for Stock A results in a posi-
tive balance and that a preference for Stock B results in a negative balance. In Column 11 of 
Table A-10, we analyze which periods match our expectations, and we can see that this oc-
curs without exception. When in Column 4 the Stock A (Stock B) is listed, then the balance in 
Column 10 is positive (negative). 
Considering that the subjects fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy and accordingly develop pref-
erences for Stock A or Stock B (Column 4 of Table A-10), then we can find a suitable explana-
tion for the surplus of Stock A (positive indication in Column 10) or, respectively, for the sur-
plus of Stock B (negative indication in Column 10) in all periods. 
Table A-11: Variances and Standard Deviations of the Five Portfolios Considering the Actual 
Events for Stock A and Stock B in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) 
Period Events Performance of Portfolios 
 Stock A Stock B AAAA AAAB AABB ABBB BBBB 
1 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +14 +21 +28 
2 +7 +7 +28 +28 +28 +28 +28 
3 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +14 +21 +28 
4 +7 ±0 +28 +21 +14 +7 ±0 
5 +7 +7 +28 +28 +28 +28 +28 
6 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 
7 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +14 +21 +28 
8 +7 ±0 +28 +21 +14 +7 ±0 
9 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 
10 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +14 +21 +28 
11 +7 ±0 +28 +21 +14 +7 ±0 
12 +7 +7 +28 +28 +28 +28 +28 
13 ±0 +7 ±0 +7 +14 +21 +28 
14 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 ±0 
15 +7 ±0 +28 +21 +14 +7 ±0 
  Variance 209.07 115.27 84.00 115.27 209.07 
  
Stand. 
Dev. 14.46 10.74 9.17 10.74 14.46 
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Abstract 
This experimental study addresses the question of whether positive and negative emotions 
have an influence on diversification behavior, and it reveals that only a small part of subjects 
take rational decisions and always choose the optimal portfolio. In addition, the study shows 
that the mood of subjects has an influence on their portfolio decisions and thus also on their 
exposure to risk. The average risk of the portfolio – measured against the standard deviation 
of the returns – is lower in the treatment entitled ‘neutral’ than in the treatments entitled 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’.  
Keywords 
positive affect; negative affect; mood; emotions; risk exposure; laboratory experiment; port-
folio choice; investment decisions; correlation neglect; information processing; investor ra-
tionality 
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1 Introduction 
The danger of having a portfolio of securities which is not optimally diversified was shown in 
September 2015, for example: Due to the Volkswagen Group's Dieselgate scandal, German 
car shares suffered considerable losses within a period of only a few days. Those who had a 
high proportion of automobile industry shares in their portfolio rapidly lost up to a third of 
the value of their portfolio. Markowitz (1952) showed that for risk-averse subjects it makes 
sense to hold diversified securities portfolios. Nevertheless, in reality many subjects hold 
insufficiently diversified securities portfolios (see, for example,  Ackert et al., 2015; Ander-
son, 2013; Hibbert et al., 2012; Ackert et al., 2011; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008; Meulbroek, 
2005; Polkovnichenko, 2005; Huberman and Sengmueller, 2004; Agnew et al., 2003; Poterba 
2003; Mitchell and Utkus 2002; Guiso et al., 2002; Benartzi, 2001; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; 
Barber and Odean, 2000; De Bondt, 1998; Kelly, 1995; Bode et al., 1994; French and Poterba, 
1991; Blume and Friend, 1975; Lease et al., 1974).  
There are many possible reasons for securities portfolios not being optimally diversified. 
Experimental economic research has already presented findings on this subject: The correla-
tions between investment alternatives are frequently neglected by investors. Considerable 
empirical evidence already exists for this phenomenon of correlation neglect (see, for exam-
ple, Gubaydullina and Spiwoks, 2015; Eyster and Weizsäcker, 2010; Hedesstrom et al., 2006; 
Benartzi and Thaler, 2001). Many investors distribute their assets evenly across all of the 
investment alternatives available. This phenomenon, which is known as the 1/N heuristic, is 
a special form of correlation neglect. In the meantime, there are also significant empirical 
findings on this issue (see, for example, Fernandes 2013; Morrin et al., 2012; Baltussen and 
Post, 2011; Hedesstrom et al., 2006, and Benartzi and Thaler, 2001). Many investors allow 
themselves to be misled by irrelevant information, or attach too much importance to certain 
information (cf. Gubaydullina and Spiwoks, 2015; Kallir and Sonsino, 2009; Goetzmann and 
Kumar, 2008). Investment decisions are frequently skewed by an inappropriately strong fo-
cus on domestic financial instruments. This phenomenon is known as home bias, and has 
also been proven empirically (cf. Weber et al., 2005; Poterba, 2003; Mitchell and Utkus, 
2002). Many investors also tend to see patterns where in reality there are none. This often 
leads to random processes being dealt with inappropriately. In this way, the so-called gam-
bler’s error can impede optimal decisions on diversification (see, for example, Filiz et al., 
2018; Stöckl et al., 2015; Huber et al., 2010). 
The influence of emotions on decision-making is now well-established in the literature (for 
an overview see, for example, George and Dane, 2016; Lerner et al., 2015; Vohs et al., 2007; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Baumeister et al., 2007; Pham, 2007; Shiv et al., 2005; Nofsinger, 
2005; Lucey and Dowling, 2005; Daniel et al., 2002; Hirshleifer, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 
2001; Isen, 2000; Loewenstein, 2000; Schwarz, 2000; Elster, 1998; Bless et al., 1996; Elster, 
1996; Johnson and Tversky, 1983). 
In recent decades, the effects of sunshine, rain, cloud cover, wind strength, storms and other 
meteorological factors on market returns at share exchanges worldwide have been thor-
oughly investigated (Kim, 2017; Kaustia and Rantapuska, 2016; Apergis et al., 2016; Bassi et 
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al., 2013; Lu and Chou, 2012; Mirza et al., 2012; Floros, 2011; Symeonidis et al., 2010; Kang 
et al., 2010; Shu and Hung, 2009; Chang et al., 2008; Keef and Roush, 2007; Chang et al., 
2006; Dowling and Lucey, 2005; Cao and Wei, 2005; Tufan and Hamarat, 2004; Krivelyova 
and Robotti, 2003; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Kamstra et al., 2003; Pardo and Enric, 
2002; Krämer and Runde, 1997; Saunders, 1993). While doing so, attempts were also made 
to create a connection between the weather and the mood of capital market protagonists. 
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) showed that share market returns on days when the sun 
shined in the morning were higher on average than on days with bad weather. This result 
was explained by sunshine favoring a positive atmosphere among investors. Kamstra et al. 
(2003) established that share market returns varied according to the length of the day, 
which has been interpreted in a similar way to the results Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003). 
Kaustia and Rantapuska (2016) carried out a similar study – however, they only observed a 
weak connection between the effect of the length of a respective day and investment deci-
sions.  
Experimental economic research is increasingly interested in the question of which influence 
positive and negative emotions have on investment decisions. Grable and Roszkowski 
(2008), for example, showed in an experimental study that subjects whose positive emotions 
predominate were willing to take greater financial risks. Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) carried 
out experiments to establish how different moods affected investment decisions. This re-
vealed that subjects with predominantly negative emotions tend to choose low-risk invest-
ments. Subjects with predominantly positive emotions, on the other hand, tended to favour 
riskier investments. Subjects whose emotions are positive are more optimistic in relation to 
their investment decisions. Kaplanski et al. (2015) showed that the mood of investors had an 
influence on their expectations in terms of returns, and on their perception of risk. The hap-
pier the subjects were, the greater their expectations were of their returns, and the lower 
their presumed risk is of stock market investments. Experiments carried out by Lee and An-
drade (2014) showed that negative affects promote risk aversion in investment decisions. 
Lahav and Meer (2012) as well as Andrade et al. (2016) used experiments to examine the 
effect of emotions on speculative bubbles, whereby they established that speculative bub-
bles were larger in the case of positive affects than with negative affects. Breaban and Nous-
sair (2018) followed a similar approach, though their findings were not as clear-cut as those 
of Lahav and Meer (2012) or of Andrade et al. (2016). 
As one can see, there are a range of findings showing that the mood of investors can influ-
ence their investment decisions. However, as yet there have been no studies on whether the 
mood of investors also has an effect on their diversification behavior and thus on the expo-
sure to risk in differently composed portfolios. This research topic has, however, now been 
addressed by this study. 
Chapter 2 deals with the design of the experiment. In Chapter 3, hypotheses are elaborated, 
and in Chapter 4 the results are presented and analyzed. In Chapter 5 the most important 
results of the investigation are summarized. 
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2 Experimental Design 
2.1 Diversification Decisions 
Markowitz (1952) proceeds from a very simple starting point: A choice between two risky 
securities. The first security (x1) has a comparatively low expected return (e1) and a compara-
tively low-risk exposure (s1). The second security (x2) has a higher expected return (e2) and a 
higher risk exposure (s2). As long as the two securities x1 and x2 are not fully positively corre-
lated in terms of the level of their returns, the returns of the portfolios develop in a propor-
tional way while their risk exposure is disproportionately low. When viewing expected re-
turns and risk exposure simultaneously, the so-called efficient frontier emerges. The efficient 
frontier shows all the possible combinations of expected returns and risk which can be con-
sidered efficient. However, for a specific investor, only one point on this efficient frontier 
represents the optimal combination of securities. Which point that is depends on the shape 
of the field of indifference curves of the investor in question. However, it has not been pos-
sible until now to determine the exact characteristic of the indifference curve field of a spe-
cific subject. In order to nevertheless be able to differentiate between diversification deci-
sions which are suboptimal and optimal, the approach by Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015) 
is useful: In this method there are two securities x1 and x2 which both offer the same return 
(e1 = e2). In this way, the efficient frontier is reduced to a single point (cf. Gubaydullina and 
Spiwoks 2015, Figure 2). In a decision-making situation of this kind, the exact characteristic 
of the indifference curve field of an investor is no longer significant. It suffices to know 
whether the investor should be categorized as risk-averse in order to be able to differentiate 
between optimal and suboptimal diversification. There are various well-established proce-
dures for discovering whether a subject is risk-loving, risk-neutral or risk-averse. In this 
study, the approach used by Holt and Laury (2002) is followed. 
2.2 Tasks 
Each subject has to make four investment decisions (Tasks 1-4), from whose success he or 
she is directly affected.  
In Task 1 there are two different securities to choose from (share A and share B). The sub-
jects have to compile a portfolio which contains four shares. The possible portfolios are thus 
AAAA, AAAB, AABB, ABBB and BBBB. The subjects profit from the dividend payments. The 
price trends of the two shares are ignored in order to create a decision-making situation 
which is as clear as possible. The expectation value of the returns is thus solely based on the 
dividend payments. The dividend payments (= expectation value of the returns) of the two 
shares A and B are identical (eA = eB = €1.50). However, they exhibit different risk profiles. 
Whereas share A generates €3 or €0, share B yields either €1 or €2 (sA > sB). Both events 
have a probability of occurrence of 50%. Whether a favorable or an unfavorable event oc-
curs depends – in both companies – on the economic situation. The yield of the two shares 
are accordingly not independent of each other, they are entirely positively correlated (corre-
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lation coefficient = +1). The subjects are informed of these circumstances. Test questions are 
used to ensure that the subjects have understood this point of departure. 
In Task 1, the subjects are informed about the movements of returns in the past ten years. 
The intention is that in this way they will obtain a specific impression of the possible events – 
of the completely positive correlation and of the different risk profiles of the two securities A 
and B. 
Table 1: Dividend Payments of the Past Ten Years for Share A and Share B 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Share A €3 €0 €3 €0 €0 €0 €3 €3 €0 €3 €? 
Share B €2 €1 €2 €1 €1 €1 €2 €2 €1 €2  €? 
By mixing the two securities A and B, no reduction in risk can be achieved in view of the en-
tirely positive correlation of the dividend payments. The ideal portfolio for risk-averse inves-
tors is thus BBBB (Table 2). 
Table 2: Expectation Value for the Dividend Payments and Variance of the Possible Portfolios 
for Task 1 
Portfolio Composition AAAA AAAB AABB ABBB BBBB 
Expectation Value of Dividend Payment €6 €6 €6 €6 €6 
Variance 36.0 25.0 16.0 9.0 4.0 
At the end of the experiment, and in the presence of the subjects, the actual dividends of 
the shares A and B for the year 2016 are determined randomly by tossing a coin. The sub-
jects then receive a payoff in the amount of the dividend payment of their portfolio. If there 
is a favorable random event (dividend of share A = €3 and dividend of share B = €2), the per-
son who has chosen the portfolio AABB receives a payment of €10 (2 x €3 + 2 x €2). The per-
son who has chosen the portfolio AAAA receives a payment of €12 (4 x €3). If an unfavorable 
random event occurs (dividend of share A = €0 and dividend of share B = €1), the person 
who has selected the portfolio AABB receives €2 (2 x €0 + 2 x €1). The person who has cho-
sen the portfolio AAAA receives €0 (4 x €0). 
In Task 2, on the other hand, a choice can be made between two different investment alter-
natives (share X and share Q). The subjects are asked to compile a portfolio consisting of 
four shares. The possible portfolios are thus XXXX, XXXQ, XXQQ, XQQQ and QQQQ. The sub-
jects profit from the dividend payments. The price trends of the two shares are ignored in 
order to create a decision-making situation which is as clear as possible. The expectation 
value of the returns is thus solely based on the dividend payments. The dividend payments 
(= expectation value of the returns) of the two shares X and Q are identical (eX = eQ = €1.00). 
The risk exposure of the two shares X and Q is also identical (sX = sQ). The two shares pay a 
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dividend of either €0 or €2. With both shares the probability of the occurrence of these two 
events is 50%. The dividend payments of the shares X and Q are based on independent ran-
dom processes (correlation coefficient = 0). The subjects are informed about these circum-
stances. Test questions are used to ensure that the subjects have understood this point of 
departure. 
In Task 2, the subjects are informed about the course of the returns in the past ten years 
(Table 2). The intention is that in this way they will obtain a specific impression of the possi-
ble events. In addition, the intention is to make them realize that the dividend payments of 
the shares are entirely uncorrelated. 
Table 3: Dividend Payments of the Past Ten Years for Share X and Share Q 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Share X €0 €0 €2 €0 €0 €0 €2 €2 €2 €2 €? 
Share Q €0 €2 €2 €2 €0 €2 €0 €0 €2 €0 €? 
By mixing the two shares X and Q, a significant reduction of risk exposure can be achieved in 
view of the uncorrelated movements in the dividend payments. The ideal portfolio for risk-
averse investors is thus XXQQ (Table 4). 
Table 4: Expectation Value for the Dividend Payments and Variance of the Possible Portfolios 
for Task 2  
Portfolio Composition QQQQ QQQX QQXX QXXX XXXX 
Expectation Value of Dividend Payment €4 €4 €4 €4 €4 
Variance 16.0 8.8 6.4 8.8 16.0 
At the end of the experiment, and in the presence of the subjects, the actual dividends of 
the shares X and Q for the year 2016 are determined randomly (by tossing a coin). At the 
end of the game, the subjects then receive a payoff in the amount of the dividend payment 
of their portfolio. If there is an unfavorable random event for share X (dividend of share X = 
€2) and an unfavorable random event for share Q (dividend of share Q = €0), the person who 
has chosen portfolio XXQQ receives a payment of €4 (2 x €2 + 2 x €0). The person who has 
chosen the portfolio XXXQ receives a payment of €6 (3 X €2 + 1 X €0).  
Task 3 is similar to Task 1. There is a choice between two different securities (share G and 
share H). The subjects have to compile a portfolio which contains four shares. The possible 
portfolios are thus GGGG, GGGH, GGHH, GHHH and HHHH. The subjects profit from the divi-
dend payments. The price trends of the two shares are ignored in order to create a decision-
making situation which is as clear as possible. The expectation value of the returns is thus 
solely based on the dividend payments. The dividend payments (= expectation value of the 
returns) of the two shares G and H are identical (eG = eH = €1.50). However, they exhibit dif-
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ferent risk profiles. Whereas share G generates either €3 or €0, share H yields either €1 or €2 
(sG > sH). Both events have a probability of occurrence of 50%. Whether a favorable or an 
unfavorable event occurs depends – in both companies – on the economic situation. The 
yield of the two shares are accordingly not independent of each other; they are entirely pos-
itively correlated (correlation coefficient = +1). The subjects are informed about these cir-
cumstances. Test questions are used to ensure that the subjects have understood this point 
of departure. 
No reduction in risk can be achieved by mixing the two securities G and H given the entirely 
positive correlation of the dividend payments. The ideal portfolio for risk-averse investors is 
thus HHHH (Table 5). 
Table 5: Expectation Value for the Dividend Payments and Variance of the Possible Portfolios 
for Task 3 
Portfolio Composition GGGG GGGH GGHH GHHH HHHH 
Expectation Value of the Dividend Payment €6 €6 €6 €6 €6 
Variance 36 25 16 9 4 
Task 4 is similar to Task 2. There is a once again a choice between two different investment 
alternatives (share E and share F). The subjects are asked to compile a portfolio consisting of 
four shares. The possible portfolios are thus EEEE, EEEF, EEFF, EFFF and FFFF. The subjects 
profit from the dividend payments. The price trends of the two shares are ignored in order 
to create a decision-making situation which is as clear as possible. The expectation value of 
the returns is thus solely based on the dividend payments. The dividend payments (= expec-
tation value of the returns) of the two shares E and F are identical (eE = eF = €1.00). The risk 
exposure of the two shares E and F is also identical (sE = sF). The two shares have a dividend 
of either €0 or €2. With both shares the probability of the occurrence of these two events is 
50%. The dividend payments of the shares E and F are based on independent random pro-
cesses (correlation coefficient = 0).  
By mixing the two shares E and F, a significant reduction of risk exposure can be achieved 
given the uncorrelated movement of the dividend payments. The ideal portfolio for risk-
averse investors is thus EEFF (Table 6). 
Table 6: Expectation Value for the Dividend Payments and Variance of the Possible Portfolios 
for Task 4 
Portfolio Composition EEEE EEEF EEFF EFFF FFFF 
Expectation Value of the Dividend Payment €4 €4 €4 €4 €4 
Variance 16 8.8 6.4 8.8 16 
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2.3 Treatments 
As this study investigates whether mood has effects on the diversification decisions of sub-
jects and thus on the risk exposure of their portfolios, the mood of the subjects is influenced 
with brief film excerpts. Emotional film excerpts are a common and effective method to cre-
ate emotions.1 Film excerpts are also being increasingly used to influence moods in econom-
ic experiments (see, for example, Andrade et al., 2016; Oswald et al., 2015; Ifcher and Zar-
ghamee, 2014; Lahav and Meer, 2012; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2011; Schaefer et al., 2010; 
Rottenberg et al., 2007; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006; Gross and Levenson, 1995).  
The selection of short film excerpts deployed here are taken from the study by Schaefer et 
al. (2010), in which more than 70 film excerpts were assessed with regard to their ability to 
create emotions. The film clips are clearly assigned to the moods which are desired. There 
are film excerpts which evoke negative emotions, and there are film excerpts which evoke 
positive emotions. There are also film excerpts which do not influence the mood of the 
viewers. These film sequences are described as neutral. 
In order to create positive emotions, the following film excerpts were used in our experi-
ment: (1) Benny and Joon (122 seconds): Benny (Johnny Depp) plays the fool in a café. (2) 
Life is Beautiful (266 seconds): A mother and son are re-united after the Second World War. 
(3) Dead Poets Society (163 seconds): All of the students in a class stand on their desks to 
show their solidarity with Mr. Keating (Robin Williams), who has just been fired. (4) Forrest 
Gump (121 seconds): Father and son are reunited. (5) Dinner for Schmucks (101 seconds): 
Complex humorous scenes. 
In order to create negative emotions, the following film excerpts were used in our experi-
ment: (1) Schindler’s List (101 seconds): The SS storm a house and shoot everyone in it. (2) 
The Piano (42 seconds): A person’s finger is chopped off deliberately with an axe. (3) The 
Blair Witch Project (232 seconds): Final scene in which the protagonists are seemingly killed. 
(1) Schindler’s List (76 seconds): Bodies are burned in a concentration camp. (5) Saving Pri-
vate Ryan (327 seconds): A war scene at Omaha Beach in the Second World War. 
The film excerpts used here which do not affect the emotions of the subjects (neutral) are as 
follows: (1) The Lover (43 seconds): Marguerite (Jane March) gets into a car. She drives to a 
house in a busy street and knocks on a door. A Chinese man opens and she goes in. (2) Blue 
(40 seconds): A man is clearing up the drawers of his desk. A woman is walking along a street 
and says hello to another woman. (3) Train ride (58 seconds): A train travels through a green 
landscape.2 (2) Blue (25 seconds): A woman goes up an escalator carrying a crate. (5) Blue 
(16 seconds): A person holds a piece of aluminum foil out of the window of a moving car. 
In the experiment, three treatments are compared. In the negative treatment, the subjects 
watch a film excerpt which evokes negative emotions before making their portfolio deci-
sions. In the positive treatment, the subjects watch a film excerpt which evokes positive 
emotions before making their portfolio decisions. In the neutral treatment, the subjects 
                                                          
1 There are various ways of influencing mood. This also includes real situations, memories and imagination, 
noises and music, presents, film clips and the so-called Velten technique (cf. Westermann et al., 1996). 
2 The film clip train ride is from the study by Gendolla and Krüsken, 2002. 
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watch a film excerpt which does not have any effect on them before making their portfolio 
decisions. 
In all three treatments it is only the film excerpts which differ. The rest of the experiment is 
the same, so in all three treatments the subjects have to carry out Tasks 1-4. 
2.4 Sequence of the Tasks and Procedure of the Experiment 
After the subjects have read the thorough instructions, their mood is measured before the 
experiment with the following question: 
 
How are you feeling now? Please mark the adequate number! 
1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9—10 
    very bad         very good 
Then the test questions about the decision-making situations (Tasks 1-4) are posed. Only 
those who answer the test questions correctly are allowed to participate in the experiment. 
This ensures that the subjects understand which decision can lead to which consequences 
for their payoff. 
Subsequently – before the first diversification task – their mood is influenced with a corre-
sponding film clip. Depending on the treatment, a film clip is shown which evokes positive 
emotions (positive treatment), negative emotions (negative treatment), or no emotions 
(neutral treatment). After the film excerpt a manipulation check takes place to test whether 
the intended mood has been created among the subjects. 
For the manipulation check the following question is posed:3 
 
Which emotions did you experience while watching the movie clip?  
Please mark one number accordingly! 
1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9—10 
very negative       very positive 
Subsequently the subjects have to make their first diversification decision in Task 1. After 
this decision has been made, the subjects are shown the second film clip. Once again, de-
pending on the treatment, a film clip is shown which evokes positive emotions (positive 
treatment), negative emotions (negative treatment), or no emotions (neutral treatment). 
                                                          
3 Similar manipulation checks were also carried out in the studies by Andrade et al., 2016; Lahav and Meer, 
2012; Rottenberg et al., 2007; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006. 
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After the film excerpt a manipulation check again takes place to test whether the intended 
mood has really been created among the subjects. Subsequently the subjects have to make 
their second diversification decision in Task 2. The same procedure is repeated until all four 
diversification decisions have been made. 
Then the experiment examines – using the approach of Holt and Laury (2002) – whether the 
subjects should be categorized as risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-loving. This is absolutely 
necessary, because the portfolios with the lowest possible risk exposure (in Task 1: BBBB; in 
Task 2: XXQQ; in Task 3: HHHH, and in Task 4: EEFF) are only optimal for risk-averse inves-
tors. Risk-loving subjects, on the other hand, would normally always choose the portfolio 
with the highest variance. Risk-neutral subject are indifferent with regard to all of the portfo-
lios, as their expectation value is always the same for all five possible portfolio alternatives. 
Before the subjects make the ten decisions on their preference for lottery A or lottery B, 
depending on the treatment a film excerpt is shown which evokes positive emotions (posi-
tive treatment), negative emotions (negative treatment), or no emotions at all (neutral 
treatment). After the film excerpt a manipulation check takes place again to test whether 
the intended mood has really been created among the subjects. Then the subjects make 
their ten decisions regarding lottery A or B. 
After the subjects have made their decisions, the drawing of the random events for the secu-
rities of Tasks 1-4 and the draw for the lottery according to Holt and Laury (2002) are made. 
Following this the payoff is made – dependent on their choice of portfolio in the Tasks 1-4, 
and depending on their success in the lottery according to Holt and Laury (2002). In the di-
versification decision tasks, up to €40 can be earned, and in the lottery up to €3.85. In addi-
tion, every participant receives a show-up fee of €1.50, so overall the subjects can earn up to 
€45.35. On average, the participants earn €24.44. The maximum was €38.35 and the mini-
mum was €11.60. The survey takes an average of 40 minutes, so the payment can be de-
scribed as attractive. Without exception, the subjects gave the impression of being concen-
trated and committed. 
The experiment was carried out at the Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences in Germany 
with students from the Faculties of Automotive Engineering, Public Health Services and 
Business in the period from 12 August 2015 to 24 September 2015 in the Ostfalia Laboratory 
for Experimental Economic Research (OLEW). Overall, 123 students took part in the experi-
ment in 37 sessions. From the Faculty of Business, 60 students took part in the experiment 
(48.78%), while from the Faculty of Automotive Engineering 40 students (32.52%), and from 
the Faculty of Public Health Services 23 students (18.70%) participated. Of these, 45 were 
women (36.59%) and 78 were men (63.41%). The number of participants per treatment was 
as follows: 44 participants in the negative treatment, 39 in the neutral treatment and 40 
participants in the positive treatment. The participants were 24.3 years old on average. 
In order to test the hypotheses, the subjects who proved to be risk-neutral or risk-loving in 
the procedure used by Holt and Laury (2002) were eliminated from the experiment. In addi-
tion, those subjects who chose variant A in the tenth decision in the test according to Holt 
and Laury (2002) were also eliminated, because it must be assumed that subjects who do 
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not choose variant B in the tenth decision of the lottery have not really understood the deci-
sion-making situation. This is because in the tenth decision, variant B is clearly superior to 
variant A – regardless of the risk preferences of the subject. The number of participants after 
the necessary thinning out was as follows: 26 participants in the negative treatment, 24 in 
the neutral treatment and 25 participants in the positive treatment. 
The experiment was programmed with z-Tree (cf. Fischbacher, 2007). The instructions, test 
questions and screenshots from the experiment can be found in the appendices. 
3 Hypotheses 
As the expectation values of the five portfolio alternatives are the same, the optimal diversi-
fication for risk-averse subjects is to choose the portfolio with the minimum variance. How-
ever, there are many empirical findings which show that in practice a large number of port-
folios are not optimally diversified (see the introduction). It cannot therefore be expected 
that risk-averse subjects will always choose the portfolio composition which minimizes risk 
exposure. Hypothesis 1 is therefore: Risk-averse subjects will not always choose the mini-
mum variance portfolio in Tasks 1-4. Null hypothesis 1 is thus: All (risk-averse) subjects will 
only choose the minimum variance portfolio in Tasks 1-4. 
There are numerous empirical findings showing that positive emotions can reduce the per-
ception of risk in investment decisions (see Conte et al., 2018; Kaplanski et al., 2014; Stanton 
et al., 2014; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011; Shu, 2010; Grable and Roszkowski, 2008; Yuen and 
Lee, 2003; Forgas, 1998). It can thus be expected that the minimum variance portfolio will be 
selected less frequently in the positive treatment than in the neutral treatment. Hypothesis 
2 is therefore: The average variance of the selected portfolios is higher in the positive treat-
ment than in the neutral treatment. Null hypothesis 2 is thus: The average variance of the 
selected portfolios is not higher in the positive treatment than in the neutral treatment. 
There are some empirical findings which show that negative emotions also have an inhibitive 
effect on subjects who based their own decisions on rational considerations (see, for exam-
ple, Conte et al., 2018; Gambetti and Giusbert, 2012; Lee and Andrade, 2011; Pham, 2007; 
Kliger and Levy, 2003; Tiedens and Linton, 2002; Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Leith and 
Baumeister, 1996). It can thus be expected that in the negative treatment the minimum var-
iance portfolio is chosen less frequently than in the neutral treatment. Hypothesis 3 is there-
fore: The average variance of the selected portfolios in the negative treatment is higher than 
in the neutral treatment. Null hypothesis 3 is thus: The average variance of the selected 
portfolios in the negative treatment is not higher than in the neutral treatment. 
If it is correct that positive and negative emotions contribute equally to a weakening of ra-
tional behavior, then it can be presumed that there are no significant differences with regard 
to portfolio decisions in the positive and negative treatments. Hypothesis 4 is therefore: The 
average variance of the selected portfolios is the same in the positive and negative treat-
ments. Null hypothesis 4 is thus: There is a significant difference in the average variance be-
tween the positive and negative treatments. 
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If it is correct that a neutral mood tends to contribute more towards making meaningful in-
vestment decisions than a positive or negative mood, this must also be reflected in the risk-
adjusted payments, i.e. in the performance of the subjects. Hypothesis 5 is therefore: Sub-
jects who make their investment decisions in the neutral treatment will obtain higher risk-
adjusted payments than subjects in the positive and negative treatments. Null hypothesis 5 
is thus: Subjects who take part in the neutral treatment will not obtain significantly higher 
risk-adjusted payments than subjects in the positive and negative treatments. 
4 Results of the Experiment 
4.1 The Effectiveness of Influencing Mood 
First, we consider whether it has been possible to create the respective desired mood in the 
three treatments. The first measurement of mood takes place before the presentation of the 
first film excerpt (round 0). In Figure 1 it can clearly be seen that the mood in round 0 – i.e. 
before the targeted creation of a mood – was rather good in all three treatments. The medi-
an of round 0 in all three treatments was 8. 
The average mood in the five rounds in which a film excerpt was presented to create a cer-
tain mood was as follows: In the negative treatment it was 3.09 (SD 1.42), in the neutral 
treatment it was 5.67 (SD 1.14) and in the positive treatment it was 7.32 (SD 1.36). In Figure 
1 it can be clearly seen in the box plots that the creation of a specific mood in the individual 
treatments was successful. 
 
Figure 1: Box Plots on the Mood of the Subjects in the Respective Rounds of the Game Ac-
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Figure 2 also shows box plots on the mood of the subjects in the three treatments. It sum-
marizes the five rounds in which film excerpts were presented to manipulate moods. 
It is clearly recognizable that the mood of the subjects varies considerably between the 
three treatments. The box for the negative treatment extends from 2.1 to 3.8. The box for 
the neutral treatment varies from 4.8 to 6.0. The box for the positive treatment varies from 
6.2 to 8.2.  
The fact that mood manipulation with the aid of the film clips worked is also shown by Table 
7. The negative treatment shows significantly lower mood values than the positive treat-
ment (z= -7.466, p= 0.0000; Mann-Whitney U test). The negative treatment shows signifi-
cantly lower mood values than the neutral treatment (z= -6.417, p= 0.0000; Mann-Whitney 
U test). The positive treatment shows significantly higher average mood values than the neu-
tral treatment (z= 5.089, p= 0.0000; Mann-Whitney U test).  
 
Figure 2: Box Plots of Mood after the Treatments (Summary of Rounds 1-5) 
Overall it can be stated that the deployment of the film excerpts led to the desired results. In 
each of the three treatments, the desired mood was predominant. In the positive treatment 
positive emotions prevailed. In the neutral treatment, a generally average mood was pre-
sent, and in the negative treatment, negative emotions predominated. To this extent, the 
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The significant values are highlighted (*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1). 
For the calculation of the average values (Ø), the figures of rounds 1-5 were used. 
4.2 Rational Strategy 
Now we will take a look at the percentage distribution of the portfolios in the three treat-
ments (Table 8). In the upper part of Table 8, Tasks 1 and 3 are listed. For risk-averse inves-
tors, the alternatives BBBB and HHHH respectively represent a rational strategy in the Tasks 
1 and 3, because for all of the possible portfolio structures, the expectation value of the 
payment is identical. However, the risk exposure (variance) in the portfolios BBBB and HHHH 
is significantly lower than in the other portfolio alternatives. In all three treatments there are 
clear deviations from the rational strategy. In the negative treatment, only 13.46% of the 
participants chose the optimal portfolio. In the neutral treatment, this even falls to 8.33%. 
And in the positive treatment, only 12% of the participants chose the optimal portfolio. 
In the upper part of the table, Tasks 2 and 4 are illustrated. The rational strategy here would 
be to choose a mix of two portfolios. The portfolios QQXX and EEFF have the same expecta-
tion value for the payment as the four other portfolio alternatives, but the risk exposure 
(variance) is considerably lower here than in the other four portfolio alternatives. The sub-
jects were obviously able to deal significantly better with this starting position. In the nega-
tive treatment, 69.23% of the risk-averse participants chose the optimal portfolio. In the 
neutral treatment, this even rose to 75%. In the positive treatment, 70% of the risk-averse 
subjects chose the optimal portfolio. 
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Table 8: Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios in the Three Treatments 
 Percentage Distribution of the Portfolios 
Portfolios Task 1 

















Rational Strategy 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Negative Treatment 7.69% 19.24% 26.92% 32.69% 13.46% 
Neutral Treatment 0.00%  10.42% 31.25% 50.00% 8.33% 
Positive Treatment 4% 26% 26% 32% 12% 
Portfolios Task 2 

















Rational Strategy 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
Negative Treatment 5.77% 13.46% 69.23% 5,77% 5.77% 
Neutral Treatment 6.25% 6.25% 75.00% 10,42% 2.08% 
Positive Treatment 10% 6.00% 70.00% 6,00% 8.00% 
Null hypothesis 1 is: All risk-averse subjects will choose the minimum variance portfolios in 
Tasks 1-4. This null hypothesis clearly has to be rejected. Hypothesis 1 can thus be viewed as 
confirmed for the time being. The subjects do not always choose the optimal portfolio. In 
other words, they do not always take a rational approach. These results are in line with 
those of Ackert et al., 2015; Gubaydullina and Spiwoks, 2015; Ackert et al. 2011; Eyster and 
Weizsäcker, 2010; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008, and Hedesstrom et al., 2006.  
This is also reflected by an unnecessarily high-risk exposure. In Table 9, the average variance 
for the minimum variance portfolio and the average variance of the portfolios chosen by the 
subjects are compared. 
Table 9: Average Variance of the Rational Strategy and the Average Variance of the Portfoli-
os Chosen by the Subjects in the Three Treatments 






Negative treatment 5.2 11.67 0.0000*** 
Neutral treatment 5.2 10.02 0.0000*** 
Positive treatment 5.2 11.94 0.0000*** 
The significant values are highlighted (*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1). 
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Here it is also revealed that the subjects frequently fail to choose the minimum variance 
portfolio, although all five portfolio alternatives exhibit the same expectation value for the 
payment. This way of evaluating the data also leads to the rejection of null hypothesis 1. 
4.3 The Influence of Mood on Portfolio Decisions 
In order to compare the average risk exposure (variance) of the three treatments, first, the 
average risk exposure of each individual subject is established and entered into a histogram 
of the average risk exposure according to treatments (Figure 3). 
It is noticeable that in the neutral treatment the distribution takes the form of a peak, which 
is clearly skewed to the right. By contrast, distribution in the negative and positive treat-
ments shows a broader spread and is only slightly skewed to the right. This means that the 
average risk exposure of the subjects in the neutral treatment was lower than the average 
risk exposure of subjects in the positive and negative treatments. This also becomes clear 
when viewing the distribution of the average variances below ten. In the neutral treatment, 
significantly more than half of the subjects are below this limit. In the positive and negative 
treatments, on the other hand, significantly less than half of the subjects are below this limit. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage Distribution of the Average Variance in the Three Treatments  
The small but easily recognizable differences in average risk exposure in the three treat-
ments are also shown when viewing the box plots (Figure 4). In the neutral treatment, the 
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treatments. When viewing figures 3 and 4, differences between the neutral treatment on 
the one hand and the positive and negative treatments on the other are recognizable. 
Whether these differences are significant was examined with the Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
First, the positive treatment was compared to the negative treatment. 
The average risk exposure (variance) was significantly higher in the positive treatment at 
11.94 than in the neutral treatment at 10.02. In the Wilcoxon rank sum test, the difference – 
with a p-value of 0.0294 – proved significant (Table 10). Null hypothesis 2 thus has to be re-
jected. Hypothesis 2 states that the average variance of the selected portfolios in the posi-
tive treatment is higher than in the neutral treatment. This hypothesis can be viewed as con-
firmed for the meantime. 






Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test  
P-Value 
11.94 10.02 0.0294** 
The significant values are highlighted (*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1). 
 
Figure 4: Average Variance in the Three Treatments 
The findings of Grable and Roszkoswki (2008) as well as those of Kuhnen and Knutson 
(2011), who discovered that there is a greater willingness to take risks when positive emo-
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Next, we examined whether the risk exposure in the negative treatment is also recognizably 
higher in the negative treatment than in the neutral treatment. The average variance in the 
negative treatment (11.67) was significantly higher than in the neutral treatment (10.02), 
but in the Wilcoxon rank sum test this difference proved to be non-significant (Table 11). 
Null hypothesis 3 therefore cannot be rejected. Hypothesis 3 states that the average vari-
ance in the negative treatment is higher than in the neutral treatment. This expectation was 
not confirmed in a statistically significant way. 






Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test  
P-Value 
11.67 10.02 0.2420 
The significant values are highlighted (*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1). 
This leaves the question of whether the average risk exposure of the positive treatment and 
the negative treatment deviate significantly from each other. The average variance of the 
negative treatment was 11.67, and that of the positive treatment was 11.94 (Table 12). This 
relatively small difference revealed itself to be insignificant in the Wilcoxon rank sum test. 






Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test  
P-Value 
11.67 11.94 0.3956 
The significant values are highlighted (*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1). 
Null hypothesis 4 thus has to be rejected. Hypothesis 4 states that the average variance of 
the selected portfolios is not significantly different in the positive and negative treatments. 
This hypothesis can thus be viewed as confirmed for the meantime. 
4.4 The Influence of Mood on Risk-Adjusted Returns 
Finally we examined whether the mood of the subjects was also reflected in their risk-
adjusted payoffs (performance). To do so, we deployed a simplified performance bench-
mark. The risk-adjusted payoff (RA) is determined as follows. 




1 + (𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉100 )
 
In order to be able to compare the performance (risk-adjusted payoff) of the subjects in the 
three treatments, first, the performance of each individual subject was determined and then 
entered into a histogram according to treatments (Figure 5). It is noticeable that in the neu-
tral treatment the distribution takes the form of a slight peak which is skewed to the left. By 
contrast, distribution in the negative and positive treatments is slightly skewed to the right. 
In addition, in the neutral treatment the risk-adjusted payoffs of the subjects were over 20. 
In the positive and negative treatments on the other hand, over 40% and over 30% of the 
subjects respectively were below 20. 
When viewing the box plots, the differences between the three treatments become clear 
(Figure 6). In the neutral treatment, the median – at 26.55 – is clearly above the medians of 
the positive (21.26) and negative (23.18) treatments. This means that the performance of 
the subjects in the neutral treatment was better than the performance of subjects in the 
positive and negative treatments. Whether these differences are significant was then exam-
ined with the Wilcoxon rank sum test. First of all the positive treatment was compared to 
the neutral treatment, and then the negative and the neutral were compared. 
 
Figure 5: Percentage Distribution of Performance (Risk-Adjusted Payoff) in the Three Treat-
ments 
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Figure 6: Risk-Adjusted Payoffs in the Three Treatments 
The average performance was significantly higher at 27.52 in the neutral treatment than in 
the positive treatment at 22.81. In the Wilcoxon rank sum test, the difference – with a p-
value of 0.0285 – proved to be significant (Table 13). The average performance was also sig-
nificantly higher at 27.52 in the neutral treatment than in the positive treatment at 23.53. In 
the Wilcoxon rank sum test, the difference – with a p-value of 0.0545 – again proved to be 
significant (Table 14).  





Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test  
P-Value 
22.81 27.52 0.0285** 
The significant values are highlighted (*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1). 





Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test  
P-Value 
23.53 27.52 0.0545* 
The significant values are highlighted (*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1). 
Thus, null hypothesis 5 clearly has to be rejected. Hypothesis 5 states that the subjects who 
make their investment decisions in the neutral treatment will obtain higher risk-adjusted 
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payments than the subjects in the positive and negative treatments. This hypothesis can be 
viewed as confirmed for the meantime. 
5 Summary and Conclusion 
For risk-averse subjects it is usually meaningful to diversify their portfolios (Markowitz, 
1952). However, practice shows that many subjects have poorly diversified securities portfo-
lios. Furthermore, some studies show that personal mood can have an influence on invest-
ment decisions. However, until now the question of whether positive and negative emotions 
have an influence on diversification behavior and thus on risk exposure has not been investi-
gated.  
The design of this experiment is loosely based on the work of Gubaydullina and Spiwoks 
(2015). Each subject has to take four investment decisions. In each task the subjects can 
choose between two different securities. The subjects have to compile a portfolio which 
contains four shares, and they profit from the dividend payments. The dividend payments of 
the shares are based on a random process. The price movements of the two shares are ig-
nored in order to create a decision-making situation which is as clear as possible. Mood is 
influenced by positive (in the positive treatment), negative (in the negative treatment) and 
neutral film excerpts (in the neutral treatment). Manipulation checks show whether the in-
fluencing of mood by the film clips has been successful. 
The results of the experiment show that the mood of the subjects has an influence on their 
diversification behavior. This becomes clear as soon as risk exposure is considered: The av-
erage risk exposure in the neutral treatment (10.02) is lower than in the positive treatment 
(11.94) and the negative treatment (11.67).  
In addition, a neutral mood leads to the subjects obtaining higher risk-adjusted payoffs. The 
average risk-adjusted performance was significantly higher at 27.52 in the neutral treatment 
than in the positive treatment at 22.81 and in the negative treatment at 23.53.  
Positive and negative moods lead to higher risk exposure and to lower risk-adjusted payoffs 
than a neutral mood. From this one can derive the recommendation that investment pro-
cesses should as far as possible not be affected by emotions. It would seem wise to develop 
systematic investment rules and to strictly orientate the investment process towards them, 
or to only let groups of persons (such as an investment committee) take investment deci-
sions rather than individuals. 
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Appendix 1: Instructions for the Experiment 
The Game 
In the first section you will take diversification decisions for a portfolio in four different tasks. 
In each task you receive four free shares. Two companies are available to choose from (e.g. 
company K and company L). You can then choose whether you want to have 4 K shares, 4 L 
shares, 3 K shares and 1 L share, 3 L shares and 1 K share, or 2 K shares and 2 L shares. The 
dividend payments which your four shares yield in 2016 are paid out to you. Movements in 
the prices of the shares are of no significance to you. In the second section you make ten 
decisions for a lottery draw.  
Before each task you are shown a short film excerpt lasting no longer than a minute. In each 
task you have five minutes time to enter your decisions. You will be given detailed infor-
mation on the tasks in the respective sections. 
Payment 
You will receive a basic payment of €1.50. In addition, you can receive dividend payments up 
to €40 in the first section, and up to €3.85 in the lottery in the second section. In total you 
can thus earn up to €45.35. Payment is made at the end of the experiment. 
Information 
Please remain quiet during the experiment. 
Please do not look at your neighbor’s screen. 
No aids are permitted (calculators, smartphones etc.). All electronic devices must be 
switched off. 
Please note the respective time limits given on the upper right of the screen. If you do not 
enter anything during this time you will not receive any payment for the respective task. 
Appendix 2: Test Questions for the Game 
 
Multiple choice test questions: 
 
Test question 1: What is your task in this game? 
ʘ Solving mathematical problems. 
ʘ Making diversification decisions and participating in a lottery. (correct) 
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Test question 2: How many companies are represented in each task and how many free  
 shares do you receive? 
ʘ Four companies are represented in each task, and there are 2 free shares to choose from.  
ʘ Two companies are represented in each task, and there are 2 free shares to choose from.  
ʘ Two companies are represented in each task, and there are 4 free shares to choose from. 
(correct) 
 
Test question 3: What does the payment in the first section depend on? 
ʘ On the movement of the share prices. 
ʘ On the dividend payments. (correct) 
ʘ On the level of the DAX. 
 
Test question 4: How many possibilities are there for the diversification of your portfolio in  
 each task? 
ʘ 2 
ʘ 4 
ʘ 5 (correct) 
Appendix 3: Test Questions on the Lottery 
 
Multiple-choice test questions: 
 
Test question 1: How high are the minimum and maximum payoffs in the lottery?  
ʘ The minimum payment is €0.00 and the maximum payment is €1.60. 
ʘ The minimum payment is €0.10 and the maximum payment is €3.85. (correct) 
ʘ The minimum payment is €0.10 and the maximum payment is €1.60. 
 
Test question 2: If the roll of the dice selects the 7th decision, you have chosen variant A in  
 the 7th decision, and you have drawn a white table tennis ball from the  
 pot, how much is your payoff? 
ʘ €0 
ʘ €2 
ʘ €1.60 (correct) 
 
Test question 3: If the roll of the dice selects the 10th decision, how many white table ten-  
 nis balls are in the pot? 
ʘ 10 
ʘ 0 (correct) 
ʘ 5 
 
- 90 - 
Test question 4: If the roll of the dice selects the fourth decision, how many yellow table  
tennis balls are in the pot?  
ʘ 6 
ʘ 0 
ʘ 4 (correct) 
Appendix 4: Measuring Risk Preferences Based on Holt and Laury (2002) 
The lottery test used by Holt and Laury (2002) was slightly modified here. In the lottery there 
are 10 risk stages and two variants. Variant A (risk-averse) with the possibility of payments of 
€1.60 or €2, and variant B (risk-loving) with the payment possibilities €0.10 or €3.85. The 
lower payment is made when a white table tennis ball is drawn, and the higher payment if a 
yellow table tennis ball is drawn from the pot (and replaced). The risk levels indicate how 
many white and yellow balls are in the pot (Table 4). For every risk stage the subjects have to 
decide whether they want to choose variant A or B.4 The risk level is determined with a ten-
sided die. The higher the risk level, the higher the probability of receiving a larger payment. 
Two examples: At risk level 1, 9 white table tennis balls and one yellow table tennis ball are 
in the pot. At risk level 8, 9 two white table and eight yellow table tennis balls are in the pot. 
Table A-1: Lottery 
Risk 
Level 
Variant A:  
 
Variant B:  
 
Decision 
A or B 
p(€2) yellow p(€1.60) white p(€3.85) yellow p(€0.10) white  
1 10% €2 90% €1.60 10% €3.85 90% €0.10  
2 20% €2 80% €1.60 20% €3.85 80% €0.10  
3 30% €2 70% €1.60 30% €3.85 70% €0.10  
4 40% €2 60% €1.60 40% €3.85 60% €0.10  
5 50% €2 50% €1.60 50% €3.85 50% €0.10  
6 60% €2 40% €1.60 60% €3.85 40% €0.10  
7 70% €2 30% €1.60 70% €3.85 30% €0.10  
8 80% €2 20% €1.60 80% €3.85 20% €0.10  
9 90% €2 10% €1.60 90% €3.85 10% €0.10  
10 100% €2 0% €1.60 100% €3.85 0% €0.10  
After the experiment the dividend payments are determined by tossing a coin. In order to 
determine the winnings of the lottery, first, a ten-sided die is thrown to decide the risk level. 
Then the table tennis balls are placed in the pot in accordance with the risk level and every 
subject draws a table tennis ball from the pot. The ball is then returned to the pot. 
                                                          
4 Before the selection of the lottery, the subjects have answered four test questions. The test questions check 
whether the subjects have understood the lottery. 
- 91 - 
Appendix 5: Screenshot of the Experiment with Z-Tree (Reconstructed in Or-
der to Improve Readability) 
Screenshot 1: Measurement of Mood before the Experiment (Reconstructed in Order to 
Improve Readability) 
How are you feeling now? Please mark the adequate number! 
 










Figure A-1: Measurement of Mood before the Experiment 
Screenshot 2: Test Questions (Reconstructed in Order to Improve Readability) 




Test question 1: What is your task in this game? 
ʘ Solving mathematical problems. 
ʘ Making diversification decisions and participating in a lottery. 
ʘ Making economic forecasts. 
 
Test question 2: How many companies are represented in each task and how many free  
 shares do you receive? 
ʘ 4 companies are represented in each task, and there are 2 free shares to choose from.  
ʘ 2 companies are represented in each task, and there are 2 free shares to choose from.  
ʘ 2 companies are represented in each task, and there are 4 free shares to choose from. 
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Test question 3: What does the payment in the first section depend on? 
ʘ On the movement of the share prices. 
ʘ On the dividend payments. 
ʘ On the level of the DAX. 
 
Test question 4: How many possibilities are there for the diversification of your portfolio in  
 each task? 
ʘ 2 
ʘ 4 








Figure A-2: Test Questions  
Screenshot 3: Manipulation Check after the Attempt to Influence Mood (Reconstructed in 
Order to Improve Readability) 
Which emotions did you experience while watching the movie clip?  
Please mark one number accordingly! 
 
very negative ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ very positive 








Figure A-3: Manipulation Check after the Attempt to Influence Mood 
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Screenshot 4: Diversification Decision (Reconstructed in Order to Improve Readability) 
You can choose between two shares (share A and share B) of a specific sector of industry. 
You can read in the table how high the dividend payments for both shares were during the 
past 10 years. If the economic situation in the sector is good, the dividend of share A is €3 
and that of share B is €2. If the economic situation in the sector is poor, the dividend of 
share A is €0 and that of share B is €1. The economic trend in this sector can vary from year 
to year and has to be viewed as a random process: The probability of a good or poor eco-
nomic situation is 50% respectively.  
    Year   Share A     Share B 
2006       €3             €2 
2007       €0             €1 
2008       €3             €2 
2009       €0             €1 
2010       €0             €1 
2011       €3             €2 
2012       €3             €2 
2013       €3             €2 
2014       €0             €1 
2015       €3             €2 
2016       €?             €? 
You receive four free shares. You can choose whether you want to have 4 A shares, 4 B 
shares, 3 A shares + 1 B share, 3 B shares + 1 A share or 2 A shares and two B shares. The 
dividend payments which your four shares yield in 2016 are paid out to you. The dividend 
payments for 2016 are determined by tossing a coin. If it is heads, this means a good eco-
nomic situation, while tails means a poor economic situation or a weak year. Movements in 
the prices of the shares are of no significance to you. 
Make your selection now. I select: 
ʘ 4 A shares. 
ʘ 4 B shares. 
ʘ 3 A shares + 1 B share. 
ʘ 3 B shares + 1 A share. 
ʘ 2 A shares + 2 B shares. 
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Please give brief reasons for your selection. These reasons have no effect on the payment, so 






Figure A-4: Diversification Decision 
Screenshot 5: Lottery (Reconstructed in Order to Improve Readability) 
You make your decisions on the next page. Each decision is a choice between variant A and 
variant B. Each variant is a type of lottery with different payoff sums and probabilities of oc-
currence. You make ten decisions. Enter your respective decision in the right-hand column of 
the table. One of these decisions will be used to determine your payoff in the lottery. This is 
done as follows: After you have made all ten decisions, a ten-sided dice is thrown to deter-
mine which of the ten decisions will be used. Each of the decisions thus has the same 10% 
probability of being used. Then the lottery you have chosen (A or B) is played. 
The probability of occurrence is simulated with the help of a pot with table tennis balls: In a 
pot with 10 table tennis balls, the number of yellow balls indicates the probability with 
which the higher payoff sum will occur. Example for decision no. 8: In a pot with 10 table 
tennis balls, 8 are yellow and 2 are white. The probability that a randomly drawn table tennis 
ball is yellow is thus 80%. If the table tennis ball drawn card is yellow, you receive €2 in vari-
ant A and €3.85 in variant B. If, however, the table tennis ball drawn is white, you receive 
€1.60 in variant A and €0.10 in variant B. You thus make ten decisions (either for lottery A or 
B). One of these is randomly chosen (with a die) and played (with a pot and ten table tennis 
balls) – the result determines your payoff in the lottery. Please answer the following test 
questions about the lottery before you make your decisions. 
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Risk 
Level 




p(€2) yellow p(€1.60) white p(€3.85) yellow p(€0.10) white 
1 10% €2 90% €1.60 10% €3.85 90% €0.10 
2 20% €2 80% €1.60 20% €3.85 80% €0.10 
3 30% €2 70% €1.60 30% €3.85 70% €0.10 
4 40% €2 60% €1.60 40% €3.85 60% €0.10 
5 50% €2 50% €1.60 50% €3.85 50% €0.10 
6 60% €2 40% €1.60 60% €3.85 40% €0.10 
7 70% €2 30% €1.60 70% €3.85 30% €0.10 
8 80% €2 20% €1.60 80% €3.85 20% €0.10 
9 90% €2 10% €1.60 90% €3.85 10% €0.10 
10 100% €2 0% €1.60 100% €3.85 0% €0.10 
Test question 1: How high are the minimum and maximum payoffs in the lottery? 
ʘ The minimum payoff is €0.00 and the maximum payoff is €1.60. 
ʘ The minimum payoff is €0.10 and the maximum payoff is €3.85. 
ʘ The minimum payoff is €0.10 and the maximum payoff is €1.60. 
 
Test question 2: If the roll of the dice selects the 7th decision, you have chosen variant A in  
 the 7th decision, and you have drawn a white table tennis ball from the  





Test question 3: If the roll of the dice selects the 10th decision, how many white table ten-  





Test question 4: If the roll of the dice selects the 4th decision, how many yellow table ten-  








Figure A-5: Lottery 
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p(€2) yellow p(€1.60) white p(€3.85) yellow p(€0.10) white 
1 10% €2 90% €1.60 10% €3.85 90% €0.10 
2 20% €2 80% €1.60 20% €3.85 80% €0.10 
3 30% €2 70% €1.60 30% €3.85 70% €0.10 
4 40% €2 60% €1.60 40% €3.85 60% €0.10 
5 50% €2 50% €1.60 50% €3.85 50% €0.10 
6 60% €2 40% €1.60 60% €3.85 40% €0.10 
7 70% €2 30% €1.60 70% €3.85 30% €0.10 
8 80% €2 20% €1.60 80% €3.85 20% €0.10 
9 90% €2 10% €1.60 90% €3.85 10% €0.10 
10 100% €2 0% €1.60 100% €3.85 0% €0.10 
 
Now please make the ten decisions:  
Which variant would you rather play – A or B? 
 
No. 1:   ʘ A     ʘ B 
No. 2:   ʘ A     ʘ B 
No. 3:   ʘ A     ʘ B 
No. 4:   ʘ A     ʘ B 
No. 5:   ʘ A     ʘ B 
No. 6:   ʘ A     ʘ B 
No. 7:   ʘ A     ʘ B 
No. 8:   ʘ A     ʘ B 
No. 9:   ʘ A     ʘ B 
No.10:  ʘ A     ʘ B 
 
 
Figure A-6: Field for the Entry of the Lottery Decisions 
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Abstract 
The procedures previously used to determine risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral or 
risk-loving) exhibit a number of weaknesses. In part, they are so complex and sophisticated 
that the subjects frequently give spontaneous, ill-considered answers. In this way, their ac-
tual risk preference can often not be correctly determined. In addition, in this process there 
are situations and circumstances in which it is not possible to clearly assign subjects to one 
of the three categories of risk preference. In addition, with the previous approaches, loss 
aversion – which has an important influence on risk preference – is not taken into considera-
tion, or only insufficiently. We propose here a new procedure to determine risk preference 
which is (1) extremely simple and clear, which (2) enables unambiguous differentiation be-
tween risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects, and which (3) takes the influence of 
loss aversion on risk preference into account in an appropriate way. 
Keywords  
Risk preference, loss aversion, portfolio choice, diversification behavior, behavioral finance, 
experimental research 
JEL Classification 
B49, C91, G11, G40 
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1 Introduction 
Markowitz (1952) shows that for risk-averse subjects it usually makes sense to hold diversi-
fied securities portfolios. However, there are many empirical findings which reveal that un-
der-diversified portfolios are very frequently held.1 Experimental economic research exam-
ines this contradiction and finds many reasons why suboptimal decisions are frequently 
made with regard to diversification.2  
Meaningful experimental results on diversification behavior can normally only be obtained if 
clarity about the risk preference of the subjects can be achieved: Because that which is 
meaningful for a risk-averse subject can be complete nonsense for a risk-loving subject, and 
vice-versa. In the meantime there are a whole range of procedures available to determine 
risk preference.3 
In our view, a good procedure for determining risk preference must above all comply with 
three criteria: 
1. It must be a simple and clear procedure. 
2. It must be possible to clearly and unambiguously differentiate between risk-averse, 
risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects.  
3. The influence of loss aversion on risk preference should not be neglected. 
We consider these three criteria to be key. (1) The procedure has to be simple and clear so 
that we can really record the risk preferences of the subjects. In the case of complex and 
confusing decision-making situations, subjects frequently lose patience and then give spon-
taneous, ill-considered answers. This can sometimes lead to a blurring of their risk prefer-
ence rather than it being revealed. (2) In the previous approaches used, there are certain 
combinations of circumstances in which risk-neutral, risk-averse and risk-loving subjects 
make – with good reason – the same decisions. In that case, it is not possible to differentiate 
between the three forms of risk preference. (3) As we will show later on, risk preference is 
significantly determined by the possibility of suffering losses. Procedures to measure risk 
preference which do not contain the possibility of losses systematically underestimate the 
proportion of risk-averse subjects. 
Our study is divided up into four sections. First, we evaluate the previous approaches against 
the background of the three criteria we have postulated. In the following chapter we present 
our new procedure to measure risk preference. Using an experimental investigation we sub-
                                                          
1 See, for example, Dimmock et al. (2016), Anderson (2013), Hibbert, Lawrence and Prakash (2012), Goetzmann 
and Kumar (2008), Meulbroek (2005), Polkovnichenko (2005), Huberman and Sengmueller (2004), Agnew, 
Balduzzi and Sundén (2003), Guiso, Haliassos and Japelli (2002), Benartzi (2001), Benartzi and Thaler (2001), 
Barber and Odean (2000), Bode, van Echelpoel and Sievi (1994), Blume and Friend (1975), and Lease, Lewellen 
and Schlarbaum (1974). 
2 See, for example, Filiz et al. (2018), Gubaydullina and Spiwoks (2015), Fernandes (2013), Morrin et al. (2012), 
Rieger (2012), Eyster and Weizsäcker (2011), Baltussen and Post (2011), Kallir and Sonsino (2009), Hedesstrom, 
Svedsater and Garling (2006), Fellner, Güth and Maciejovsky (2004), Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2009), Weber, 
Siebenmorgen and Weber (2005).  
3 See, for example, Lönnqvist et al. (2015), Charness, Gneezy and Imas (2013), Crosetto and Filippin (2013), 
Eckel and Grossmann (2002, 2008), Lejuez et al. (2002), Holt and Laury (2002), and Gneezy and Potters (1997). 
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sequently show that loss aversion should not be neglected when measuring risk preference. 
In the final chapter we summarize the most important results of the investigation. 
2 The Previous Approaches and their Weaknesses 
In the following section we discuss the approaches of Holt and Laury (2002), Eckel and 
Grossman (2008), and Crosetto and Filippin (2013). In addition, we briefly consider the ap-
proaches used by Lejuez et al. (2002), Gneezy and Potters (1997), the DOSPERT question-
naire created by Weber, Blais and Betz (2002), and the socio-economic panel (Schupp and 
Wagner, 2002; Wagner, Burkhauser and Behringer, 1993). 
2.1 The Multiple Price List Method of Holt and Laury (2002) 
In the multiple price list method of Holt and Laury (2002), subjects are asked to make ten 
decisions choosing between two lotteries in each case (Table 1). As the first decision, lottery 
A ($2.00 with a probability of 10% or $1.60 with a probability of 90%) is set against lottery B 
($3.85 with a probability of 10% and $0.10 with a probability of 90%). The subject has to de-
cide whether they would play lottery A or lottery B. This is followed by the other nine com-
parisons between lottery A and lottery B. From the sequence of the ten decisions, conclu-
sions about the risk preferences of the subject are then drawn. 
Table 1: The Lottery Alternatives of Holt and Laury (2002) 
 Lottery A Lottery B 
No. Prob. Event Prob. Event Prob. Event Prob. Event 
1 10% $2.00 90% $1.60 10% $3.85 90% $0.10 
2 20% $2.00 80% $1.60 20% $3.85 80% $0.10 
3 30% $2.00 70% $1.60 30% $3.85 70% $0.10 
4 40% $2.00 60% $1.60 40% $3.85 60% $0.10 
5 50% $2.00 50% $1.60 50% $3.85 50% $0.10 
6 60% $2.00 40% $1.60 60% $3.85 40% $0.10 
7 70% $2.00 30% $1.60 70% $3.85 30% $0.10 
8 80% $2.00 20% $1.60 80% $3.85 20% $0.10 
9 90% $2.00 10% $1.60 90% $3.85 10% $0.10 
10 100% $2.00 0% $1.60 100% $3.85 0% $0.10 
Prob. = probability of occurrence; event = random event. 
The main problem of this approach is the complexity of the decision-making situation. Nei-
ther the expected returns nor the extent of the risk exposure of the alternatives A and B are 
clearly recognizable for the subjects. Accordingly, many subjects decide randomly or based 
on a gut feeling. In this situation, it frequently occurs that ten decisions are made where the 
decision-making process cannot be clearly interpreted. Jacobson and Petrie (2009) as well as 
Charnes and Viceisza (2011) show that between 55% and 75% of the decision-making pro-
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cesses cannot be clearly interpreted. Charness et al. (2018) and Dave et al. (2010) also point 
out additional uncertainties in the interpretation of results.  
The approach used by Holt and Laury (2002) becomes somewhat clearer if one considers the 
expected returns and the risk (standard deviation) of the ten lottery alternatives (Table 2). In 
the first lottery alternative, lottery A has an expected return of $1.64 and a standard devia-
tion of 0.12. Lottery B has an expected return of $0.48 and a standard deviation of 1.13. 
Risk-neutral subjects orientate themselves solely towards expected returns and therefore 
decide in favor of alternative A. A risk-averse subject will also decide in favor of alternative 
A, because here the expected returns is higher and at the same time the risk is lower than 
that of alternative B. But how would a risk-loving subject decide? Expected returns would 
speak for alternative A, but the risk speaks for alternative B. How a risk-loving subject de-
cides therefore depends on the extent of their appetite for risk. Subjects with a great appe-
tite for risk will choose alternative B because the higher risk more than compensates for the 
lower expected return. Subjects with a mild appetite for risk will choose alternative A be-
cause the higher expected return more than compensates for the lower risk. 
Table 2: The Expected Returns and Risk (Standard Deviation) of the Lottery Alternatives used 
by Holt and Laury (2002) and the Preferences of Risk-Neutral, Risk-Averse and Risk-Loving 
Subjects 
 Lottery A Lottery B Preference Preference Preference 
No. E(A) SD E(B) SD Risk-Neutral Risk-Averse Risk-Loving 
1 1.64 0.12 0.48 1.13 A A A or B 
2 1.68 0.16 0.85 1.50 A A A or B 
3 1.72 0.18 1.23 1.72 A A A or B 
4 1.76 0.20 1.60 1.84 A A A or B 
5 1.80 0.20 1.98 1.88 B A or B B 
6 1.84 0.20 2.35 1.84 B A or B B 
7 1.88 0.18 2.73 1.72 B A or B B 
8 1.92 0.16 3.10 1.50 B A or B B 
9 1.96 0.12 3.48 1.13 B A or B B 
10 2.00 0.00 3.85 0.00 B B B 
E(A) = expected returns of lottery A; E(B) = expected returns of lottery B; SD = standard deviation. 
In the fifth decision, risk-neutral subjects choose alternative B, because the expected return 
of $1.98 is higher than that of alternative A ($1.80). Risk-loving subjects also choose alterna-
tive B because here both expected return and risk are higher than in alternative A. But how 
will risk-averse subjects react? The expected return would speak for alternative B, but the 
risk speaks for alternative A. How the subject decides now depends on the extent of their 
risk aversion. If they are highly risk-averse, they will choose alternative A because the lower 
risk offsets the lower expected return. If, however, they are only slightly risk-averse, they will 
decide in favor of alternative B, because the higher expected return more than compensates 
for the higher risk. 
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Now the following question arises: How should subjects be classified who always prefer al-
ternative A in the first four decisions and then prefer alternative B in the last six decisions? 
These can be either risk-neutral, risk-averse or risk-loving subjects (see Table 2). It cannot 
therefore be guaranteed that they will be unambiguously assigned to one of the three possi-
ble categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-loving).  
The approach used by Holt and Laury (2002) therefore does not satisfy any of the three re-
quirements which we formulated at the beginning for reliable determining of risk prefer-
ence: (1) It is complex and unclear. (2) It does not lead to a clear differentiation between 
risk-neutral, risk-averse and risk-loving subjects. (3) It does not take the possibility of losses 
into account. 
2.2 The Approach used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) 
The approach used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) has the advantage that the decision-
making situation is significantly clearer than in the case of Holt and Laury (2002). The sub-
jects decide in favor of one of five possible lotteries. In each lottery there are two possible 
events which each have a probability of occurrence of 50%. From lottery 1 to lottery 5, the 
expected values rise, as do the risks (Table 3, Figure 2).  
In the loss treatment the participants receive $6 for filling in a questionnaire4 in the run-up 
to the lottery. They can lose part of this $6 in lottery 4 and all of it in lottery 5. In order to 
remunerate all subjects uniformly, the expected values are $6 higher in the no-loss treat-
ment. The approach used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) thus also takes the possibility of 
losses into consideration. 
Table 3: Lottery Alternatives in Eckel and Grossman (2008) 









1 A 50% $10 $16 $10 $16 0 B 50% $10 $16 
2 A 50% $18 $24 $12 $18 6 B 50% $6 $12 
3 A 50% $26 $32 $14 $20 12 B 50% $2 $8 
4 A 50% $34 $40 $16 $22 18 B 50% $-2 $4 
5 A 50% $42 $48 $18 $24 24 B 50% $-6 $0 
Event = possible random event; Prob = probability of occurrence; Return Loss = payoff of the coincidental 
events in the loss treatment; Return No-loss = payoff of the coincidental events in the no-loss treatment; E(r) 
loss = expected value of the payoff in the loss treatment; E(r) no loss = expected value of the payoff in the no-
loss treatment; SD = standard deviation. 
                                                          
4 Zuckerman’s sensation-seeking scale. See Zuckerman (1979, 1994). 
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The approach deployed by Eckel and Grossman (2008) is problematic in that the assignment 
of the subjects to the three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-
loving) is by no means clear. This becomes apparent when one considers that risk-averse, 
risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects exhibit fundamentally diverging indifference curves. 
Risk-averse subjects have rising indifference curves, whereas risk-neutral subjects have abso-
lutely horizontal indifference curves and risk-loving subjects have falling indifference curves 
(Figure 1).  






















E(r) = expected value of return; risk (standard deviation). 
If the space of possibilities which results from the five lotteries is considered, the following 
becomes recognizable: All of the subjects who choose lottery 5 can be risk-averse as well as 
risk-neutral or risk-loving (Figure 2). 
The approach used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) thus manages to fulfill two of the three 
criteria we have put forward: It is a simple and clear decision-making situation and the pos-
sibility of making losses is also taken into account. However, the unambiguous identification 








Risk-Avers Risk-Loving Risk-Neutral 
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Figure 2: Space of Possibilities in Eckel and Grossman (2008) as well as the Indifference 
Curves of a Risk-Averse (Unbroken Grey Line), a Risk-Neutral (Dotted Grey Line) and a Risk-
Loving Subject (Dashed Grey Line) 
 
2.3 The Approach used by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) 
Crosetto and Filippin (2013) have proposed the most interesting approach yet to determine 
risk preferences. In this approach, the participants are faced with the following decision-
making situation: They have to decide how many of a total of 100 boxes they want to collect. 
One of the boxes contains a 'bomb'. The participants receive a payoff of €0.10 per box. After 
they have decided on a number of boxes (static version) or have ended the game by pressing 
the ‘stop button’ (dynamic version),5 a number between 1 and 100 is drawn from an urn. If 
the number drawn is ≤ the number of collected boxes, the 'bomb' has exploded and the 
money is gone. If the number drawn is > the number of collected boxes, the subject receives 
a payment based on the multiplication of the number of boxes collected by €0.10. It can be 
expected that the subjects want to win as much money as possible. The more boxes they 
collect, the higher the payoff. At the same time, the risk of encountering the ‘bomb’ (num-
ber drawn ≤ the number of collected boxes) rises. The subjects thus have to weigh up how 
much risk is meaningful to them. The space of possibilities of this decision-making situation 
is shown in Figure 3. 
                                                          
5 Crosetto and Filippin deployed a static basic variation and a dynamic variant. In the static variant the subjects 
only see a picture of 100 boxes and have to decide how many they want to collect. In the dynamic PC version 
the 100 boxes are shown on the screen. By pressing a start button the participants trigger the collection of one 




















Risk (Standard Deviation) 
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Figure 3: Space of Possibilities in Crosetto and Filippin (2013) 
 
From the first to the 50th box, expected returns rises gradually. At the same time the risk also 
increases steadily. From the 50th to the 75th boxes, the risk continues to rise, whereas ex-
pected returns falls. From the 75th to the 100th boxes, the risk as well as expected returns 
both decrease. The highest expected return is achieved if one collects exactly 50 boxes. Risk-
averse subjects – depending on their risk aversion – will choose between one and 50 boxes. 
Risk-loving subjects will choose between 50 and 75 boxes. Risk-neutral subjects will always 
collect exactly 50 boxes, because expected return reaches its maximum level there. The effi-
cient frontier of the space of possibility thus extends from one to 75 boxes. The section from 
76 to 100 boxes, however, is the non-efficient part of the space of possibility. 
The great advantage of this approach is the enormous clarity of the decision-making situa-
tion. In addition, loss opportunities can also be implemented easily, which Crosetto and Fil-
ippin (2013) in fact do in one of the treatments.  
Nevertheless, some criticism can be made: (1) If a subject collects exactly 50 boxes it is not 
possible to recognize whether they are risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-loving. While it is true 
that all risk-neutral subjects will collect exactly 50 boxes, one cannot conclude that all sub-
jects who collect 50 boxes are risk-neutral. In view of the maximum expected return, slightly 
risk-averse or slightly risk-loving subjects could also consider 50 boxes to be the most attrac-
tive option.6 (2) The decision-making situation is indeed very clear, but it is not simple. How 
many subjects recognize that the maximum expected return can be found at exactly 50 box-
es? And how many subjects realize what the risk (standard deviation) is for the 100 different 
                                                          
6 Around 14% of the subjects decide to collect exactly 50 boxes. This means that a notable proportion of the 



















Risk (Standard Deviation) 
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possibilities? A considerable amount of calculating is required to work that out. (3) How 
should subjects who collect more than 75 boxes be characterized? Those persons who move 
in the non-efficient part of the space of possibilities are also either risk-averse, risk-neutral 
or risk-loving. There is no other possibility. However, which of these three alternatives they 
fit into cannot be said, because each subject who collects more than 75 boxes is obviously 
not aware of the shape of the space of possibilities. 
The three requirements we have put forward for a good process to determine risk prefer-
ences are not completely fulfilled here. The decision-making situation is clear, but it is not 
exactly simple. It is not possible in every case to unambiguously assign subjects to one of the 
three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving). On the positive 
side, introducing a risk of loss is simple, which Crosetto and Filippin (2013) in fact do in one 
of the treatments. 
2.4 Further Approaches 
The method used by Lejuez et al. (2002) aims to create a relative comparison of risk prefer-
ence between two or more subjects. However, his aim is not to assign them to one of the 
three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving). The decision-
making situation is designed as follows: A balloon and a pump are shown on a computer 
screen. With every click of a mouse, the balloon is pumped up a bit more and the participant 
receives €0.05. Their credit is shown on a temporary account. The subject can stop pumping 
at any time. If the balloon bursts, the credit accumulated is lost. A total of 90 rounds of the 
game are played, in which there are three different colored balloons (blue, yellow and or-
ange). The three colors represent different probabilities of bursting. The subjects are only 
informed that the three different-colored balloons have a different bursting point, and that 
the balloon can even burst on the first pump. The average number of pumps made is used as 
an indicator for risk preference. As no advance information is provided about expected re-
turns and risk, this method is not suitable for assigning subjects to one of the three catego-
ries of risk preference: Only a relative comparison between subjects can take place. For ex-
ample, it can be established that subject A acts more cautiously than subject B. However, 
whether subject A is risk-averse and subject B is risk-loving remains unclear. Subject A could 
be strongly risk-averse and subject B could be slightly risk-averse. Or subject A is slightly risk-
loving and subject B is highly risk-loving. This remains unclear.  
The method used by Gneezy and Potters (1997) examines which proportion of their portfolio 
subjects invest in a risky asset. To do so, they are asked which proportion of 200 cents they 
want to bet on in a lottery which there is a probability of two thirds that they will lose the 
amount and a probability of one third that they will win two and a half times the amount. So 
if they win they retain the amount they wager plus two and a half times the amount as win-
nings. The lottery thus has a positive expected value. A total of nine rounds are played. In 
treatment H, the participants decide separately for each round which proportion of the 200 
cents they want to bet. In treatment L, decisions are made in advance for each of three 
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rounds of the game. The amount which is wagered thus remains constant for three rounds. 
Depending on the treatment, the participants are informed about the (aggregated) results 
after one or three lotteries and then they bet again. It is shown that the average amount 
placed as a bet in treatment L (decision in advance) is greater than in treatment H (separate 
decision for each round). The results reveal that an investment period spread over several 
periods leads to a larger proportion of the investor's assets being invested in a risky asset. In 
an adapted form, Charness and Gneezy (2010) established that the participants of the exper-
iment would pay in order to have more frequent opportunities to change the composition of 
their portfolio. However, the structure of the experiment is not suited to assigning the sub-
jects to one of the three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-
loving). Once again, the approach can only be used to establish that subject A acts more cau-
tiously than subject B. The same issue arises as in the case of Lejuez et al. (2002). 
Another way of determining individual risk preference is to interview the subjects. A good 
example of this is the domain-specific risk taking questionnaire (DOSPERT) developed by 
Weber, Blais and Betz (2002). The questionnaire relates to a large number of high-risk activi-
ties or behaviors from five fields: (1) Sports and leisure, (2) health, (3) social issues, (4) eth-
ics, and (5) finances. The questionnaire records the probability of the respondents taking 
risks, their perception of these risks and of the benefit which might result from the risks tak-
en. A total of 40 topics are evenly distributed over five fields, whereby only the field of fi-
nance is subdivided into (a) gambling and (b) investment risks. The participants estimate 
their own risk preference on a scale from 1 (low-risk) to 5 (high-risk). Assignation to one of 
the three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving) is not possi-
ble on the basis of this questionnaire. Once again, this approach can only be used to estab-
lish that subject A acts more cautiously than subject B. The same issues arise as in the case 
of Lejuez et al. (2002).  
Another example of surveying risk preference within the framework of a questionnaire is the 
socio-economic panel (SOEP). Schupp and Wagner (2002) as well as Wagner, Burkhauser and 
Behringer (1993) describe the approach used in the questionnaire. The idea is that the inter-
viewees provide information about their general risk preferences. Assignation to one of the 
three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving) is not possible 
on the basis of this questionnaire. The same applies to the differentiated versions of the 
SOEP approach (Schupp and Wagner, 2002; Wagner, Burkhauser and Behringer, 1993). 
These approaches can only be used to establish that subject A acts more cautiously than 
subject B. The same issues arise as in the case of Lejuez et al. (2002). 
Lönnqvist et al. (2015) examine the time stability of various procedures for the measure-
ment of risk preferences, while Charness, Gneezy and Imas (2013) compare different proce-
dures for the measurement of risk preferences. However, they do not provide a different 
approach for the identification of risk-neutral, risk-averse and risk-loving subjects. 
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3 The New Approach 
We propose a procedure for differentiating between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving 
subjects which is very clear and simple and which makes it possible to assign subjects unam-
biguously to the three categories of risk preference.  
It deals with a decision to choose between two lotteries.7 The subjects take a card – they can 
choose between taking a card from pile A or one from pile B. Both piles consist of four play-
ing cards each. In pile A there are two cards which lead to a profit of €+4, and two cards 
which lead to a profit of €+6 (Figure 4). In pile B there are two cards which lead to no profit 
€±0, and two cards which lead to a profit of €+10 (Figure 5).  
Figure 4: The Four Cards in Pile A 
       
Figure 5: The Four Cards in Pile B 
       
The subjects are informed that the expected return in both piles is identical at €+5. In addi-
tion, the subjects are made aware of the fact that pile A leads to results which fluctuate 
slightly around the expected value (low-risk), while pile B leads to results which fluctuate 
considerably around the expected value (high-risk). The two piles of cards containing four 
cards each are not only shown on the screen, but can also be seen as real playing cards on 
the table of the game leader. The subjects are informed that the pile of cards which they 
decide for (A or B) will be shuffled and that they then have to take a card. The entire survey 
is programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). However, we have decided not to program 
random events in z-Tree, but to carry them out analogously. In this way we want to counter-
act the possible suspicion that it could be a manipulated random event. The subjects see the 
                                                          
7 We were inspired by Bechara et al. (1994) here. 
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playing cards and can be sure that there is a probability of exactly 50% that the favorable 
event (€+6 in pile A and €+10 in pile B) will occur. In addition, they can also be sure that 
there is a probability of exactly 50% that the unfavorable event (€+4 in pile A and €±0 in pile 
B) will occur (Table 4).  
Table 4: Lottery Alternatives in the New Approach 
Pile Prob Return E(r) Risk (SD) 
A 50% €+4  €+5  1.0 50% €+6  
B 50% €±0  €+5  5.0 50% €+10  
Prob = probability; E(r) = expected value of the return; SD = standard deviation.  
The shuffling of the cards is left to a machine in order to avoid the suspicion that the game 
leader has an influence on random events. After the cards have been shuffled, the subjects 
have to take one of the four cards from the pile they have chosen. They then receive the 
payment which is noted on this card. Test questions are used to ensure that the subjects 
understand the circumstances. The instructions for the game, the test questions and select-
ed screenshots can be viewed in the appendix. 
The two lotteries lead to a clear space of possibilities (Figure 6) which also permits an unam-
biguous assignment of the subjects to the three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, 
risk-neutral and risk-loving).  
The space of opportunities consists of only two points. The left point shows the expected 
return and risk profile of pile A (low-risk). The right point shows the expected return and risk 
profile of pile B (high-risk). 
The decision options for the subjects are: 
• I would like to take a card from pile A. 
• I would like to take a card from pile B. 
• I would like to take a card. I don't mind which pile I take one from. 
If one takes into account the form of the indifference curves for risk-averse, risk-neutral and 
risk-loving subjects (Figure 1), the decision made by the subjects leads to an unambiguous 
assignment to one of the three categories of risk preference: Risk-averse subjects prefer pile 
A. Risk-loving subjects prefer pile B. Risk-neutral subjects are indifferent as to whether they 
choose pile A or B (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Space of Possibilities of the New Approach as well as the Indifference Curves of a 
Risk-Averse (Unbroken Grey Line), a Risk-Neutral (Dotted Grey Line) and a Risk-Loving Sub-
ject (Dashed Grey Line) 
  
In this way, two out of the three criteria for a suitable procedure to record the risk prefer-
ence of the test persons are fulfilled: (1) The decision-making situation is very clear and sim-
ple. The subjects know precisely which consequences their decision will have. They do not 
have to decide on the basis of a gut feeling, but can make well thought-out, conscious deci-
sions corresponding to their preferences. (2) The three alternatives (pile A, pile B or indiffer-
ence as to whether the card is from A or B) permit unambiguous conclusions about the three 
categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving). In the following chap-
ter we will also take the influence of loss aversion on risk preference into account. 
4 Taking Loss Aversion into Account in the New Approach 
There is hardly another phenomenon in behavioral economics which has been the subject of 
as much research as loss aversion (for a comprehensive overview see, for example, Kahne-
man 2011, Chapter 29; see also Rabin 2000; Fehr and Goette 2007; Tom et al., 2007). Fre-
quently, subjects are strongly influenced in their actions by the effort to avoid losses. One 
would expect that risk preference would also be influenced by the possibility of the threat of 
losses. However, this presumption has not yet been confirmed. Eckel and Grossman (2008) 
and Crosetto and Filippin (2013) have both included treatments with the possibility of losses. 
In spite of this, notable effects on the risk preferences of the subjects could not be observed 














Risk (Standard Deviation) 
- 111 - 
Mukherjee et al. (2017) showed that in the case of small amounts up to $4, a profit had a 
greater positive influence on the well-being of the participants than an equally high loss had 
in negative terms. Here, an evaluation scale ranging from 0 (= no effect) to 5 (= very strong 
effect) was used. In the case of an amount of $25, however, the negative perception of a loss 
was more intense than the positive feeling of an equally large profit. These results indicate 
that loss aversion might only have an influence on risk preference when larger amounts are 
involved. In Eckel and Grossman (2008), losses between $-2 and $-6 can occur. And in Cro-
setto and Filippin (2013), losses of €-2.50 can occur.  
We will now carry out the new approach to establish risk preference in three variations in 
order to investigate the influence of loss aversion on risk preference in more detail. In 
Treatment 1, there is no possibility of making a loss. In Treatment 2, a loss of €-2.50 can be 
made. In Treatment 3, a loss of €-25 can be made (Table 5). 
Table 5: Random Events, Expected Values and Standard Deviations in Treatments 1-3 
Treatment Pile Prob. Return E(r) SD 
1 
A 50% €+4  €+5  1.0 50% €+6  
B 50% €±0  €+5  5.0 50% €+10  
2 
A 50% €+4  €+5  1.0 50% €+6  
B 50% -2.5  €+5  7.5 50% €+12.5  
3 
A 50% €+4  €+5  1.0 50% €+6  
B 50% €-25  €+5  30 50% €+35  
Prob. = probability; E(r) = expected value of the return; SD = standard deviation.  
The results obtained by Mukherjee et al. (2017), Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Crosetto 
and Filippin (2013) lead us to expect that there will be no significant differences between 
Treatment 1 and Treatment 2. The possible losses of €-2.50 are presumably too small to 
have an influence on the risk preferences of the subjects. The first hypothesis is therefore as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: In Treatment 2, not more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse (risk-
loving) than in Treatment 1. 
The first null hypothesis which will have to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 1: In Treatment 2, significantly more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-
averse (risk-loving) than in Treatment 1. 
The results of Mukherjee et al. (2017), however, give reason to presume that the danger of 
losses of €-25 can have an influence on the risk preferences of the subjects. The second hy-
pothesis is therefore as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2: In Treatment 3, more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse (risk-loving) 
than in Treatment 1. 
The second null hypothesis to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 2: In Treatment 3, not more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse (risk-
loving) than in Treatment 1. 
If the presumption is correct that the possibility of a small loss does not really impress sub-
jects, whereas that of a larger loss has a significant influence on risk preferences, it must also 
be possible to establish a difference between Treatment 2 and Treatment 3. Our third hy-
pothesis is therefore as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: In Treatment 3, more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse (risk-loving) 
than in Treatment 2. 
The third null hypothesis which will have to be examined is therefore: 
Null hypothesis 3: In Treatment 3, not more (less) subjects will prove to be risk-averse (risk-
loving) than in Treatment 2. 
In our experiment we conduct a between-subjects comparison. A total of 157 students of 
the Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences in Wolfsburg took part in the experiment. 53 sub-
jects played Treatment 1, 52 subjects played Treatment 2, and 52 subjects played Treatment 
3. 53 women (33.76%) and 104 men (66.24%) took part. 72 of the subjects study business 
management (45.86%), 69 subjects study vehicle construction (43.95%) and 16 students 
study health care (10.19%). The experiment was carried out from 4-10 April 2018 in the Ost-
falia Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research (OLEW) in Wolfsburg in Germany. The 
experiment is programmed in z-Tree. Only the playout of random events is carried out in an 
analogue way by taking a card from the respective selected pile.8 
The actual experiment is preceded by a real effort task. We give the subjects a task which is 
not enjoyable and which requires a considerable amount of time. The subjects are supposed 
to view the task as work which is paid for with an appropriate amount (€25). The subjects 
have to encode a total of 175 three-letter words in sequences of numbers. When they have 
encoded a word correctly, the next word appears. This real effort task is based on Erkal, 
Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2011). In order to make it more demanding, Benndorf, Rau 
and Solch (2014) change the assignment of numbers to letters for every word. We used this 
approach. 
In addition, we consider it to be important that payment for the real effort task made is in 
cash and is carried out directly afterwards and before the actual experiment (the selection of 
one of the two lotteries). Willingness to spend is noticeably reduced if payment is made in 
cash in comparison to credit or debit cards (see, for example, Prelic and Semester, 2001; 
Runnemark et al., 2015). It has also been shown that impulsive purchase behavior is restrict-
ed when a person is handling cash (see, for example, Thomas, Kaushik and Seenivasan, 
2011). From this we conclude that immediate cash payment after the real effort task leads 
                                                          
8 We also chose this path in order to obtain maximum credibility with regard to an uninfluenced random pro-
cess (see also Chapter 3). 
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to the subjects perceiving the amount as their own hard-earned money. In this way, the so-
called house money effect9 is probably avoided or at least considerably reduced. 
We pay the subjects a show-up fee of €2. For the coding work (real effort task) the subjects 
earn €25, for which they require between 35 and 60 minutes. In the actual experiment the 
subjects earn an average of €5.56. Overall the subjects thus earn an average of €32.56. 
Reading the instructions for the game, answering the test questions, carrying out the coding 
work, deciding between piles A and B and taking a card take up between 60 and 90 Minutes. 
The payment they receive is therefore at an appropriate, average level. The subjects gave 
the impression of being very attentive and motivated. 
The results were clear and are largely in line with our expectations (Table 6). In Treatment 1 
(no possibility of loss), only 21 out of 53 subjects (39.62%) chose the low-risk variation (pile 
A). 28 subjects (52.83%) chose the risky variant (pile B). Four subjects (7.55%) were indiffer-
ent to whether they chose a card from pile A or B. In Treatment 2 (possibility of a small loss), 
25 out of 52 subjects (48.08%) chose the low-risk variation (pile A). 24 subjects (46.15%) 
chose the risky variant (pile B). Three subjects (5.77%) were indifferent to whether they 
chose a card from pile A or B. In Treatment 2, the low-risk pile A was chosen more often and 
the risky pile B was chosen less frequently than in Treatment 1. However, Pearson's chi 
squared test showed this difference to be insignificant, with a p-value of 0.418 (Table 7). The 
null hypothesis 1 therefore has to be rejected. This confirmed our presumption (hypothesis 
1) that a possibility of a small loss of €-2.50 does not have any significant influence on the 
risk preferences of the subjects. This result is in line with the findings of Crosetto and Filippin 
(2013) and those of Eckel and Grossman (2008).  
Table 6: Results of the Selection Decision According to Treatments 
Treat-




















1 €+4/€+6 €±0/€+10 21 28 4 39.62% 52.83% 7.55% 
2 €+4/€+6 €-2.5/€+12.5 25 24 3 48.08% 46.15% 5.77% 
3 €+4/€+6 €-25/€+35 36 11 5 69.23% 21.15% 9.62% 
Table 7: Results of Pearson’s Chi Squared Test 
Comparison P-Value 
Treatment 1 (no possibility of loss) versus Treatment 2 (possibility of a small loss) 0.418 
Treatment 1 (no possibility of loss) versus Treatment 3 (possibility of significant loss) 0.001 
Treatment 2 (low possibility of loss) versus Treatment 3 (possibility of significant loss) 0.009 
                                                          
9 Thaler and Johnson (1990) showed that subjects take more risks when they have previously made a profit or if 
start-up capital is made available to them. This applies as long as their earlier profit or start-up capital have not 
been used up, and they are playing with ‘house money’, as it were. 
- 114 - 
In Treatment 3, however (possibility of a significant loss) a marked influence on risk prefer-
ences can be noted. Here, 36 out of 52 subjects (69.23%) chose the low-risk variation (pile 
A). Only eleven subjects (21.15%) chose the risky variant (pile B). Five subjects (9.62%) were 
indifferent to whether they chose a card from pile A or B. This is a marked difference in 
comparison to Treatment 1 (no possibility of loss). Pearson's chi squared test also shows this 
difference with a p-value of 0.001 (Table 7). Null hypothesis 2 clearly has to be rejected. Our 
presumption that the possibility of a higher loss (€-25) leads more often to risk-averse be-
havior (hypothesis 2) is thus confirmed.  
The comparison between Treatment 2 (risk of a small loss) and Treatment 3 (risk of high 
loss) also reveals considerable differences. Pearson's chi squared test shows this difference 
with a p-value of 0.009 (Table 7). It is therefore clear that null hypothesis 3 also has to be 
rejected. Our presumption that a risk of a high loss influences the risk preference of subject 
considerably more than a risk of a low loss (hypothesis 3) is thus confirmed. Crosetto and 
Filippin (2013) had already expressed the presumption that a probability of a high loss would 
have an effect on the measurement of risk preferences. Our results entirely confirm this pre-
sumption. 
Overall, it can be stated that taking a probability of a substantial loss into account leads to a 
more realistic recording of the three categories of risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral 
and risk-loving).  
5 Conclusion 
Experimental research on diversification behavior requires a clear differentiation between 
risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects, because decisions which can be absolutely 
meaningful for a risk-loving subject are completely inconceivable for a risk-averse subject 
and vice-versa. Robust findings in experimental research on diversification can only be ob-
tained if it is known how to categorize the risk preferences of the subject. Differentiating 
between risk-neutral, risk-averse and risk-loving subjects is, however, a demanding task. The 
approach used by Holt and Laury (2002) has undoubtedly received the most attention. We 
have also used this procedure on several occasions (see, for example, Filiz et al., 2018; 
Gubaydullina and Spiwoks 2015). However, we also had the impression that not all subjects 
dedicate themselves to the task with the necessary concentration, and in view of its com-
plexity ultimately make spontaneous decisions which are not well-thought out (for similar 
observations see Jacobson and Petrie, 2009; Charmes and Viceisza, 2011).  
The approach used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) is significantly simpler and clearer, and 
that deployed by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) even more so. However, all three procedures 
exhibit the weakness that in certain situations it is not possible to differentiate in an unam-
biguous and reliable way between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects. In addi-
tion, in these three approaches the influence of loss aversion on risk preference is not taken 
into consideration, or not sufficiently.  
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In the form of our Treatment 3 (probability of a substantial loss) we are proposing a new 
approach to discriminate between risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving subjects which is 
(1) extremely simple and clear, and which (2) permits the clear assignment of subjects to the 
three categories of risk preference, and (3) takes the influence of loss aversion on risk pref-
erence into account in an appropriate way. 
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Appendix: Instructions for the Game, Test Questions and Selected Screen-
shots 
The main instructions are from the study by Benndorf, Rau and Solch (2014). 
The Task 
In this game, you can earn money by completing a task. The task consists of coding 175 
words into numbers. For every correctly coded word you receive credit of 14 cents. In total 
you can earn up to €25. In the task, three upper case letters correspond to one word. Every 
upper-case letter must be assigned to a number. The coding for this can be found in the table 
below. Please take a look at the photo on the screen: 
 
In this example, the participant has already coded two words correctly. Now the three upper 
case letters have to be coded: V, B and U. The solution is provided in the table:  
• V is 398. (see the number entered above by the participant) 
• B is 463. 
• U is 575. 
To enter please click on the blue box below the first upper-case letter.  
When all three figures have been entered please click on OK with the mouse.  
The computer then checks whether ALL upper-case letters have been correctly coded into 
figures, i.e. whether all three figures were entered correctly. Only then is the word consid-
ered to be correct. If the wrong number is entered, the computer points this out (in red let-
ters) after pressing the OK button. The current word remains on the screen until the correct 
number is entered. However, your previous entries (in the three fields under the upper-case 
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letters) are all deleted. The table remains the same, i.e. the numbers assigned to the letters 
remain identical. In the same way, the position of the upper-case letters in the table does 
not change. 
When the correct number is entered you receive the next randomly drawn word (again con-
sisting of three upper-case letters). The table continues to be randomly 're-shuffled': New 
three-digit figures are randomly selected and entered into the table as new mappings for the 
upper-case letters. The position of the upper-case letters in the table is randomly rear-
ranged. Please note that all 26 upper-case letters of the German alphabet are used. 
Following on from this task you will take part in a lottery. You will be given detailed infor-
mation about the lottery when the time comes. 
Payment 
• Basic payment of €2. 
• For every correctly coded word you receive credit of 14 cents. In total you can earn up 
to €25 (175 x 14.2857 cents). 
• The money you might win in the lottery is added to this.  
Important Information 
• Please remain quiet during the game! 
• Do not look at your neighbor’s screen! 
• No aids are permitted (calculators, smartphones etc.) All electronic devices must be 
switched off! 
Test Questions (Treatment 1) 
Test question 1: How much is the minimum and maximum payment when you choose pile 
A?  
a. The minimum payment is €+6 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
b. The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+6. (correct) 
c. The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
Test question 2: How much is the minimum and maximum payment when you choose pile 
B?  
a. The minimum payment is €±0 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
b. The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+10. 
c. The minimum payment is €±0 and the maximum payment is €+10. (correct) 
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Test question 3: How many different piles of cards are there? 
a. 1 
b. 2 (correct) 
c. 3 
Test question 4: How high is the probability of occurrence of the best and worst possible 
results in the lottery? 
a. 100% 
b. 0% 
c. 50% (correct) 
Screenshot 1: Real Effort Task (Reconstructed in Order to Improve Readability) 
Coding 
Out of 175 words to be coded you are currently encoding word number 1  


































































Figure A-1: Real Effort Task  
O.K. 
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Screenshot 2: Instructions and Test Questions on the Lottery in Treatment 1 (Reconstruct-
ed in Order to Improve Readability) 
Lottery 
You can now take a card as part of a lottery. There are two piles of cards to choose from (pile 
A and pile B). The cards are drawn by hand. 
There are four cards in pile A. Two cards lead to a payment of €+4 and two cards lead to a 
payment of €+6. 
There are four cards in pile B. Two cards lead to a payment of €±0 and two cards lead to a 
payment of €+10. 
        Pile A                          Pile B 
 (consists of four cards)                (consists of four cards) 










Please answer the following test questions about the lottery: 
Test question 1: How much is the minimum and maximum payment when you choose pile 
A?  
ʘ The minimum payment is €+6 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
ʘ The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+6. 
ʘ The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
Test question 2: How much is the minimum and maximum payment when you choose pile 
B?  
ʘ The minimum payment is €+/-0 and the maximum payment is €+35. 
ʘ The minimum payment is €+4 and the maximum payment is €+10. 
ʘ The minimum payment is €+/-0 and the maximum payment is €+10. 
Best possible event: €+6 (Probability: 50%) 
Worst possible event: €+4 (Probability: 50%) 
Expected value: €+5 
Low-risk (results fluctuate slightly around the 
expected value) 
Best possible event: €+10 (Probability: 50%) 
Worst possible event: €±0 (Probability: 50%) 
Expected value: €+5 
High-risk (results fluctuate considerably around 
the expected value) 
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Test question 4: How high is the probability of occurrence of the best and worst possible 






Figure A-2: Instructions and Test Questions on the Lottery in Treatment 1 
Screenshot 3: Decision-Making Options on the Lottery in Treatment 1 (Reconstructed in 
Order to Improve Readability) 
Lottery 
You can now take a card as part of a lottery. There are two piles of cards to choose from (pile 
A and pile B). The cards are drawn by hand. 
There are four cards in pile A. Two cards lead to a payment of €+4 and two cards lead to a 
payment of €+6. 
There are four cards in pile B. Two cards lead to a payment of €±0 and two cards lead to a 
payment of €+10. 
        Pile A                          Pile B 
 (consists of four cards)                (consists of four cards) 










Best possible event: €+6 (Probability: 50%) 
Worst possible event: €+4 (Probability: 50%) 
Expected value: €+5 
Low-risk (results fluctuate slightly around the 
expected value) 
 
Best possible event: €+10 (Probability: 50%) 
Worst possible event: €±0 (Probability: 50%) 
Expected value: €+5 
High-risk (results fluctuate considerably around 
the expected value) 
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You now have to decide which pile you want to take a card from. 
Make your selection now. Click on one of the three alternatives. 
ʘ I would like to take a card from pile A. 
ʘ I would like to take a card from pile B. 
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Abstract 
We analyzed interest rate forecasts from Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. We assessed 532 forecast 
time series with a total of 85,264 individual interest rate forecasts. To do so, we carried out a 
comparison to naïve forecasts and investigated the forecast time series for topically-
orientated trend adjustments. In addition, we deployed the sign accuracy test and the unbi-
asedness test. The results are very sobering in part: 95.9% of all forecast time series are 
characterized by the phenomenon of topically-orientated trend adjustments, and 99.4% of 
all forecast time series proved to be biased. Only a small proportion of the forecast time se-
ries (3.6%) reflected the future interest rate trend significantly more precisely than a naïve 
forecast. However, at the same time some of the results of the study are surprisingly posi-
tive. The sign accuracy test revealed that 48.3% of all forecast time series predict the interest 
rate trend significantly better than a random walk forecast. 
Keywords  
Interest rate forecasts, survey forecasts, forecast accuracy, portfolio management, topically-
orientated trend adjustment behavior. 
JEL Classification 
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1 Introduction 
Future interest rate trends are of key significance for almost all investment decisions on the 
capital markets. If the general level of interest rates in an economy rises, the prices of most 
bonds will fall. Only securities with a short residual term to maturity and floating-rate bonds 
remain largely unaffected by such developments. The longer the term to maturity and the 
lower the coupon, the greater the fall in bond prices. If the general level of interest rates 
falls, the opposite effect occurs, and the prices of most bonds rise. 
Interest rate trends are, however, also of great importance for investments in the stock mar-
ket. The fair value of a share is the total of all discounted future profits that this share pro-
vides. If one wishes to take a critical look at the current market price of a stock, it is wise not 
to compare its current price with the current fair value, but rather to determine the future 
fair value of the stock. If the current value is significantly below the fair value which it will 
have at the end of the investment horizon, it is an attractive investment. However, in order 
to establish the future fair value of a stock, one has to forecast the predominant future in-
terest rate level, because this simultaneously represents the future discount rate in the de-
termination of fair value.  
In the case of international portfolios, exchange rate movements also have to be taken into 
account. The interest rate parity theory shows that interest rate trends at home and abroad 
have great significance for exchange rates. 
As a rule, financial market analyzes normally begin with a forecast of interest rate trends, 
because bond and share prices – and ultimately also exchange rates – are significantly influ-
enced by interest rates. It is therefore not surprising that the accuracy of interest rate fore-
casts have been of great interests to academics and business professionals for a long time 
now. In the past 40 years, around 50 studies have already been published on the accuracy of 
survey-based interest rate forecasts (see the comprehensive synoptic overview in Table 20 in 
the appendix). Some trends have emerged in these studies:  
Only a few studies considered the interest rate forecasts they analyzed to be largely relia-
ble.1 These were largely forecasts on the base rates of central banks or forecasts of short-
term market rates such as the three-month money market rate. However, for portfolio man-
agement, interest rate forecasts for bonds with maturities of at least a year are primarily of 
interest, because active portfolio management strategies can be realized much more easily 
in this segment. There are also some studies with mixed findings.2 Here again, it is mostly 
forecasts for short-term interest rates which come off well, while more than half of the stud-
                                                          
1 See, for example, Throop (1981), Tabak and Feitosa (2008), Baghestani and Marchon (2012), Knüppel and 
Schultefrankenfeld (2013) and Pierdzioch (2015). 
2 See, for example, Dua (1988), Zarnowitz and Braun (1992), Cho (1996), Gosnell and Kolb (1997), Greer (2003), 
Scheier and Spiwoks (2006), Goodhart and Lim (2008), Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein (2008), Chun (2009), Spiwoks, 
Bedke and Hein (2010), Jongen, Verschoor and Wolff (2011), Kunze, Kramer and Rudschuk (2013), Kunze and 
Gruppe (2014), Baghestani and Danila (2014), Beechay and Österholm (2014), Oliver and Pasaogullari (2015), 
and Miah, Khalifa and Hammoudeh (2016). 
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ies take a very critical view of the quality of the interest rate forecasts which they exam-
ined.3 
Until now, US interest rate forecasts have been the main focus of research, although Euro-
pean interest rate forecasts – particularly British and German ones – have also been fre-
quently examined. In the Asia-Pacific region there have been several studies focusing on 
Japan,4 but otherwise there has only been little published research dealing with interest rate 
forecasts for the Asia-Pacific region. Goodhart and Lim (2008) looked at interest rate fore-
casts in New Zealand, while Baghestani, Arzaghi and Kaya (2015) analyzed their Australian 
counterparts. Jongen, Verschoor and Wolff (2011) investigated forecasts of interest rate 
trends in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Taiwan for the peri-
od 1995-2009. However, this study limited itself to assessment criteria which do not provide 
a comprehensive impression of the accuracy of the forecasts. Instead it compared survey 
forecasts with random walk forecasts or implicit forward rate forecasts. Miah, Khalifa and 
Hammoudeh (2016) analyzed interest rate forecasts from China, Hong Kong, India, Indone-
sia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, among others. They exam-
ined the period 2001-2012 and applied the efficiency test and the unbiasedness test. As a 
data basis they used the survey forecasts of Fx4casts.com. For us, this is definitely the most 
interesting study among those which have previously been carried out. However, we refer to 
a different data basis (Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts), and in addition to interest rate fore-
casts from China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, 
we also look at forecasts from Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand. We also take a longer 
period of time into account in our analysis (1990-2016).5 In addition, we use a far more 
comprehensive set of tools for the evaluation of the quality of forecasts: (1) Comparison to a 
naïve forecast with the aid of the Diebold-Mariano test, (2) examination of the forecast di-
rection with the help of the sign accuracy test, (3) examination for systematic forecast errors 
with the aid of the unbiasedness test, and (4) test for the presence of possible topically-
oriented trend adjustments with aid of the TOTA coefficient. 
Unlike many of the previous studies we not only examine the time series of the consensus 
forecasts, but also the forecast time series of the banks, investment companies, associations, 
consulting firms and industrial companies which participated in the survey. It cannot be 
ruled out that individual institutions might succeed in making forecasts which are more reli-
able than the consensus forecasts. Limiting the analysis to consensus forecasts might there-
fore mislead us. We evaluated a total of 532 time series with 85,264 interest rate forecasts. 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Friedman (1980), Belongia (1987), Simon (1989), Hafer and Hein (1989), Francis (1991), 
Hafer, Hein and MacDonald (1992), Domian (1992), Ilmanen (1996), Kolb and Stekler (1996), Baghestani, Jung 
and Zuchegno (2000), Albrecht (2000), Spiwoks (2003), Brooks and Gray (2004), Benke (2004), Mose (2005), 
Baghestani (2005), Benke (2006), Spiwoks and Hein (2007), Mitchell and Pearce (2007), Spiwoks, Bedke and 
Hein (2009), Gubaydullina, Hein and Spiwoks (2011), Schwarzbach, Kunze, Rudschuck and Windels (2012), 
Chortareas, Jitmaneeroj and Wood (2012), Butter and Jansen (2013), Spiwoks, Gubaydullina and Hein (2015), 
and Kunze, Wegener, Bizer and Spiwoks (2017). 
4 See, for example, Gosnell and Kolb (1997), Spiwoks and Hein (2007), Gubaydullina, Hein and Spiwoks (2011), 
Jongen, Verschoor and Wolff (2011), Butter and Jansen (2013), Spiwoks, Gubaydullina and Hein (2015), and 
Baghestani, Arzaghi and Kaya (2015). 
5 The Australian interest rate forecasts start in 1990. The other time series only begin later. 
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In this respect, the study can be viewed as the most comprehensive analysis by far of inter-
est rate forecasts in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Some surprising results were revealed in the process, which certainly opens up opportunities 
for active portfolio management strategies. For example, 61.5% of the forecast time series 
on the interest rates of Indian state bonds with ten years remaining to maturity (forecast 
horizon: 13 months) predict the future interest rate trend (rising or falling) significantly bet-
ter than a random walk forecast. With forecasting results of this kind, it should be possible 
to systematically obtain excess returns.  
The study is divided into five sections. In chapter 2 the data basis is described in detail. In 
chapter 3 the methods used are presented. The results of the study are shown in chapter 4. 
In the final chapter a summary of the study is provided. 
2 Data Basis 
Bates and Granger (1969) were the first to raise the question of whether better results could 
be achieved via a suitable combination of several forecasts than by means of choosing the 
(presumably) best forecast. The idea behind this is that many forecasts contain useful ele-
ments of information which are not found in other forecasts and which can be brought to-
gether in a consensus forecast (see, for example, Thiele 1993). This idea triggered a lively 
debate on the possibilities and limitations of suitable combinations of forecasts, which cul-
minated in 1989 in a special edition of the Journal of Forecasting and the International Jour-
nal of Forecasting. As a result of this debate, the company Consensus Economics created the 
specialist journal Consensus Forecasts. Since October 1989 it has been published on a 
monthly basis. Every month, Consensus Economics interviews more than 700 leading aca-
demics from the fields of economics and business for their forecasts in relation to various 
economic indicators for over 85 countries. Alongside the forecasts of these experts, Consen-
sus Economics also publishes a consensus mean, which is the arithmetical average of the 
experts’ forecasts.  
The interest rate forecasts for Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand which are analyzed here come from 
the regularly published journal Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts. We examined the forecasts 
which were published there in the period from January 1990 to December 2015. The fore-
casts relate to the period from April 1990 to the end of December 2016. The data for Aus-
tralia in the initial years is from the journal Consensus Forecasts. For the period after the 
establishment of the journal Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts in 1995, the Australian interest 
rate forecasts are taken from that periodical. We evaluated a total of 532 time series with 
85,264 interest rate forecasts. There is a detailed overview in Table 1. 
Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts differentiates between two forecast horizons: In the jour-
nal, the forecasts are occasionally described as three-month forecasts and twelve-month 
forecasts. In reality, however the forecast horizons are of four and thirteen months. This can 
be seen in the following example: In the edition of January 2015, which was available in 
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around mid-January, the forecasts for the end of April 2015 and the end of January 2016 
were published. The forecasts themselves are handed in by the participating institutions at 
the beginning of January. The actual period of time from the beginning of January 2015 to 
the end of April 2015 is four months, while the period of time from the beginning of January 
2015 to the end of January 2016 is thirteen months. 
Table 1: Data Used from the Journal Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts 






Results in the 
Table 
Australia 10 Year Government Bond Yield 42 7,871 3 
Three Month Interest Rates 42 8,115 4 
China One-Year Base Lending Rate 30 3,507 5 
Hong Kong Prime Lending Rate 30 5,159 6 
Three Month Interest Rates 38 6,077 7 
India 10 Year Government Bond Yield 26 3,809 8 
Three Month Interest Rates 24 4,196 9 
Indonesia 10 Year Government Bond Yield 24 3,595 10 
Malaysia Base Lending Rate  30 4,374 11 
Three Month Interest Rates 36 5,842 12 
New Zealand 10 Year Government Bond Yield 36 6,566 13 
Three Month Interest Rates 36 6,552 14 
Singapore Prime Lending Rate 30 3,876 15 
Three Month Interest Rates 38 5,906 16 
South Korea Three Year Interest Rates 28 3,194 17 
Taiwan 10 Year Government Bond Yield 16 2,103 18 
Thailand Three Month Interest Rates 26 4,522 19 
∑  532 85,264  
We analyzed all of the forecast time series which have at least 80 items of data. We did not 
take time series with less than 80 observations into consideration. Under certain circum-
stances, time series which are too short or contain too large gaps can lead to inconclusive 
results in the procedures used to measure the quality of forecasts. 
3 Methods 
The following statistical tools were used to measure the quality of forecasts: Comparison to 
a naïve forecast with the aid of the Diebold-Mariano test (3.1), examination of the forecast 
direction with the help of the sign accuracy test (3.2), the test for the unbiasedness of the 
forecasts (3.3) and the test for the presence of topically-orientated trend adjustments with 
the help of the TOTA coefficient (3.4).  
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3.1 Comparison to a Naïve Forecast with the Aid of the Diebold-Mariano Test 
The French mathematician Pierre Simon Laplace (1814) introduced the principle of indiffer-
ence (also known as the principle of insufficient reason) into the literature: A black box emits 
a figure x, and then the subject is requested to forecast which figure the black box will emit 
next. In view of the subject's complete lack of knowledge regarding the processes going on 
in the black box, it is not possible to give a single reason why the next figure should be larger 
than x. They can also not give a single reason why the next figure should be smaller than x. 
The only thing which an unknowing but sensible person can do is to forecast the figure x 
again for the future. In this way, a naïve forecast (everything remains the same) is under-
standable as long as one has no insight into the processes which lead to the figures which 
need to be forecast. Ever since it was identified, the naïve forecast has been considered to 
be the rock bottom in terms of forecast accuracy. Even a very rudimentary understanding of 
the processes at play should lead to better accuracy than that offered by a naïve forecast.  
Simple measurements of forecast quality (such as mean absolute error or mean squared 
error) enable us to make a comparison with a naïve forecast. However, these simple ap-
proaches do not permit an assessment of statistical significance. This deficit is avoided by 
using the Diebold-Mariano test (Diebold and Mariano, 1995). To do so, we calculate the 
mean squared error (MSE) for the time series of the expert prognoses and for the time series 
of the naïve forecasts. The test statistics of the Diebold-Mariano test are defined as follows: 
1 2
1 ( ( ) ( ))
ˆ /








T  = number of observations 
V = loss function 
P1 = naïve forecast 
P2 = expert forecast 
 = joint spread of the two loss functions   
 
The null hypothesis tested in this way is that the naïve forecast (P1) and the expert forecast 
(P2) have the same accuracy. Neither one of the two alternatives thus provides a clearly bet-
ter result. The numerator is the mean deviation between the loss functions V of the two 
forecast approaches to be compared. Normally a squared loss function is assumed; in other 
words, the squared errors of the two forecast approaches are compared (P1 and P2). The 
denominator is the joint spread of the two loss functions. This is estimated on the basis of 
the long-term autocovariances of the loss functions. In the case of large samples, this test 
value is asymptotically normally distributed. 
ˆ /d Tγ
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3.2 Sign Accuracy Test 
The sign accuracy test (Merton, 1981; Henriksson and Merton, 1981) is another widespread 
tool for evaluating forecasts. In this procedure, the extent of a forecasted change is not the 
issue. It only examines whether the general direction of the forecasts (rising or falling) is cor-
rect. The forecasts are then entered into a 2x2 matrix (Table 2).  
Table 2: 2x2 Contingency Table 
 Actual Event: 
Interest Rates Rise 
Actual Event: 
Interest Rates Fall 
∑ 
Forecast: Interest Rates Rise N11 N12 N1 
Forecast: Interest Rates Fall N21 N22 N2 
∑ N1 N2 N 
On the one hand, a differentiation is made between whether an interest rate increase or an 
interest rate fall was forecast; on the other hand, a differentiation is also made between 
whether an interest rate rise or an interest rate fall has actually occurred. The principal diag-
onal in the 2x2 matrix (N11 and N22) indicates the forecasts which are correct regarding the 
trend direction. The secondary diagonal (N12 and N21) indicates the forecasts which are in-
correct regarding the trend direction. A chi squared test is now applied to examine whether 
the distribution frequency of the four fields is significantly different from a random walk 
forecast (cf. Diebold and Lopez, 1996; Joutz and Stekler, 2000). If this is the case, a compari-
son between the number of observations in the principal diagonals and the secondary diag-
onals must be carried out to establish whether the forecasts are significantly better or signif-
icantly worse than a random walk forecast. 
3.3 Unbiasedness Test 
The unbiasedness test using the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969) 
can check whether the forecast errors are systematic. According to the theory of rational 




 = event which has actually occurred (dependent variable) 
α  = constant  
  = forecast of the actual event at the moment in time t 
  = coefficient of the respective forecasts 
 = error term at the moment in time t 
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Based on this equation, forecasts are considered unbiased if α is not significantly different to 
0, and β is not significantly different to 1. In addition, the error term ut may not be autocor-
related. 
Forecasts are considered unbiased when, with a low probability of error, the joint hypothesis 
of α = 0 and β = 1 does not have to be rejected. This is checked by using the Wald test. A 
further condition is the absence of autocorrelations in the value of the error term ut, which 
is examined with the Durbin-Watson test. If, according to these criteria, a forecast time se-
ries is based on rational expectations, Granger and Newbold (1973) argue that this by no 
means signifies that the forecasts are perfect. They merely do not exhibit systematic errors. 
3.4 Topically-Orientated Trend Adjustment  
In order to answer the question of whether forecasters have oriented themselves towards 
current levels when drawing up interest rate forecasts, the TOTA coefficient is used as a sta-
tistical benchmark (Andres and Spiwoks, 1999). Topically-orientated trend adjustment 
(TOTA) is present when forecasts reflect the present more strongly than the future. In the 
most unfavorable case, the future-oriented character of such forecasts may be lost entirely.  
The TOTA coefficient is the quotient of two coefficients of determination (R2A and R2B). The 
R2A measures the correlation between the forecasts at the time of their validity and the ac-
tual events. The R2B measures the correlation between the forecasts at the time of their ap-
pearance and the actual events. The TOTA coefficient takes the following form: 
2 2
2 2
forecasts (validity date); actual events





TOTA coefficient = =  
If the TOTA coefficient has a value of < 1, topically-orientated trend adjustment is given, and 
forecasts reflect the present more strongly than the future.  
The TOTA coefficient and the unbiasedness test are closely related. If a forecast time series is 
characterized by the phenomenon of topically-orientated trend adjustment, the forecast 
error ut is normally not randomly distributed (cf. Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein, 2010). Forecast 
time series which have a TOTA coefficient of < 1 are therefore normally biased. 
4 Results 
510 of the 532 forecasts analyzed have a TOTA coefficient of < 1 (see Tables 3-19). 95.9% of 
all the forecast time series analyzed are therefore characterized by the phenomenon of topi-
cally-orientated trend adjustments. If interest rates rise, expectations regarding future inter-
est rates will therefore normally be revised upwards. If interest rates fall, expectations re-
garding future interest rates will therefore usually be revised downwards. In this way, the 
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forecast time series ultimately reflect current interest rates more strongly than future ones. 
Expressed more pointedly, it could be said that the experts are forecasting the present ra-
ther than the future. This is consistent with the results of earlier studies. In an analysis of 
1,182 forecast time series of the G7 countries and five other European countries, a total of 
98.5% of all forecast time series studied exhibited a topically-orientated trend adjustment 
(see Spiwoks, Gubaydullina and Hein, 2015). 
These sobering findings are also reflected in the unbiasedness test. 529 of the 532 forecasts 
analyzed exhibit bias (see Tables 3-19). In 99.4% of all forecast time series studied, either α 
differs significantly from 0, or β differs significantly from 1, or the error term ut proves to be 
autocorrelated.  
Even unbiased forecasts can exhibit dramatic forecasting errors. The term unbiased merely 
states that forecasting errors are not of a systematic nature. A systematic forecasting error 
is, for example, a continuous over – or underestimation of the subject of the forecast (α≠0). 
A different kind of systematic forecasting error is present when small actual events are con-
stantly overestimated (or underestimated), and major actual events are constantly underes-
timated (or overestimated) (β≠1). Systematic forecasting errors are also present when the 
error term ut reveals a pattern. This is usually the case when topically-orientated trend ad-
justment is present (cf. Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein 2010). However, other systematic forecast-
ing errors can also lead to the error term ut proving to be autocorrelated. Biased forecast 
time series are thus a reflection of systematic errors in drawing up the forecasts. This is true 
for 99.4% of all the forecasts we considered. 
An expert's forecast can be viewed as largely worthless if it cannot bear comparison with the 
respective naïve forecast. A naïve forecast requires no specialist knowledge and is available 
free of charge to everyone at any time. One should, however, expect that forecasts made by 
highly-paid financial market experts are more exact than naïve forecasts. In many of the 
forecast subjects and forecast horizons examined here, the experts’ forecasts – compared to 
the mean squared forecast error – are indeed more precise than naïve forecasts.6 A total of 
175 out of 532 forecast time series (32.9%) exhibit lower mean squared forecast errors than 
the respective naïve forecasts. However, the Diebold-Mariano test shows that only 19 out of 
532 forecast time series (3.6%) contain significantly better forecasting results than naïve 
forecasts. The experts who forecast the prime lending rate in Hong Kong are particularly suc-
cessful. 14 out of 30 forecast time series (46.7%) predict the interest rate trend significantly 
                                                          
6 In the forecasts of the prime lending rate in Hong Kong, it can be seen that 26 out of 30 forecast time series 
(86.7%) were superior to the naïve forecast. In the case of the forecasts of the 3-month rate in Hong Kong, 24 
out of 38 forecast time series (63.2%) were superior to a naïve forecast, while in the forecasts of the 3-month 
rate in India, at least the forecasts with a 13 month forecast horizon were highly successful: 9 out of 12 forecast 
time series (75%) were more precise than the corresponding naïve forecast. Among the forecasts of 10-year 
interest rates in Indonesia, the forecasts with a horizon of 13 months were once again very successful. 9 out of 
12 forecast time series (75%) are more exact than a naïve forecast. Forecasts of the base lending rate in Malay-
sia were more successful than a naïve forecast in 18 out of 30 cases (60%), which is also the case for forecasts 
of 3-month interest rates in Malaysia in 19 out of 36 cases (52.8%). The forecasts of the 3-month rate in New 
Zealand were more precise than a naïve forecast in 25 out of 36 cases (69.4%). Among the forecasts of the 3-
month rate in Thailand with a forecast horizon of 13 months, 9 out of 13 forecast time series (69.2%) were 
superior to the naïve forecast. 
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better than a naïve forecast (Table 6). Apart from this there are only five individual cases in 
which the time series of expert forecasts are significantly more precise than the time series 
of the respective naïve forecasts. 
The sign accuracy test merely reveals whether forecasts were in the right direction (rising or 
falling). For the sign accuracy test, however, it is completely irrelevant whether forecasts 
predict the extent of future trends. The findings here are surprisingly favorable. In 248 out of 
513 forecast time series (48.3%), the future trend (rising or falling interest rates) has been 
grasped significantly better than by a random walk forecast (see Tables 3-19). This is also a 
remarkable success in comparison to the findings of many previous studies. For example, 
Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein (2008) established a success rate of only 19.9% among US interest 
rate forecasts. 
In the case of Australian 3-month interest rates with a forecast horizon of four months, 13 
out of 21 forecast time series (61.9%) were significantly better in predicting the future trend 
direction (rising or falling) than a random walk forecast (Table 4). The forecasts for the base 
lending rate in China are very conspicuous: 29 out of 30 forecast time series (96.7%) predict 
the future interest rate trend significantly better than a random walk forecast (Table 5). This 
result is even surpassed by forecasts for the prime lending rate in Hong Kong. All 30 forecast 
time series (100%) reflect the future interest rate trend significantly more precisely than a 
random walk forecast (Table 6). The forecasts for three-month interest rates in Hong Kong, 
with a 13 month forecast horizon, are also very successful. 14 out of 19 forecast time series 
(73.7%) predict the interest rate trend significantly better than a random walk forecast (Ta-
ble 7). Forecasts for the three-month rate in India are equally successful. In 17 out of 24 
forecast time series (70.8%), the future trend (rising or falling interest rates) is reflected sig-
nificantly better than by a random walk forecast (Table 9). The base lending rate in Malaysia 
is also forecasted successfully: 23 out of 28 forecast time series (82.1%) predict the future 
interest rate trend significantly better than a random walk forecast (Table 11). The forecasts 
for the three-month rate in New Zealand similarly predict the future interest rate trend sig-
nificantly better (rising or falling) in 25 out of 36 cases (69.4%) than a random walk forecast 
(Table 14). Among the forecasts for three-month interest rates in Thailand, it is particularly 
those with a forecast horizon of four months that are successful. 10 out of 13 forecast time 
series (76.9%) predict the future trend significantly more precisely than a random walk fore-
cast (Table 19). 
In the case of 19 out of 532 forecast time series, the sign accuracy test could not be carried 
out, because frequencies of < 1 occur in one or several fields of the 2x2 contingency table. In 
these cases, however, the chi squared distribution is no longer a suitable test statistic (see, 
for example, Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein, 2009). 
Overall, it can be stated that forecasting three-month interest rates is considerably easier 
than ten-year interest rates. Only 15.3% of the forecast time series on 10-year rates (Austral-
ia, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Taiwan) predict the future trend (rising or falling interest 
rates) significantly more precisely than a random walk forecast, whereas in the case of three-
month interest rates (Australia, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thai-
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land) the figure is 57.1%. This coincides with the findings which have been obtained in other 
parts of the world. For example, in the case of US interest rate forecasts, Spiwoks, Bedke and 
Hein (2008) showed that only 8.8% of all forecast time series on 10-year interest rates were 
significantly more successful than a random walk forecast, while in the case of three-month 
interest rates the figure was 30.9%. 
The interest rates for short maturities are influenced considerably more by the actions of 
central banks than the interest rates for long maturities. In addition, central banks frequent-
ly provide an outlook on their future base rate policies. It can be that careful observation of 
central bank policy benefits forecasts of three-month interest rates, but not those for ten-
year interest rates (cf. Spiwoks, Bedke and Hein 2008, p. 376). That would explain the varia-
tions in the success of forecasts. 
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Table 3: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Australia (10-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















ANZ  440 0.813 - 0.004 o 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.406 - 0.034 o 0.388 0.000 0.000 
BIS Shrapnel 442 0.837 - 0.000 o 0.821 0.000 0.000 0.559 - 0.000 - 0.048 0.000 0.000 
BT Financial Group 450 0.808 - 0.025 o 0.803 0.000 0.000 0.431 - 0.024 o 0.108 0.000 0.000 
Centre of Policy St. 205 0.461 - 0.011 o 0.994 0.000 0.000 0.022 - 0.049 o 0.743 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 245 0.796 - 0.002 o 0.686 0.000 0.000 0.296 - 0.079 o 0.334 0.000 0.000 
Commonwealth B. 444 0.785 - 0.000 - 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.401 - 0.015 o 0.642 0.000 0.000 
Deloitte Acc. Econ. 428 0.806 - 0.017 o 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.424 o 0.111 - 0.011 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 124 0.349 o 0.148 o 0.856 0.000 0.000 0.256 - 0.075 o 0.107 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 228 0.743 - 0.009 o 0.542 0.000 0.000 0.415 o 0.183 o 0.564 0.000 0.000 
HSBC 286 0.814 - 0.096 o 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.623 - 0.031 o 0.178 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan Chase 403 0.760 - 0.000 - 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.361 - 0.000 o 0.198 0.000 0.000 
Macquarie  386 0.752 - 0.035 - 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.363 - 0.001 - 0.025 0.000 0.000 
Merrill Lynch 300 0.847 - 0.018 o 0.889 0.000 0.000 0.570 o 0.242 o 0.266 0.000 0.000 
Moody’s Analytics 206 0.755 - 0.006 o 0.952 0.000 0.000 0.341 o 0.106 o 0.924 0.000 0.000 
Nation. Australia B. 411 0.825 - 0.011 o 0.713 0.000 0.000 0.499 - 0.018 o 0.943 0.000 0.000 
Nomura 328 0.587 - 0.023 o 0.675 0.000 0.000 0.137 - 0.024 - 0.011 0.000 0.000 
Royal B. of Canada 272 0.771 o 0.249 o 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.298 o 0.107 o 0.576 0.000 0.000 
Suncorp 212 0.436 - 0.000 o 0.489 0.000 0.000 0.038 o 0.155 + 0.057 0.000 0.000 
UBS 449 0.791 - 0.005 o 0.973 0.000 0.000 0.382 - 0.023 - 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Westpac 450 0.798 - 0.000 + 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.455 - 0.042 o 0.316 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.806 - 0.004 o 0.887 0.000 0.000 0.430 - 0.031 o 0.323 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; Sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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Table 4: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Australia (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















ANZ 468 0.904 o 0.471 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.377 o 0.180 + 0.035 0.000 0.000 
BIS Shrapnel 465 0.897 o 0.159 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.490 o 0.215 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
BT Financial Group 468 0.886 o 0.432 + 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.427 o 0.847 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Centre of Policy St. 219 0.780 o 0.393 o 0.107 0.001 0.000 0.015 - 0.096 o 0.663 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 276 0.854 o 0.889 o 0.156 0.002 0.000 0.239 o 0.235 o 0.379 0.000 0.000 
Commonwealth B. 470 0.912 o 0.759 o 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.378 o 0.190 o 0.372 0.000 0.000 
Deloitte Acc. Econ. 450 0.874 o 0.592 o 0.205 0.000 0.000 0.430 o 0.407 o 0.063 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 124 0.560 o 0.867 o 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.044 o 0.089 o 0.839 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 227 0.913 o 0.162 + 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.457 o 0.351 + 0.000 0.409 0.000 
HSBC 272 0.953 o 0.502 o 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.713 o 0.172 + 0.028 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan Chase 410 0.877 o 0.450 + 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.387 o 0.902 o 0.387 0.000 0.000 
Macquarie  411 0.900 o 0.537 + 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.368 o 0.388 o 0.482 0.000 0.000 
Merrill Lynch 325 0.914 o 0.633 + 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.523 o 0.723 o 0.892 0.000 0.000 
Moody’s Analytics 188 0.906 o 0.457 + 0.002 0.028 0.000 0.364 o 0.779 o 0.660 0.000 0.000 
Nation. Australia B. 432 0.896 o 0.366 + 0.046 0.843 0.000 0.452 o 0.970 o 0.066 0.001 0.000 
Nomura 352 0.817 o 0.627 o 0.887 0.000 0.000 0.140 o 0.573 o 0.087 0.000 0.000 
Royal B. of Canada 272 0.865 o 0.121 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.383 o 0.612 o 0.366 0.036 0.000 
Suncorp 212 0.619 - 0.083 o 0.922 0.796 0.000 0.044 o 0.668 o 0.646 0.000 0.000 
UBS 472 0.874 o 0.707 + 0.031 0.006 0.000 0.363 o 0.576 o 0.401 0.000 0.000 
Westpac 470 0.930 o 0.506 + 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.503 o 0.234 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.897 o 0.308 + 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.427 o 0.737 o 0.206 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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Table 5: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for China (1-Year Base Lending Rate) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Bank of China 258 0.671 o 0.317 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 o 0.623 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Barclays Capital 101 0.841 o 0.733 o 0.317 0.000 0.000 0.030 o 0.386 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BNP Paribas 108 0.888 o 0.830 + 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.441 o 0.343 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 100 0.599 o 0.229 + 0.001 0.000 0.047 0.007 o 0.179 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Daiwa Capital 115 0.897 o 0.766 + 0.000 0.000 0.952 0.675 o 0.359 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 158 0.702 o 0.240 + 0.036 0.002 0.000 0.000 o 0.445 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hang Seng Bank 107 0.918 o 0.532 + 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.547 o 0.885 + 0.590 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 212 0.665 o 0.332 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 o 0.530 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IHS Economics 278 0.735 o 0.408 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 o 0.441 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ING 216 0.574 o 0.298 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.036 o 0.889 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan Chase 96 0.580 o 0.271 + 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 o 0.324 + 0.002 0.000 0.098 
Morgan Stanley 93 0.808 o 0.632 + 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.013 o 0.895 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nomura 158 1.017 o 0.860 + 0.000 0.001 0.000 1.432 o 0.751 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Oxford Economics 232 0.695 - 0.089 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.153 o 0.618 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 300 0.718 o 0.564 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 o 0.738 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
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Table 6: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Hong Kong (Prime Lending Rate) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Bank of China  334 0.967 + 0.025 + 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.574 + 0.058 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bank of East Asia  483 0.986 + 0.024 + 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.738 o 0.257 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
C. Pacific-Yamaichi  168 0.985 o 0.264 + 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.287 o 0.131 + 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Credit Suisse  168 0.957 o 0.211 + 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.479 o 0.203 + 0.020 0.000 0.000 
Daiwa Research I. 273 0.956 + 0.044 + 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.488 + 0.076 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank  264 0.967 + 0.031 + 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.633 o 0.418 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FAZ Institute 132 0.939 o 0.208 + 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.449 o 0.161 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 156 0.972 o 0.703 + 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.785 o 0.697 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hang Seng Bank 363 0.994 + 0.021 + 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.778 + 0.047 + 0.000 0.006 0.000 
HSBC Economics 341 0.999 o 0.682 + 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.787 o 0.197 + 0.000 0.349 0.000 
IHS Economics 288 0.957 + 0.075 + 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.527 o 0.201 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sakura Institute 139 0.378 o 0.946 + 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.153 + 0.009 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank  209 0.970 + 0.036 + 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.441 o 0.668 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UBS 132 0.930 + 0.098 + 0.000 0.863 0.001 0.253 o 0.408 + 0.045 0.455 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.975 + 0.023 + 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.720 + 0.043 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
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Table 7: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Hong Kong (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Bank of China 336 0.923 + 0.088 + 0.003 0.080 0.000 0.760 o 0.152 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bank of East Asia 484 0.906 o 0.121 + 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.804 o 0.163 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 339 0.967 o 0.125 + 0.000 0.848 0.000 0.768 o 0.390 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
C. Pacific-Yamaichi 168 0.981 o 0.628 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.374 o 0.317 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Credit Suisse 185 0.887 o 0.231 o 0.091 0.292 0.000 0.573 o 0.577 o 0.284 0.000 0.000 
Daiwa Research 275 0.818 + 0.096 o 0.191 0.064 0.000 0.481 o 0.418 o 0.301 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 297 0.921 o 0.900 o 0.067 0.012 0.000 0.744 o 0.736 + 0.014 0.000 0.000 
FAZ Institute 132 0.921 o 0.456 o 0.392 0.061 0.000 0.374 o 0.931 + 0.030 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 375 0.862 o 0.214 + 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.795 o 0.223 + 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Hang Seng Bank 363 0.913 o 0.143 + 0.023 0.595 0.000 0.832 + 0.041 + 0.000 0.011 0.000 
HSBC 342 0.962 o 0.318 o 0.244 0.082 0.000 0.827 o 0.182 + 0.000 0.002 0.000 
ING 405 0.920 o 0.202 + 0.000 0.339 0.000 0.794 o 0.368 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Morgan Stanley 100 1.013 o 0.411 o 0.401 0.240 0.761 0.818 o 0.744 + 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Nomura 196 0.947 o 0.251 o 0.474 0.000 0.000 0.868 o 0.336 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Sakura Institute 139 0.126 o 0.291 o 0.098 0.123 0.001 0.002 o 0.301 o 0.077 0.044 0.000 
Societe Generale 117 0.834 o 0.464 o 0.184 0.024 0.094 0.676 o 0.327 o 0.149 0.004 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 212 0.782 o 0.415 o 0.521 0.000 0.002 0.392 o 0.897 + 0.013 0.000 0.000 
UBS 131 0.808 o 0.638 o 0.674 0.001 0.001 0.026 o 0.767 o 0.510 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.909 o 0.154 + 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.778 o 0.140 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
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Table 8: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for India (10-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Citigroup 190 0.182 o 0.110 O 0.273 0.007 0.000 0.025 o 0.725 + 0.001 0.004 0.000 
Confed of Indian I. 144 0.949 - 0.037 o 0.073 0.000 0.032 0.684 o 0.563 o 0.093 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 101 0.932 - 0.011 + 0.020 0.090 0.000 0.907 o 0.329 + 0.030 0.008 0.000 
Dresdner Bank 84 0.747 o 0.919 + 0.011 0.021 0.790 0.653 o 0.287 + 0.037 0.183 0.829 
FERI 156 0.389 - 0.058 o 0.270 0.000 0.000 0.003 o 0.245 o 0.123 0.000 0.000 
Hindustan Lever 176 0.897 - 0.063 o 0.601 0.000 0.000 0.718 o 0.112 o 0.500 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Securities 272 0.849 o 0.126 o 0.080 0.015 0.000 0.812 o 0.299 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HIS Economics  186 0.607 o 0.170 + 0.028 0.076 0.000 0.317 o 0.140 - 0.046 0.000 0.000 
NCAER 214 0.881 - 0.005 o 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.712 - 0.003 o 0.688 0.000 0.000 
Nomura 224 0.951 o 0.171 o 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.951 o 0.537 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tata Services 327 0.922 - 0.073 + 0.001 0.033 0.000 0.813 o 0.163 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UBS 138 0.905 o 0.178 o 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.730 o 0.518 + 0.013 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.934 o 0.167 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.843 o 0.944 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
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Table 9: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for India (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Citigroup 221 0.862 o 0.316 o 0.558 0.000 0.000 0.104 o 0.669 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Confed of Indian I. 166 0.908 o 0.621 + 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.656 o 0.624 + 0.028 0.000 0.002 
Deutsche Bank 151 0.905 o 0.304 + 0.011 0.109 0.000 0.443 o 0.413 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dresdner Bank 232 0.808 NA NA + 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.373 o 0.296 + 0.000 0.018 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 98 0.113 o 0.389 + 0.026 0.002 0.000 0.000 o 0.553 o 0.835 0.000 0.000 
Hindustan Lever 168 0.864 NA NA + 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.752 - 0.001 + 0.000 0.000 0.002 
HSBC Securities 234 0.502 o 0.172 o 0.585 0.000 0.000 0.167 o 0.513 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan  108 0.484 o 0.315 o 0.793 0.000 0.707 0.452 o 0.249 + 0.001 0.004 0.594 
NCAER 212 0.809 o 0.335 + 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.336 o 0.927 o 0.090 0.000 0.000 
Tata Services 325 0.854 o 0.487 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.180 o 0.870 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UBS 136 0.666 o 0.158 o 0.200 0.001 0.000 0.049 o 0.186 o 0.133 0.122 0.002 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.799 o 0.393 + 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.223 o 0.502 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
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Table 10: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for India (10-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Bahana Securities 194 0.916 o 0.990 o 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.569 o 0.553 - 0.033 0.000 0.000 
Bank Danamon  98 0.809 NA NA o 0.301 0.000 0.023 0.464 o 0.367 + 0.043 0.000 0.000 
Castle Asia  108 0.787 - 0.034 o 0.433 0.360 0.000 0.440 o 0.513 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup  228 0.912 o 0.505 o 0.273 0.000 0.615 0.443 o 0.707 o 0.722 0.000 0.000 
Danareksa S.  375 1.001 NA NA o 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.844 o 0.273 o 0.317 0.156 0.000 
GK Goh   110 1.107 o 0.347 o 0.053 0.276 0.000 0.969 o 0.864 o 0.542 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 272 0.916 o 0.270 o 0.983 0.000 0.000 0.590 o 0.281 o 0.601 0.000 0.000 
ING  199 0.937 o 0.353 o 0.191 0.008 0.000 0.747 o 0.519 o 0.983 0.000 0.000 
Nomura  134 0.867 o 0.338 o 0.866 0.000 0.095 0.419 o 0.308 - 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Societe Generale 124 0.822 - 0.002 NA NA 0.450 0.000 0.653 o 0.222 NA NA 0.031 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 174 0.861 o 0.111 o 0.676 0.144 0.000 0.358 o 0.660 o 0.971 0.018 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.926 o 0.265 o 0.884 0.000 0.000 0.590 o 0.501 o 0.547 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
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Table 11: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Malaysia (Base Lending Rate) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















AMSecurities 212 0.890 o 0.226 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.493 o 0.318 o 0.309 0.000 0.000 
CIBD-CIMB 157 1.002 + 0.096 + 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.612 o 0.272 + 0.017 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 94 0.848 o 0.305 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.105 o 0.821 + 0.013 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 92 0.996 o 0.261 NA NA 0.022 0.000 1.016 o 0.222 + 0.000 0.000 0.010 
Goldman Sachs 118 0.792 - 0.049 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.388 o 0.301 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Securities  149 0.551 - 0.056 o 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.005 o 0.441 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
JM Sassoon 150 0.918 o 0.218 + 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.746 o 0.158 + 0.001 0.270 0.000 
Kanega Research 109 0.954 o 0.131 + 0.009 0.014 0.000 0.142 o 0.155 + 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Kay Hian Research 261 0.951 o 0.249 + 0.001 0.495 0.000 0.918 o 0.231 + 0.001 0.368 0.000 
Maybank 145 0.791 o 0.390 NA NA 0.082 0.000 0.037 - 0.086 o 0.201 0.000 0.000 
MIER 276 0.862 o 0.277 + 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.636 o 0.475 o 0.697 0.204 0.000 
RHB Research 400 1.021 o 0.287 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.676 o 0.169 + 0.000 0.045 0.000 
Societe Generale 104 0.911 o 0.216 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.102 o 0.800 + 0.008 0.000 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 165 1.051 o 0.240 + 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.654 o 0.555 o 0.059 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 480 0.939 o 0.130 + 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.606 o 0.160 + 0.000 0.180 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 





- 148 - 
Table 12: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Malaysia (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















AMSecurities 211 0.896 o 0.261 o 0.051 0.706 0.000 0.364 o 0.400 o 0.161 0.000 0.000 
Baring- ING 427 0.882 o 0.499 + 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.603 o 0.920 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BofA-Merrill Lynch 111 1.050 o 0.643 o 0.068 0.052 0.000 0.924 o 0.650 o 0.536 0.000 0.000 
CIBD-CIMB 156 0.962 o 0.622 o 0.350 0.028 0.000 0.588 o 0.184 o 0.148 0.000 0.000 
Citigroup 383 0.923 o 0.100 + 0.004 0.011 0.000 0.534 o 0.474 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 127 0.996 o 0.546 o 0.071 0.006 0.000 0.884 o 0.153 + 0.000 0.000 0.014 
Goldman Sachs 464 0.877 - 0.081 o 0.663 0.000 0.000 0.573 NA NA + 0.017 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 195 0.819 - 0.051 o 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.138 o 0.479 + 0.004 0.000 0.000 
JM Sassoon 150 0.917 o 0.180 + 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.689 o 0.248 + 0.002 0.064 0.000 
Kanega Research 118 0.819 o 0.113 + 0.005 0.098 0.000 0.077 o 0.179 + 0.000 0.047 0.000 
Kay Hian Research 120 0.841 o 0.575 + 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.497 o 0.276 o 0.940 0.000 0.000 
Maybank 141 0.876 o 0.110 o 0.699 0.008 0.000 0.200 o 0.144 o 0.248 0.000 0.000 
MIER 282 0.915 o 0.243 + 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.604 o 0.424 o 0.482 0.000 0.000 
RHB Research 404 0.935 o 0.245 + 0.000 0.527 0.000 0.501 o 0.263 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Societe Generale 118 1.019 o 0.938 + 0.000 0.436 0.001 1.540 o 0.810 o 0.095 0.000 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 238 0.963 o 0.237 + 0.001 0.028 0.000 0.581 o 0.445 o 0.238 0.025 0.000 
UOB Kay Hian 220 0.908 o 0.274 o 0.189 0.654 0.000 0.352 o 0.294 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.927 o 0.199 + 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.588 o 0.291 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test; NA = not available. 
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Table 13: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for New Zealand (10-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















ANZ Bank 488 0.832 - 0.010 o 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.575 - 0.053 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 
ASB Bank 274 0.798 - 0.011 o 0.849 0.000 0.000 0.393 - 0.072 o 0.630 0.000 0.000 
Bank of NZ 480 0.779 - 0.038 o 0.806 0.000 0.000 0.426 - 0.047 o 0.423 0.000 0.000 
BERL 340 0.483 - 0.024 o 0.951 0.000 0.000 0.231 - 0.086 o 0.355 0.043 0.000 
Credit Suisse FB 114 0.297 o 0.263 o 0.602 0.002 0.000 0.239 o 0.983 o 0.638 0.213 0.000 
Deutsche Bank NZ 468 0.831 - 0.006 + 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.481 - 0.001 - 0.004 0.000 0.000 
First NZ Capital 348 0.830 - 0.000 o 0.988 0.000 0.000 0.565 o 0.145 o 0.198 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs NZ 144 0.516 - 0.059 o 0.955 0.043 0.000 0.093 o 0.308 - 0.015 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 216 0.867 - 0.003 o 0.550 0.000 0.000 0.490 - 0.053 o 0.129 0.000 0.000 
Infometrics 498 0.762 - 0.002 o 0.469 0.000 0.000 0.426 - 0.021 o 0.549 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan Chase 331 0.754 - 0.000 o 0.444 0.019 0.000 0.361 - 0.035 o 0.833 0.000 0.000 
Macquarie 172 0.776 - 0.003 o 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.341 - 0.050 o 0.472 0.000 0.000 
National Bank NZ 212 0.465 o 0.663 o 0.107 0.529 0.000 0.000 o 0.180 o 0.455 0.000 0.000 
NZIER 440 0.764 - 0.000 o 0.257 0.000 0.000 0.572 - 0.060 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Ord Minnett S. 128 0.234 - 0.005 o 0.567 0.008 0.000 0.367 o 0.783 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UBS 476 0.779 - 0.001 - 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.393 - 0.084 - 0.040 0.000 0.000 
Westpac 482 0.799 - 0.003 o 0.663 0.000 0.000 0.497 - 0.092 o 0.359 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.793 - 0.005 o 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.504 o 0.118 o 0.075 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
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Table 14: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for New Zealand (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















ANZ Bank 488 0.939 o 0.287 + 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.694 o 0.383 o 0.446 0.000 0.000 
ASB Bank 274 0.998 o 0.243 + 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.684 o 0.654 o 0.434 0.000 0.000 
Bank of NZ 480 0.937 o 0.152 + 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.758 o 0.341 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 
BERL 340 0.770 o 0.275 o 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.403 o 0.213 o 0.128 0.038 0.000 
Credit Suisse FB 114 0.742 o 0.215 + 0.012 0.490 0.000 0.042 o 0.236 + 0.000 0.043 0.000 
Deutsche Bank NZ 468 0.947 + 0.076 + 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.630 o 0.497 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 
First NZ Capital 348 0.960 o 0.161 + 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.637 o 0.394 o 0.299 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs NZ 146 0.825 o 0.265 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 o 0.464 + 0.008 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 198 0.972 o 0.294 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.805 o 0.419 + 0.038 0.000 0.000 
Infometrics 498 0.925 o 0.411 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.472 o 0.969 o 0.363 0.000 0.000 
JPMorgan Chase 327 0.959 o 0.328 o 0.071 0.115 0.000 0.435 o 0.861 o 0.743 0.000 0.000 
Macquarie 176 1.002 o 0.320 + 0.001 0.021 0.000 0.806 o 0.324 o 0.379 0.000 0.000 
National Bank NZ 212 0.807 o 0.130 + 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.270 o 0.361 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NZIER 440 0.891 o 0.997 o 0.067 0.015 0.000 0.493 o 0.860 o 0.258 0.000 0.000 
Ord Minnett S. 128 0.772 o 0.537 + 0.009 0.078 0.000 0.685 o 0.193 + 0.001 0.860 0.000 
UBS 478 0.927 o 0.412 + 0.001 0.496 0.000 0.558 o 0.571 + 0.028 0.000 0.000 
Westpac 482 0.946 o 0.137 + 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.542 o 0.611 + 0.039 0.006 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.929 o 0.150 + 0.000 0.562 0.000 0.603 o 0.291 + 0.009 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
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Table 14: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Singapore (Prime Lending Rate) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Citigroup  94 0.580 o 0.604 NA NA 0.004 0.000 0.308 o 0.163 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit Suisse 95 0.847 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.355 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.002 
Deutsche Bank  164 0.996 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.920 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs  151 0.792 - 0.003 o 0.696 0.000 0.000 0.871 o 0.196 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 
HSBC  322 1.090 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 2.542 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
JM Sassoon  164 1.144 o 0.457 o 0.119 0.000 0.000 2.295 o 0.956 - 0.030 0.000 0.000 
Kay Hian Research 122 0.784 o 0.280 o 0.055 0.000 0.000 1.378 o 0.951 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Morgan Stanley 95 0.818 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.704 - 0.010 o 0.338 0.000 0.000 
Nomura  183 0.973 - 0.000 o 0.505 0.000 0.000 1.054 - 0.008 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 
OCBC Bank  194 0.970 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.868 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
Sakura Institute 144 0.749 o 0.430 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.398 o 0.903 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 168 0.978 - 0.061 o 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.863 o 0.395 o 0.064 0.000 0.000 
U. Overseas Bank 190 0.937 - 0.013 o 0.058 0.000 0.000 1.050 o 0.542 + 0.004 0.000 0.000 
UOB Kay Hian  143 9.037 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 2.053 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 392 0.946 - 0.000 o 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.749 - 0.002 - 0.039 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
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Table 16: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Singapore (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Citigroup  382 0.847 o 0.196 + 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.431 o 0.189 o 0.229 0.353 0.000 
Credit Suisse 154 0.922 o 0.246 o 0.058 0.270 0.000 0.424 o 0.531 o 0.264 0.000 0.000 
DBS Bank 208 0.892 o 0.554 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.379 o 0.349 - 0.032 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank  240 0.916 o 0.999 + 0.003 0.017 0.047 0.761 o 0.844 + 0.049 0.000 0.000 
Goldman Sachs  454 0.818 o 0.111 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.522 o 0.557 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 
HSBC  335 0.926 o 0.553 o 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.501 o 0.948 - 0.002 0.000 0.000 
IHS 212 0.891 o 0.119 o 0.990 0.451 0.000 0.311 - 0.098 o 0.622 0.000 0.000 
ING 279 0.697 o 0.319 + 0.028 0.024 0.000 0.097 o 0.442 + 0.011 0.000 0.000 
JM Sassoon 166 0.541 o 0.494 + 0.041 0.149 0.163 0.064 o 0.495 o 0.914 0.626 0.000 
Kay Hian Research 236 0.572 - 0.057 o 0.375 0.059 0.000 0.188 o 0.426 + 0.023 0.000 0.000 
Merrill Lynch 127 0.767 o 0.313 o 0.855 0.470 0.027 0.371 o 0.229 o 0.874 0.000 0.001 
Nomura  252 0.663 o 0.571 o 0.385 0.202 0.000 0.426 o 0.319 + 0.031 0.000 0.000 
OCBC Bank  323 0.831 o 0.554 o 0.291 0.000 0.000 0.527 o 0.750 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Sakura Institute 128 0.315 - 0.052 o 0.796 0.001 0.444 0.001 o 0.391 o 0.492 0.000 0.028 
S. Chartered Bank 243 0.658 o 0.484 + 0.016 0.049 0.002 0.098 o 0.823 o 0.066 0.000 0.000 
UBS 122 0.625 o 0.951 o 0.435 0.146 0.002 0.355 o 0.492 o 0.411 0.000 0.000 
U. Overseas Bank 206 0.751 o 0.412 + 0.026 0.176 0.000 0.615 o 0.240 + 0.000 0.031 0.000 
UOB Kay Hian  143 0.837 o 0.434 o 0.184 0.051 0.000 0.342 o 0.719 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.770 o 0.511 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.436 o 0.403 + 0.002 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
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Table 17: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for South Korea (3-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Credit Suisse 112 0.295 - 0.032 o 0.790 0.009 0.000 0.403 - 0.021 o 0.340 0.000 0.000 
Daewoo Securities 208 0.849 - 0.090 o 0.874 0.000 0.000 0.586 o 0.465 o 0.172 0.000 0.000 
Daishin Economics 133 0.634 - 0.098 o 0.466 0.000 0.000 0.164 - 0.000 - 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Dresdner Bank  179 0.724 - 0.002 o 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.643 - 0.006 o 0.473 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 94 0.838 - 0.009 o 0.848 0.002 0.000 0.634 o 0.463 o 0.108 0.000 0.000 
Hyundai Securities 228 0.714 - 0.005 o 0.364 0.000 0.000 0.216 - 0.056 o 0.166 0.000 0.000 
ING Baring 94 0.322 o 0.149 - 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.382 - 0.000 - 0.040 0.001 0.000 
LG Group 211 0.856 - 0.056 o 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.338 - 0.001 - 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Samsung ER 196 0.923 - 0.000 o 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.830 - 0.021 - 0.025 0.000 0.000 
Sakura 143 0.581 - 0.013 o 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.020 - 0.031 o 0.107 0.372 0.000 
Shinhan Securities 144 0.640 - 0.002 NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.138 - 0.000 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
Societe Generale 92 0.841 - 0.000 o 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.573 o 0.725 o 0.123 0.000 0.002 
UBS 101 0.912 - 0.018 o 0.073 0.001 0.000 0.820 - 0.038 o 0.781 0.000 0.005 
Consensus Forec. 278 0.834 - 0.047 o 0.795 0.000 0.000 0.485 - 0.008 - 0.014 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
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Table 18: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Taiwan (10-Year Government Bond Yield) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Citigroup  176 0.325 o 0.116 o 0.791 0.000 0.043 0.000 - 0.036 o 0.645 0.000 0.294 
HSBC  192 0.629 - 0.004 o 0.681 0.000 0.000 0.127 - 0.094 o 0.163 0.000 0.000 
IHS  234 0.645 - 0.023 - 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.222 - 0.018 o 0.222 0.000 0.000 
ING  224 0.675 o 0.119 o 0.752 0.000 0.005 0.208 o 0.120 o 0.941 0.000 0.000 
Nomura  167 0.635 - 0.004 o 0.444 0.001 0.000 0.001 - 0.032 o 0.391 0.000 0.000 
Polaris Research 134 0.721 - 0.000 o 0.601 0.000 0.000 0.339 - 0.003 o 0.314 0.000 0.000 
Taiwan Institute R. 126 0.719 o 0.227 + 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.222 o 0.102 NA NA 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 236 0.672 - 0.045 o 0.453 0.000 0.000 0.201 - 0.065 o 0.234 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
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Table 19: Results of the Measurement of Forecast Quality for Thailand (3-Month Interest Rates) 
  Forecast Horizon 4 Months Forecast Horizon 13 Months 
     Unbiasedness     Unbiasedness 
   DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW  DM Test Sign Acc. 
Test 
F Test DW 
















Citigroup 298 0.823 o 0.366 + 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.468 o 0.570 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Deutsche Bank 82 0.972 o 0.762 + 0.006 0.064 0.000 0.797 o 0.320 o 0.908 0.298 0.000 
Goldman Sachs 377 0.762 o 0.231 o 0.297 0.063 0.000 0.522 o 0.368 o 0.366 0.000 0.000 
HSBC Economics 346 0.865 o 0.349 + 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.361 o 0.332 o 0.060 0.000 0.000 
ING  400 0.820 o 0.328 + 0.006 0.481 0.000 0.344 o 0.297 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kasikornbank 390 0.761 o 0.148 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.391 o 0.401 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 
Merrill Lynch 155 0.865 o 0.270 o 0.659 0.000 0.002 0.538 o 0.524 - 0.025 0.000 0.000 
Morgan Stanley 85 0.963 o 0.379 o 0.804 0.194 0.027 0.131 o 0.509 o 0.095 0.030 0.095 
Nomura 146 0.791 o 0.487 + 0.000 0.000 0.421 0.579 o 0.912 + 0.006 0.000 0.007 
Phatra Thanakit S. 334 0.850 o 0.370 + 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.554 o 0.382 + 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Siam C. Bank 175 0.899 o 0.254 + 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.725 o 0.391 o 0.506 0.000 0.000 
S. Chartered Bank 206 0.841 o 0.838 + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.398 o 0.474 + 0.047 0.000 0.000 
Consensus Forec. 504 0.841 o 0.437 + 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.477 o 0.379 o 0.186 0.000 0.000 
# = number of observations; TOTA = TOTA coefficient; DM test = Diebold-Mariano test; Res = result; o = no significant result; - = significantly worse than a naïve or 
random walk forecast; + = significantly better than a naïve or random walk forecast; sign acc. test = sign accuracy test; unbiasedness = test for unbiasedness; DW = 
Durbin-Watson test. 
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A further factor is that it is obviously more difficult to forecast market interest rates than 
those which are set or controlled by governments. The base lending rate in China, the prime 
lending rate in Hong Kong, the base lending rate and the three-month interest rate in Malay-
sia as well as the prime lending rate in Singapore are set directly by the respective admin-
istration or – at least partly – managed by it. The success rate for the relevant forecast time 
series is relatively high: 75% of the forecast time series for these interest rates predict the 
future interest rate trend (rising or falling) significantly better than a random walk forecast. 
5 Conclusion 
We analyzed interest rate forecasts for the Asia-Pacific region in the period from 1990-2016. 
To do so, we examined individual interest rate forecasts from Australia, China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. As a 
basis we used forecasting data which had been published in the journal Asia Pacific Consen-
sus Forecasts on a monthly basis. We did not limit ourselves to the analysis of consensus 
forecasts, however: We also evaluated all of the forecast time series issues by banks, in-
vestment companies, consulting firms, associations and industrial companies. Overall we 
assessed 532 forecast time series with a total of 85,264 individual interest rate forecasts. 
The variety of procedures which we used to measure the quality of forecasts enabled us to 
create a comprehensive evaluation of forecasting performance in the Asia-Pacific region. We 
carried out a comparison to naïve forecasts. We examined the forecast time series for evi-
dence of topically-orientated trend adjustments. In addition, we deployed the sign accuracy 
test and the unbiasedness test.  
The results are very sobering in part. 95.9% of all forecast time series are characterized by 
the phenomenon of topically-oriented trend adjustments. This means that the overwhelm-
ing majority of all forecast time series reflect the present rather than the future. In total, 
99.4% of all forecast time series proved to be biased. Given that topically-orientated trend 
adjustments usually lead to the error term ut not being distributed randomly, the result of 
the unbiasedness test is not surprising.  
Only a small proportion of the forecast time series (3.6%) reflected the future interest rate 
trend significantly more precisely than a naïve forecast. The only forecast whose success 
went beyond rare individual cases was that for the prime lending rate in Hong Kong. 46.7% 
of these forecast time series predict the future interest rate trend significantly better than a 
random walk forecast. 
However, some of the results of the study are also surprisingly positive. The sign accuracy 
test reveals that in 248 out of 513 forecast time series (48.3%), the future trend (rising or 
falling interest rates) has been grasped significantly better than by a random walk forecast. 
In this context, at least part of the forecasts for Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Singapore and Thailand proved to be particularly successful. 
 
- 157 - 
Overall it can be stated that – at least in some countries and for some forecast horizons – 
forecasts of future interest rate trends in the Asia-Pacific region are significantly more suc-
cessful than those made in other parts of the world. This has consequences for portfolio 
management: Active portfolio management strategies have no prospects of success in many 
financial markets because the necessary forecasting competence is simply not there. How-
ever, this is different, for example, in the case of the Indian bond market. 61.5% of the fore-
cast time series on the interest rates of Indian state bonds with ten years remaining to ma-
turity (forecast horizon: 13 months) predict the future interest rate trend (rising or falling) 
significantly better than a random walk forecast. This should suffice in order to achieve sys-
tematic excess returns with active portfolio management strategies. 
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Appendix 
Table 20: Overview of Studies on the Accuracy of Survey-Based Interest Rate Forecasts 
Study Countries 
Analyzed 
Interest Rates Analyzed Data Source Period Con-
sidered 
Methods Used Result 
Friedman (1980) USA Fed Funds Rate, 3-Month and 
12-Month Bills, 6-Month 
Eurodollars, Utility Bonds, 
Municipal Bonds 
Goldsmith-Nagan Bond 
and Money Market Letter 
1969 - 1977 Unbiasedness Test, Effi-
ciency Test, Consistency 
Test 
Negative 
Throop (1981) USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate Goldsmith-Nagan Bond 
and Money Market Letter 
1970 - 1979 MSE, RMSE Positive 
Belongia (1987)  USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate  Wall Street Journal 1981 - 1986  Direction of Change, 
MAE, RMSE   
Negative 
Dua (1988)  USA 3-Month and 12-Month 
Treasury Bill Rate, Fed Funds 
Rate  
Goldsmith-Nagan Bond 
and Money Market Letter 
/ Federal Reserve Bulletin 
/ Bond Buyer 
1972 - 1985  MAE, RMSE, Theil´s U Mixed 
Simon (1989) USA Fed Funds Rate Money Market Services 1984 - 1987 MAE, MSE Negative 
Hafer / Hein (1989)  USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate  Bond and Money Market 
Letter 
1969 - 1989  Bias Tests, Market Effi-
ciency Tests 
Negative 
Francis (1991) USA Various Bank Interest Rates 
in Pennsylvania 
Call Reports 1983 - 1986 Mann-Whitney Test Negative 
Zarnowitz / Braun 
(1992) 
USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate ASA-NBER Quarterly Sur-
vey 
1968 - 1990 ME, MAE, RMSE Mixed 
Hafer / Hein / MacDon-
ald (1992)  
USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate Bond and Money Market 
Letter / Wall Street Jour-
nal 
1977 - 1988  Unbiasedness Test, ME, 
MAE, RMSE, Theil´s U 
Negative 
Domian (1992)  USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate IBC / Donoghue’s Money 
Fund Report 
1982 - 1990  Granger Causality Negative 
Ilmanen (1996)  USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate 
and 30-year Government 
Bond Yield 
 Wall Street Journal 1981 - 1994  Yield Change Predic-
tions Compared to For-
wards and No-Change 
Negative 
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Study Countries 
Analyzed 
Interest Rates Analyzed Data Source Period Con-
sidered 
Methods Used Result 
Kolb / Stekler (1996)  USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate 
and 30-Year Government 
Bond Yield  
Wall Street Journal 1982 - 1990  Compared to No-
Change, Random Walk 
measured by Skillings-
Mack, Fisher’s Exact 
Negative 
Cho (1996) USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate 
and 30-Year Government 
Bond Yield  
Wall Street Journal 1989 - 1994 Rank Consistency Test Mixed 
Gosnell / Kolb (1997)  GER, JPN, CH, 
GB, USA 
3-Month Euromarket Rate   Risk 1990 - 1992  Measured against  
No-Change Model and 
Forward Rate Forecast 
Mixed 
Baghestani / Jung / 
Zuchegno (2000) 
USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate ASA-NBER Quarterly 
Survey 
1983 - 1995 Unbiasedness Test Negative 
Albrecht (2000)  GER 3-Month Rate, 10-Year Gov-
ernment Bond Yield  
Finanzen 1991 - 1997  ME Negative 
Spiwoks (2003)  GER 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 1999  Theil’s U, TOTA Coeffi-
cient 
Negative 
Greer (2003)  USA 30-Year Government Bond 
Yield  
Wall Street Journal 1984 - 1998  Binomial Test, Direc-




Brooks / Gray (2004)  USA 30-Year and 10-Year Gov-
ernment Bond Yield  
Wall Street Journal 1982 - 2002  
 
 




Benke (2004)  GER 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Handelsblatt 1991 - 2003  Simplified Sign Accuracy 
Test 
Negative 
Mose (2005)  GER, USA 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield  
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2005  MAE Negative 
Baghestani (2005) USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) 
2001 - 2003 ME, MAE, RMSE  Negative 
Scheier / Spiwoks 
(2006)  
GB 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2004  Theil’s U2, TOTA Coeffi-
cient 
Mixed 
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Study Countries 
Analyzed 
Interest Rates Analyzed Data Source Period Con-
sidered 
Methods Used Result 
Benke (2006)  GER 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Handelsblatt 1992 - 2005  Simplified Sign Accuracy 
Test  
Negative 
Spiwoks / Hein (2007)  FRA, GER, ITA, 
JPN, GB, USA 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield  
ZEW-Finanzmarktreport 1995 - 2004  RMSE, MARE Negative 
Mitchell / Pearce (2007) USA 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate 
and 30-Year Government 
Bond Yield 
Wall Street Journal 1982 - 2002 Unbiasedness Test Negative 
Tabak / Feitosa (2008) BRA Short Term Interest Rate Selic / Bloomberg and 
Central Bank of Brazil 
1982 - 2002 MSE, Diebold-Mariano Positive 
Goodhart / Lim (2008) NZ, GB 3-Month Official Cash NZ, 
Official Bank Rate UK (Libor) 
RBNZ and BoE Interest 
Rate Forecasts 
NZ 2000 - 
2006 
UK 1992 - 
2004 
Unbiasedness Test Mixed 
Spiwoks / Bedke / Hein 
(2008)  
USA 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield and 3-Month Treasury 
Bill Rate 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2004  Unbiasedness Test, Sign 
Accuracy Test, Efficiency 
Test 
Mixed 
Spiwoks / Bedke / Hein 
(2009) 
CH 3-Month Interest Rate and 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1998 - 2007 Unbiasedness Test, Sign 




Chun (2009) USA Fed Funds Rate, Short, Medi-
um and Long Maturity Yield  
Blue Chip Financial Fore-
casts 
1993 - 2011 Compared against Time-
series Models, Parame-
tric Yield Curve Models 
and Futures Prices 
Mixed 
Spiwoks / Bedke / Hein  
(2010) 
GER 3-Month Interest Rate and 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2006 Unbiasedness Test, 
TOTA Coefficient, Effi-
ciency Test, Sign Accu-
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Study Countries 
Analyzed 
Interest Rates Analyzed Data Source Period Con-
sidered 
Methods Used Result 
Gubaydullina / Hein / 
Spiwoks (2011) 
CAN, CH, ESP, 




10-Year Government Bond 
Yield and 3-Month Interest 
Rate 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2009  TOTA Coefficient Negative 
Jongen / Verschoor / 
Wolff (2011) 
23 countries 
inter alia AUS, 
HK, IDN, MYS, 
NZ, SGP, TWN 
3-Month Interest Rates   
 




Schwarzbach / Kunze / 
Rudschuck / Windels 
(2012)  
GER 10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Bloomberg, Reuters 1999 - 2011  Augmented Dickey 





maneeroj / Wood 
(2012)  
GB 3-Month Interest Rate and 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2006  Unbiasedness Test, Or-
thogonality Test 
Negative 
Baghestani / Marchon  
(2012) 
BRA Central Bank of Brazil Selic 
Interest Rate Target 
Central Bank of Brazil 
Online Survey 
2003 - 2011 Unbiasedness Test Positive 
Butter / Jansen (2013) GER, GB, JPN, 
NLD, USA 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield  
Consensus Forecasts 2003 - 2008 Successful Forecasts as 
a Percentage of Total 
Forecasts 
Negative 
Kunze / Kramer / 
Rudschuk (2013) 
EUR 3-Month EURIBOR Bloomberg/Reuters Pro-
fessional Survey Fore-
casts 
1998 - 2011 Granger Causality Mixed 
Knüppel / Schulte-
frankenfeld (2013) 
BRA, GB Interest Rates Central Bank COPOM, IBGE 1999 - 2011 RMSE Positive 
Kunze / Gruppe (2014) EUR 3-Month EURIBOR Consensus Forecasts 1998 - 2013 Quandt-Andrews Break-
point Test, Theil´s U 
Mixed 
Baghestani / Danila 
(2014)  
CZE 2-Week Repo Rate and 12-
Month Interbank Interest 
Rate (PRIBOR)  
Czech National Bank 
(CNB) 
2005 - 2012  Theil´s U, Diebold-
Mariano Test, Fisher´s 
Exact Test 
Mixed 
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Study Countries 
Analyzed 
Interest Rates Analyzed Data Source Period Con-
sidered 
Methods Used Result 
Beechay / Österholm 
(2014)  
SWE Government Bond Yield, 
Forward Rate and Interest-




2002 - 2012  Unbiasedness Test, Effi-
ciency Test, Modified 
Diebold Mariano Test, 
RMSE 
Mixed 
Kunze / Gruppe / 
Wendler (2015) 
EUR 3-Month EURIBOR  Consensus Forecasts 1998 - 2013  Sign Accuracy Test, 
Turning Point Analysis, 
RMSE 
Mixed 
Spiwoks / Gubaydullina 
/ Hein (2015) 
CAN, CH, ESP, 
GER, FRA, GB, 
ITA, JPN, NLD, 
NOR, SWE, 
USA 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield 
Consensus Forecasts 1989 - 2009 TOTA Coefficient 
 
Negative 
Oliver / Pasaogullari 
(2015) 
USA Fed Funds Rate, 1-Year, 5-
Year and 10-Year Bond Yield   
Blue Chip Financial Fore-
casts 
1990 - 2012 RMSE Mixed 
Baghestani / Arzaghi / 
Kaya (2015) 
AUS, CAN, CH, 
EUR, GB, JPN, 
USA 
3-Month Eurocurrency Rate 
and 10-Year Government 
Bond Yield 
Blue Chip Financial Fore-
casts 
1999 - 2008 Unbiasedness Test, 




Pierdzioch (2015) USA Prime Interest Rate, Treasury 
Bill Rate and T-Bond Rate  




Miah / Khalifa / 
Hammoudeh (2016) 
30 Countries 
inter alia CHN, 
HK, IND, KOR, 
PHL, SGP, 
THAI, TWN 
Long-Term and Short-Term 
Interest Rates 
Fx4casts.com 2001 - 2012 Unbiasedness Test, Effi-
ciency Test, Unit Root 
Test 
Mixed 
Kunze / Wegener / Bizer 
/ Spiwoks (2017) 
GER, GB 3-Month Interbank Rate and 
10-Year Government Bond 
Yield  
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Abstract 
The consequences of overconfidence affect many spheres of economic life. As yet, few fac-
tors are known that determine the extent of possible overconfidence. There are also few 
studies concerning the influence of positive and negative emotions on self-assessment. It 
has not yet been examined whether emotions can affect learning effects regarding self-
assessment, wherefore the present study addresses this research question. 
In a real-effort-task experiment the participants are presented with tasks over the course of 
5 rounds. After each round, they are asked to assess their own performance. They are then 
given feedback on their actual performance, thereby allowing for learning effects. Their 
mood is induced by positive (treatment “positive”), negative (treatment “negative”) and 
neutral (treatment “neutral”) movie clips. There are no significant differences in the three 
treatments regarding absolute and relative overconfidence. However, the participants’ 
moods differed with regard to the occurrence of learning effects. Obvious learning effects 
can be established in a neutral mood when examining absolute overconfidence. These learn-
ing effects cannot be detected in positive and negative moods. 
Keywords 
Overconfidence, emotions, self-assessment, feedback, learning effect 
JEL Classification 
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1 Introduction 
In psychological research, the overconfidence bias is a widely-known phenomenon of indi-
vidual behavior. In economic research, this phenomenon is regarded as a reason for ineffi-
cient markets (Proeger and Meub, 2013). Different groups of people such as investors, man-
agers, bankers and other economic actors have been proven to show overconfidence (Bar-
ber and Odean, 2001; Menkhoff et al., 2013; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2014). Considering the 
numerous psychological and economic studies that have been concerned with the phenom-
enon of overconfidence,1 the following literature review is limited to those studies that di-
rectly address the present research question:  
The study by Allwood and Bjorhag (1991) did not reveal any findings that indicate the influ-
ence of negative affect on the extent of overconfidence. A positive mood could not be in-
duced successfully which is why the influence of positive affect could not be examined.  
Allwood et al. (2002) compared the effect of positive and negative emotions on the extent of 
overconfidence without taking into account a neutral treatment (control group). Their study 
showed that the participants are liable to overconfidence when being in a positive or in a 
negative mood. A significant difference regarding overconfidence between the two treat-
ments could not be detected.  
Kuvaas and Kaufmann (2004) published a similar study. They also compared the influence of 
positive and negative emotions on overconfidence – and did not consider a neutral treat-
ment (control treatment) either. They concluded that there are no differences between the 
overconfidence shown in both treatments. 
De Paola et al. (2014) assessed the effect of superstition and positive and negative emotions 
on overconfidence. Their examination was conducted as a field experiment with approx. 700 
Italian students who were randomly allocated numbered seats before a written exam. 
Moods were induced by lucky numbers, unlucky numbers and neutral numbers. De Paola et 
al. (2014) ascertain that the students generally overestimate themselves systematically and 
that their overconfidence increases due to the lucky numbers. Unlucky numbers, by con-
trast, have a cushioning effect on the extent of overconfidence. 
The study by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2014) is of great importance for the present study and is 
therefore presented in detail in the following: In two experiments, Ifcher and Zarghamee 
examined if positive, negative or neutral (control treatment) moods affect self-assessment.  
In the first experiment, they examined the effects of positive and neutral moods on the ex-
tent of overconfidence. The moods were successfully induced with the help of movie clips. 
Those participants with a positive mood show more absolute overconfidence as well as more 
relative overconfidence than those participants with a neutral mood.2 Overestimation is a 
common phenomenon relating to this behavior. 72% of the participants showed absolute 
                                                          
1 For an overview see Moore and Healy (2008), Adel and Mariem (2013), Ifcher and Zarghamee (2014). 
2 Research literature distinguishes between two kinds of overconfidence: “absolute overconfidence” (AOC), a 
form of self-evaluation in absolute numbers, and “relative overconfidence” (ROC), when the participants assess 
their own success in comparison to other participants (see also Ifcher and Zarghamee (2014), De Paola et al. 
(2014)). The following tables and figures will contain the abbreviations AOC and ROC. 
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overconfidence, while 62% showed relative overconfidence. On average, the participants 
overestimated their performance by 18.29%. The difference between positive and neutral 
moods, however, proved to be insignificant regarding absolute overconfidence. 
In the second experiment, Ifcher and Zarghamee examined the effect of negative and neu-
tral moods on the extent of overconfidence. The moods were successfully induced using 
movie clips. Those participants with a negative mood showed both more absolute overcon-
fidence and more relative overconfidence than those participants with a neutral mood. 
These differences, however, are statistically not relevant. The participants overestimated 
their performance by averagely 9.2%.  
Both positive and negative mood induction increases overconfidence in comparison to par-
ticipants with a neutral mood. Comparing the treatments “positive” and “negative”, the 
overconfidence in the “negative” treatment is lower than in the “positive” treatment. First, 
the results of these previous studies will be reviewed. Therefore, the first hypothesis reads 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: 
H1a: Positive or negative emotions influence overconfidence to a larger extent than a neu-
tral mood does. 
H1b: Overconfidence is stronger when feeling positive emotions rather than negative emo-
tions. 
The above-mentioned studies have not examined the development of overconfidence over 
time but only conducted the experiments in one session. However, the present study will 
focus on the long-term influence of positive and negative affect on overconfidence. 
Conducting the experiment in more than one session enables the researcher to examine if 
the participants have any learning effects when assessing their own performance. Since the 
experiment consists of 5 rounds and since the participants receive feedback on their perfor-
mances after each round, they can reflect on their self-assessment for the next round and 
thereby learn to easier assess their own capabilities. This makes it possible to analyze the 
influence of emotions on learning effects. We therefore consider the possibility that moods 
can influence possible learning effects that result from repeated self-assessment with indi-
vidual feedback. 
There are now some studies that investigate overconfidence within the framework of games 
with multiple periods containing feedback: 
Clark and Friesen (2009) carried out a real-effort-task experiment in two rounds. After the 
first round, the participants estimated the number of the tasks that they completed correctly 
and were then given feedback on the actual number of correct answers. For the second 
round, the participants reconsidered their self-assessment and indeed performed better in 
the second round than in the first round. Hence, they experienced some learning effects.  
Grossmann and Owens (2012) conclude that small learning effects could be achieved 
through self-assessment. However, they did not have any statistically relevant success. 
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Proeger and Meub (2014) performed a real-effort-task experiment. The participants had to 
solve 10 simple calculations with three fixed variables and one random variable. The partici-
pants were then asked to assess their own performance. They were asked to estimate how 
many problems they solved correctly. Each participant received some feedback. It can be 
concluded that the participants achieved a learning effect through self-assessment. In each 
round (3 rounds in total), the participants’ self-assessment improved. 
The previous studies did not examine the influence of emotions on learning effects. It re-
mains to be examined whether learning effects are influenced by emotions. Therefore, it 
must be researched whether repeated self-assessment with individual feedback can lead to 
individuals breaking away from overconfidence even when they are in a positive or in a neg-
ative mood. Consequently, hypothesis 2 reads as follows: 
Hypothesis 2:  
H2a: Learning effects are triggered by feedback on repeated self-assessment in a neutral 
mood. 
H2b: Learning effects that are attained by repeated self-assessment with individual feedback 
are not affected by positive or negative moods. 
The present paper is structured in 4 paragraphs. The following paragraph describes the ex-
perimental design. The results are then presented in the subsequent paragraph. Finally, the 
last paragraph summarizes the most striking results of the study. 
2 Experimental Design 
The experimental design follows the design by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2014) who took the 
following approach: 
First, the participants take part in a quiz that consists of 30 questions (20 general knowledge 
questions (Moore and Small, 2007) and 10 mathematical tasks (Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007)), which they have 15 minutes to answer. They will receive $0.50 for each correct an-
swer. Secondly, the mood is induced. For mood induction, the participants are shown movie 
clips that are supposed to trigger positive or negative emotions. Meanwhile, the control 
group looks at a screen saver or watches neutral movie clips. In the next step, the partici-
pants assess their performance in the quiz. They estimate the number of the tasks that they 
completed correctly (absolute overconfidence) and assess the quality of their performance 
in comparison to their fellow gamblers (relative overconfidence). They receive $5.00 for 
each correct estimation. The fourth step includes the manipulation check of the participants’ 
mood induction, using PANAS3. In the fifth step, they answer questions regarding demo-
graphic and personal characteristics. The average profit is $15.00.  
                                                          
3 PANAS stands for Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. 
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The experimental design of the present study is structured as follows: After the participants 
have read the detailed instructions, they must answer four control questions4 correctly. Be-






Each round starts with a real-effort task. There are 25 general knowledge questions and 25 
mathematical tasks. The general knowledge questions were taken from Moore and Small 
(2007) and supplemented with five similar questions. The mathematical tasks by Niederle 
and Vesterlund (2007) were also used and supplemented with 15 similar tasks. Hence, the 
experiment consists of 50 tasks and is structured into 5 rounds. Each round contains 5 gen-
eral knowledge tasks and 5 mathematical tasks. The participants are allowed 45 seconds to 
complete the real-effort task. They receive a material incentive to motivate them to answer 
the questions correctly. 2 points are awarded for each correct answer. They can receive 100 
points in total if all questions are answered correctly. This is equivalent to a payout of 
€15.00. 
Moods are then induced using short movie clips. Emotional movie clips are one of the most 
effective methods to trigger emotions.5 Movie clips are often used in economic experiments 
to evoke certain moods (see e.g. Allwood et al., 2002; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006; Rottenberg et 
al., 2007; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2014; Oswald et al., 2015). 
The movie clips have been chosen from the study by Schaefer et al. (2010), which analyzes 
more than 70 movie clips for their effect on mood induction. The movie clips are categorized 
into positive, negative and neutral effects on a person’s mood and ranked according to their 
effectivity. 
The present experiment uses the following movie clips to induce a positive mood: (1) Benny 
and Joon (122 seconds): Benny (Johnny Depp) clowns around in a café. (2) Life is Beautiful 
(266 seconds): Mother and son are reunited after World War II. (3) Dead Poets Society (163 
seconds): The students mount their desks to express their solidarity with Mr. Keating (Robin 
Williams). (4) Forrest Gump (121 seconds): Father (Tom Hanks) meets son. (5) Dinner for 
Schmucks (101 seconds): Complex comic scene. 
The following movie clips were used to induce a negative mood: (1) Saving Private Ryan (327 
seconds): A combat scene in World War II. (2) The Piano (42 seconds): One of the main char-
acters has a finger chopped off with an ax. (3) The Blair Witch Project (232 seconds): Final 
scene when the main characters are obviously killed. (4) Schindler’s List (76 seconds): Corps-
                                                          
4 The control questions are used to check if the participants understood the instructions of the experiment. 
5 There are different methods of mood induction, including real situations, memories and imaginations, noises 
and music, gifts, movie clips or the Velten technology. See Westermann et al. (1996). 
How are you feeling now? Please mark the adequate number! 
1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9—10 
very bad       very good 
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es are burnt in a concentration camp. (5) City of Angels (257 seconds): Maggie (Meg Ryan) 
dies in Seth’s (Nicolas Cage) arms.  
The neutral movie clips were the following: (1) The Lover (43 seconds): Marguerite (Jane 
March) gets into a car. She is taken to a house in a busy street where she knocks on a door. A 
Chinese man opens the door and she enters the house. (2) Blue (40 seconds): A man clears 
the drawers of his desk. A woman passes through an alley and salutes another woman on 
the way. (3) Train Ride (58 seconds): A train crosses a green countryside.6 (4) Blue (25 sec-
onds): A woman holding a box goes up an escalator. (5) Blue (16 seconds): A person throws a 
piece of foil out of the window of a car. 
Those movie clips inducing negative emotions are shown in the treatment “negative”, while 
those clips triggering positive emotions are shown in the treatment “positive” and the neu-
tral clips are presented in the treatment “neutral” (control group). 
In each round, a manipulation check was conducted after the participants watched the mov-







Afterwards, the participants’ self-assessment is captured by the following questions:  
− How many of the 10 tasks did you complete correctly? 
− How many tasks did you complete correctly compared to the other participants, i.e. 
how many more or fewer tasks compared to the average number of tasks completed 
by the other participants? 
To motivate the participants to assess their performance as accurately as possible, they re-
ceive 8 points for each overlap of the estimated and the actual performance. They can re-
ceive 80 points in total, which equates to a payout of €12.00. 
The investigation of the self-assessment follows the approach by Ifcher and Zarghamee 
(2014): Absolute overconfidence is captured and relative confidence is considered. 
The absolute overconfidence is the difference between the assumed number of correctly 
completed tasks and the actual number of correctly solved tasks. If, for example, a partici-
pant assumes that they completed 10 (4) tasks correctly but only 7 tasks were actually 
solved, their absolute overconfidence would be +3 (-3).  
                                                          
6 The movie clip “Train Ride” is similar to the clip chosen by Gendolla and Krüsken (2002). 
7 Similar manipulation checks were conducted in the studies by Kirchsteiger et al. (2006), Rottenberg et al. 
(2007), Lahav and Meer (2012), Andrade et al. (2015). 
Which emotions did you experience while watching the movie clip? 
Please mark one number accordingly! 
1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9—10 
very negative    very positive 
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Relative overconfidence results from the difference between the assumed and the actual 
relative success in comparison to the other participants. For example, a participant assumes 
that they averagely solved 4 tasks more (4 tasks less) than the other participants. In fact, 
they only solved 2 more tasks correctly than the other participants. Hence, relative overcon-
fidence is +2 (-6). 
After each of the five rounds, the participants are given feedback on the success of their self-
assessment. Each participant is told how many tasks they completed correctly (absolute 
overconfidence) and how they performed in relation to the other participants (relative over-
confidence). Over the course of the five rounds, the participants can thereby learn from their 
experience in the previous rounds and progressively assess their own performance in a more 
realistic way. 
With the exception of presented movie clips, the experimental process is the same for the 
treatments “negative”, “positive” and “neutral”. Table 1 provides an overview on the re-
search method. 
Table 1: Overview on the Treatments of the Experiment 







Negative Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neutral Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Positive Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The treatments “positive” and “negative” lasted approx. 45 minutes, while the experiment 
lasted approx. 35 minutes for the control group. This can be attributed to the length of the 
movie clips, which are considerably shorter for the induction of a neutral mood than for the 
induction of a positive or negative mood. 
The participants are remunerated for their performance. The total number of points award-
ed to each participant (180 points are possible to achieve in total) is converted into a sum of 
money in euros. Each point equals €0.15. Each participant furthermore receives a show-up 
fee of €2.50. The participants can earn €29.50 in total. They earned €12.81 on average. The 
minimum payout was €2.50; the maximum payout was €19.60. 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The instructions and screen-
shots are given in the appendices of this paper. 
The experiment was conducted between 30 March and 22 April 2015 with students of the 
Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences. 104 participants took part in the 22 sessions of the 
experiment. 45 participants study at the Faculty of Business (43.3%), 45 participants study at 
the Faculty of Automotive Engineering (43.3%) and 14 participants study at the Faculty of 
Public Health Services (13.5%). 28 women (26.9%) and 76 men (73.1%) participated in the 
experiment. The participants were assigned to the treatments as follows: 34 participants 
(32.7%) played the treatment “negative”, 32 participants (30.8%) the treatment “positive” 
















Round of the Game
and 38 participants (36.5%) played the treatment “neutral”. The average age of the partici-
pants was 23.7 years. 
3 Results 
3.1 Mood Induction 
First, I will determine if the mood induction was successful. The average mood of the partici-
pants in treatment “negative” was 3.28 (SD 1.24). The average mood of the participants in 
treatment “neutral” was 5.52 (SD 0.95). The average mood of the participants in treatment 
“positive” was 7.03 (SD 1.50). Figure 1 gives an overview on the participants’ moods in each 
















Figure 1: Participants’ Moods before the Experiment and in the Five Rounds of the Game 
Figure 1 shows that the mood induction in the individual treatments was successful. Before 
the start of the treatments, the participants were in a positive mood (see the boxplots of 
round 0). After the mood induction, the moods of the participants in the three treatments 
disperse (rounds 1-5). Figure 2 summarizes the different moods of the participants in the 
three treatments of the five rounds. This highlights the success of the mood induction. The 
participants’ moods before the start and in each round of the experiment as well as the 
standard deviations are shown in Table 2. 
  































Figure 2: Participants’ Average Moods in the Five Rounds of the Game (Excluding the Mood 
before the Experiment) 
Table 2: Participants’ Average Moods per Round 
Treatment # 




1 2 3 4 5 Øa 










































Please note: The significant values are printed in bold (*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1). 
aTo calculate the average values, the values of the five rounds of the game were taken into account; the values 
before the start of the experiment were not considered.  
Comparing the treatments (Table 2), the treatment “negative” shows significantly lower val-
ues than the treatment “positive” (z= -6.561, p= 0.0000; Mann-Whitney U Test). The treat-
ment “negative” also shows considerably lower values when compared to the treatment 
“neutral” (z= -6.382, p= 0.0000; Mann-Whitney U Test). Furthermore, the treatment “posi-
tive” shows significantly higher values than the treatment “neutral” (z= 4.570, p= 0.0000; 
Mann-Whitney U Test). Mood induction was therefore successful. 

























Round of the Game
3.2 Absolute Overconfidence 
This subchapter presents the results of absolute overconfidence. Figure 3 portrays the re-
sults of the three treatments and the five rounds of the game. It can clearly be observed that 
the treatments “negative”, “neutral” and “positive” do not differ greatly regarding absolute 
overconfidence. The median is on the level of 0 for a total of seven times (treatment “nega-
tive”: Rounds 4 and 5; treatment “neutral”: Rounds 3 and 4; treatment “positive”: Rounds 2, 


















Figure 3: Participants’ Absolute Overconfidence in the Three Treatments and in the Five 
Rounds of the Game 
Figure 4 shows the average absolute overconfidence in the five rounds. It can clearly be seen 
how close the absolute overconfidence in the three treatments lie together. The lower 
whiskers are all between 0 and -1. The upper whiskers are all between 1 and 2. The median 
for all three treatments is between 0 and 1. In the treatments “neutral” and “positive” 25% 
of the values are lower than 0 and 75% of the values are higher than 0. In the treatment 
“negative” 80% of the values are higher than 0 and 20% of the values are lower than 0. Thus, 












































 Figure 4: Participants’ Absolute Overconfidence per Treatment 
Table 3 shows the participants’ self-assessment regarding absolute overconfidence in each 
treatment. It can be observed that overestimation is predominant. In the treatment “nega-
tive”, 46.5% of participants overestimate themselves, in the treatment “positive” 43.1% of 
participants overestimate themselves and in the treatment “neutral” 51.1% of participants 
overestimate themselves. Underestimation occurs in the treatment “negative” with 25.9% of 
participants, with 26.3% in the treatment “positive” and with 26.8% in the treatment “neu-
tral”. Accurate self-assessment was detected with 27.6% of participants in treatment “nega-
tive”, with 30.6% in the treatment “positive” and with 22.1% in the treatment “neutral”. 
Table 3: Participants’ Self-assessment (Absolute Overconfidence) per Treatment 
Treatment # 
Absolute Overconfidence in % 
Underrating Adequate  
Self-Assessment 
Overconfidence 
Negative 34 25.9 27.6 46.5 
Neutral 38 26.8 22.1 51.1 
Positive 32 26.3 30.6 43.1 
Table 4 shows a summary of all the numbers on overconfidence. Surprisingly, the average 
absolute values for overconfidence are highest in the treatment “neutral” with 0.55 (SD 
0.79). This number is followed by 0.41 (SD 0.46) in the treatment “negative” and by 0.40 (SD 
0.61) in the treatment “positive”. 
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Table 4: Participants’ Absolute Overconfidence per Round 
Treatment # 
Average AOC Values per Round 
(Standard Deviation) 
1 2 3 4 5 Ø 




































Please note: The significant values are printed in bold (*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1). 
In the treatment “negative”, the participants assumed that they averagely solved 5.39 (SD 
1.59) tasks correctly. They actually completed only 4.98 (SD 1.68) tasks correctly. The differ-
ence is 0.41. Hence, the participants overestimated their own performance by 8.23%. The 
same is true for the treatment “positive”. On average, the participants assumed that they 
solved 5.36 (SD 1.56) tasks correctly. They actually only completed 4.96 (SD 1.63) tasks cor-
rectly. The difference is 0.40. The participants therefore overestimated their own perfor-
mance by 8.06%. In the treatment “neutral”, the participants assumed that they averagely 
solved 5.16 (SD 1.34) tasks correctly. They actually only completed 4.61 (SD 1.75) tasks cor-
rectly. The difference is 0.55, wherefore they overestimated their own performance by 
11.93%.  
The Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum Test does not reveal any significant differences between the treat-
ments “positive” or “negative” and the treatment “neutral” (treatment “negative” vs. treat-
ment “neutral”: z=-0.705, p=0.4805; treatment “positive” vs. treatment “neutral”: z=-0.706, 
p=0.4801). Therefore, hypothesis 1a for absolute overconfidence must be discarded. The 
overconfidence of the participants in the treatments “negative” and “positive” is not signifi-
cantly higher than in the treatment “neutral”. The results of the study by Ifcher and Zar-
ghamee (2014) are hereby confirmed.  
Hypothesis 1b must also be rejected for absolute overconfidence since the values of the 
treatment “positive” are not significantly higher than the values of the treatment “negative” 
(Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum Test: z=0.045, p=0.9638). 
3.3 Relative Overconfidence 
This subchapter presents the results on relative overconfidence. Figure 5 gives an overview 
on the relative overconfidence of the participants in the respective rounds and treatments. 
This overview, similarly, reveals only few differences among the treatments. The interquar-
tile ranges are larger for relative overconfidence than for absolute overconfidence.  
One reason for this is likely the difficulty that the participants experience in assessing the 
other participants’ performance in the respective round in order to estimate their own suc-
cess in comparison to the other participants. 





















































Average of the 5 Rounds of the Game
For the large part, the boxes stretch below 0. This indicates that the participants rather un-
derestimate than overestimate their own relative performance. It is remarkable that 9 out of 
































Figure 6: Participants’ Relative Overconfidence per Treatment 
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Figure 6 shows the average values of the five rounds per treatment concerning relative over-
confidence. As is the case for the findings on absolute overconfidence, the values for relative 
overconfidence are similar. It can be clearly seen that 80% of the boxes are below 0. Only 
20% are above 0. 
Different to absolute overconfidence, the participants overestimate their own performance 
with regard to relative overconfidence (Table 5). In the treatment “negative” 38.2% underes-
timate their relative success, with 45.6% in the treatment “positive” and 44.2% in the treat-
ment “neutral”. Overestimation can also be observed. In the treatment “negative” 35.9% 
overestimate their success relative to the other participants’ performance, with 33.8% over-
estimation in the treatment “positive” and 29.5% in the treatment “neutral”. A correct self-
assessment was given by 25.9% of the participants in the treatment “negative”, by 20.6% in 
the treatment “positive” and by 26.3% in the treatment “neutral”. 
Table 5: Participants’ Self-assessment Relative to the Other Participants (Relative Overconfi-
dence) per Treatment 
Treatment # 
Relative Self-Assessment in % 
Underestimation Accurate Self- 
Assessment 
Overestimation 
Negative 34 38.2 25.9 35.9 
Neutral 38 44.2 26.3 29.5 
Positive 32 45.6 20.6 33.8 
 
Table 6: Participants’ Relative Overconfidence per Round 
Treatment # 
Average ROC Values per Round 
(Standard Deviation) 
1 2 3 4 5 Ø 




































Please note: The significant values are printed in bold (*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1). 
Table 6 shows the values for relative overconfidence. The average values of the five rounds 
are striking because they are negative in the three treatments. It can be concluded that, on 
average in the five rounds, the participants underestimate their own performance relative to 
the other participants’ performance in the session. 
In the treatment “negative”, the participants assumed that they averagely completed 0.23 
(SD 1.87) fewer tasks correctly than the average of the other participants. In fact, they ful-
filled only 0.12 (SD 1.96) fewer tasks successfully than the average of the other participants. 
The difference is 0.11. In the treatment “positive”, the participants assumed that they aver-
agely completed 0.26 (SD 1.71) fewer tasks correctly than the average of the other partici-
pants. However, it turned out that they accomplished exactly as many tasks as the average 
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of the other participants (0.00 (SD 1.68)). The difference is 0.26. In the treatment “neutral”, 
the participants assumed that they averagely completed 0.34 (SD 1.71) fewer tasks correctly 
than the average of the other participants. In fact, they fulfilled only 0.10 (SD 1.81) fewer 
tasks successfully than the average of the other participants. This makes a difference of 0.24. 
To answer the question whether there are significant differences between the treatments, 
the Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum Test was used (treatment “negative” vs. treatment “positive”: z= 
0.779, p= 0.4361; treatment “negative” vs. treatment “neutral”: z= 1.459, p= 0.1445; treat-
ment “positive” vs. treatment “neutral”: z= 0.579, p= 0.5627). No significant differences be-
tween the three treatments can be established. Hypothesis 1a must be discarded for relative 
overconfidence. The participants in the treatments “negative” and “positive” do not show a 
significantly higher relative overconfidence than the participants in the treatment “neutral”. 
These results are contradictory to the results by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2014), who detected 
a stronger manifestation of relative overconfidence in positive and negative moods than in a 
neutral mood. Hypothesis 1b must also be neglected for relative overconfidence because the 
relative overconfidence in the treatment “positive” was not significantly higher than the rel-
ative overconfidence in the treatment “negative”. 
3.4 Learning Effects 
This subchapter will analyze if the participants experienced any learning effects. To assess 
hypotheses 2a and 2b the values of absolute overconfidence in the first three rounds were 
compared to the values of absolute overconfidence in the last two rounds. This is reasonable 
because the participants might need more than one feedback on their performance to im-
prove their self-assessment, or in order to experience a learning process. 
To compare the first three rounds of the game to the last two rounds, the Wilcoxon-Signed-
Rank Test was administered. 
In the treatment “neutral”, significant learning effects could be established (z= 3.187, p= 
0.0014). Those participants taking part in the treatment “neutral” were obviously able to use 
the feedbacks of the first round to improve their self-assessment over time. 
Therefore, hypothesis 2a cannot be neglected. The results by Clark and Friesen (2009) and by 
Proeger and Meub (2014) can be confirmed. 
The results for the treatments “positive” and “negative” are fundamentally different. The 
Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank Test shows that the results of the last two rounds do not significantly 
differ from the results of the first three rounds (treatment “positive” (z= 1.600, p= 0.1096), 
treatment “negative” (z= 1.301, p= 0.1934)). 
This indicates that both positive and negative moods prevent the participants from having 
any learning effects and from achieving more realistic self-assessment. 
The same approach was taken to assess relative overconfidence. The values of the relative 
overconfidence in the first three rounds were compared to the values of the absolute over-
confidence in the last two rounds. No learning effects can be detected in neither the treat-
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ment “neutral” nor in the treatments “positive” or “negative”. The relative self-assessment 
in the first three rounds does not significantly differ from the relative self-assessment in the 
last two rounds (Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank Test for the treatment “neutral”: z= -1.588, p= 
0.1122; for the treatment “positive”: z= -1.562, p= 0.1183; for the treatment “negative”: z= 
0.342, p= 0.7323). Regarding relative overconfidence, hypothesis 2a must therefore be dis-
carded. The assessment of hypothesis 2b for learning effects concerning relative overconfi-
dence is thereby omitted. 
The fact that the assessment of relative overconfidence has not returned any learning ef-
fects even in the treatment “neutral” is probably owing to the complexity of assessing one’s 
own performance in comparison to the other participants’ achievements (relative overconfi-
dence) as opposed to assessing one’s own performance (absolute overconfidence). More 
time is needed to reflect on the other participants’ performance in the session in order to 
assess one’s own relative capability. 
4 Conclusion 
The present study examines the phenomenon of overconfidence and addresses two re-
search questions: (1) The study examines the influence of positive and negative emotions on 
self-assessment. (2) The study also addresses the question if any learning effects through 
self-assessment are influenced by positive or negative emotions.  
The economic experiment was conducted with 122 students of the Faculties of Business, 
Automotive Engineering and Public Health Services of the Ostfalia University of Applied Sci-
ences. 
Positive, negative and neutral movie clips were used for mood induction. Absolute and rela-
tive overconfidence were equally assessed. 
The study produced the following results: 
1. The participants’ moods were successfully induced using positive, negative and neutral 
movie clips. The average moods in the three treatments are significantly different. The 
treatment “negative” shows an average mood value of 3.28, the treatment “neutral” an 
average mood value of 5.52 and the treatment “positive” an average mood value of 7.03. 
2. The participants’ overconfidence in the treatments “negative” and “positive” is not sig-
nificantly higher than their overconfidence in the control group (treatment “neutral”). 
This is equally true for the absolute overconfidence and the relative overconfidence. 
Therefore, hypothesis 1a must be discarded.  
3. Furthermore, the treatment “positive” does not present a significantly increased tenden-
cy towards overconfidence when compared to the treatment “negative”. This is equally 
true for the absolute overconfidence and the relative overconfidence. Hence, hypothesis 
1b must also be rejected. 
4. Participants with a neutral mood (control group) achieve striking learning effects regard-
ing absolute overconfidence. In the last two rounds, they assess their own performance 
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significantly more accurately than in the first three rounds. This is why hypothesis 2a 
cannot be rejected. 
5. Participants with a positive or a negative mood (treatment “positive” and treatment 
“negative”) do not achieve any considerable learning effects regarding absolute overcon-
fidence. They do not assess their performance more accurately in the last two rounds 
than in the first three rounds. It can hence be established that both positive and negative 
emotions can influence possible learning effects. Therefore, hypothesis 2b must be re-
jected. 
6. Regarding relative overconfidence, no learning effects could be detected. In neither of 
the treatments “neutral”, “positive” or “negative”, the participants can forecast their rel-
ative performance over the course of the game more accurately than in any other. In all 
three treatments, the relative overconfidence of the first three rounds does not signifi-
cantly differ from the relative overconfidence in the last two rounds. 
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Appendix A: English Translation of the Instructions 
The Game 
In each part of this game you will be given 10 tasks. You have 45 seconds to complete each 
task. There are 5 rounds in total. In the following, you are presented two examples: 
  
− Question: What is the capital of the federal country of Saarland? 
Answer: Saarbrücken 
        
− Task: Please add the five numbers given below and enter your result into the input 
field: 
26 16 86 05 41 
Answer: 174 
 
First, you will complete the tasks. Then you will watch a short movie clip that is shorter than 
5 minutes. After that, you will be asked to assess your own performance by answering the 
following two questions: 
 
− How many tasks did you complete correctly? 
− How many tasks did you complete correctly in comparison to the other participants? 
How many more or less? 
 
• Example 1: I think that I gave three correct answers less than the average of 
the participants. Hence, you enter -3. 
• Example 2: I think that I gave three correct answers more than the average of 
the participants. Hence, you enter +3. 
 
You have 45 seconds to complete the self-assessment. After each round of the game, you 
will receive feedback on your actual performance. 
 
Award for Points 
For each correct answer, you will receive 2 points. 
For each correct self-assessment, you will receive 8 points. 
You can be awarded 180 points in total. 
 
The Payout 
The basic payout is €2.50. For each point, you will receive €0.15. You can earn up to €29.50 
in total. 
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Please note 
Please keep quiet during the experiment! 
Please do not look at your seatmate’s monitor! 
You are not allowed to use any auxiliary devices (calculator, smartphone etc.). All electronic 
devices must be switched off! 
Please note the timing given in the upper right hand corner of the monitor. If you do not 
enter an answer in the given time, you will not be awarded any points for the respective 
task. 
Appendix B: Original Instructions in German 
Das Spiel 
In diesem Spiel werden Sie in jedem Spielabschnitt 10 Aufgaben bekommen. Für jede Aufga-
be haben Sie 45 Sekunden Zeit. Insgesamt gibt es 5 Spielabschnitte. Im Folgenden finden Sie 
zwei Beispielaufgaben: 
  
− Aufgabe: Wie lautet die Landeshauptstadt von Saarland? 
Antwort: Saarbrücken 
 
− Aufgabe: Bitte addieren Sie die unten angegebenen fünf Zahlen und tragen Sie Ihr Er-
gebnis in die Ergebniszeile ein. 
26 16 86 05 41 
Antwort: 174 
 
Zunächst werden Sie die Aufgaben lösen. Anschließend werden Sie einen kurzen Filmaus-
schnitt zu sehen bekommen, der nicht länger als 5 Minuten dauert. Im Anschluss werden Sie 
Ihre Leistung einschätzen, indem Sie die beiden folgenden Fragen beantworten: 
 
− Wie viele von den 10 Aufgaben haben Sie korrekt gelöst? 
− Wie viele Aufgaben haben Sie im Vergleich zum Durchschnitt der anderen Teilneh-
mer korrekt gelöst? Wie viele mehr oder wie viele weniger? 
 
• Beispiel 1: Ich glaube, ich habe drei korrekte Lösungen weniger als der Durch-
schnitt der anderen Teilnehmer. Also geben Sie -3 ein. 
• Beispiel 2: Ich glaube, ich habe drei korrekte Lösungen mehr als der Durchschnitt 
der anderen Teilnehmer. Also geben Sie +3 ein. 
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Für die Selbsteinschätzung haben Sie 45 Sekunden Zeit. Nach jedem Spielabschnitt bekom-
men Sie ein Feedback über Ihre tatsächliche Leistung. 
 
Die Punktevergabe 
Für jede richtig gelöste Aufgabe erhalten Sie 2 Punkte. 
Für jede richtige Selbsteinschätzung erhalten Sie 8 Punkte. 
Insgesamt können Sie bis zu 180 Punkte erreichen. 
 
Die Auszahlung 
Sie erhalten eine Grundauszahlung von 2,50 Euro. Darüber hinaus erhalten Sie für jeden er-
reichten Punkt 0,15 Euro. Insgesamt können Sie bis zu 29,50 Euro verdienen. 
 
Hinweise 
Bitte verhalten Sie sich während des Experiments ruhig! 
Bitte schauen Sie Ihren Nachbarn nicht auf den Bildschirm! 
Es sind keine Hilfsmittel (Taschenrechner, Smartphones etc.) zugelassen. Alle elektronischen 
Geräte bleiben ausgeschaltet! 
Bitte beachten Sie die jeweiligen Zeitangaben oben rechts am Bildschirm. Wenn Sie inner-
halb dieser Zeit keine Eingabe machen, erhalten Sie keine Punkte für die jeweilige Aufgabe. 
Appendix C: Screenshot of the Experiment with Z-Tree (Reconstructed in Or-
der to Improve Readability) 
Screenshot 1: Measurement of Mood before the Experiment (Reconstructed in Order to 
Improve Readability) 
How are you feeling now? Please mark the adequate number! 
 






Figure A-1: Measurement of Mood before the Experiment 
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Screenshot 2: Manipulation Check after the Attempt to Influence Mood (Reconstructed in 
Order to Improve Readability) 
Which emotions did you experience while watching the movie clip?  
Please mark one number accordingly! 
 
very negative ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ ʘ very positive 








Figure A-2: Manipulation Check after the Attempt to Influence Mood 
 
